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Abstract
The aim of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness
of internal auditing in municipalities in Israel, as
perceived by different groups of users.
A model to evaluate effectiveness was developed, followed
by the preparation of a self-administered questionnaire
of the	 Likert	 type.	 After pilot
	 testing,	 the
questionnaire was despatched. The empirical study was
conducted on the majority of Israeli municipalities that
possess an internal auditing unit. The respondent groups
also included journalists at local newspapers who cover
the annual municipality internal auditing reports.
The returned questionnaires provided the data used in the
research analysis. After factor analysis, the model
emerged based on the following components: Independence,
Competence, Scope of work, Performance of the internal
auditing unit, and the Implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings.
The respondents were divided into
	 five groups:
(1) Staff of the municipality internal auditing unit
(2) Councillors - elected by the public
	 (3) Top
management (4) Middle level management (5) Journalists.
Meetings were also held with the mayors of various
municipalities to ascertain their opinions on the results
of the data analysis.
The research findings revealed major differences in the
evaluation of effectiveness between different groups of
users. In general, the research shows that the closer
the user stands to the internal auditing operation, the
higher the evaluation. The implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings was rated
by all the respondent groups as lower than the other
components.
Another result is that the internal auditing unit tends
to be perceived as less effective in smaller
municipalities; for this comparison, municipalities were
divided into three categories according to population
size.
The research has yielded various recommendations for
operational change in order to improve the effectiveness
of internal auditing in municipalities.
The model developed in this study can also serve to
evaluate the different aspects of effectiveness of
individual internal auditing units in individual
municipalities in Israel.
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PART ONE	 PURPOSE AND THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Chapter one
Purpose of the study
1.	 Purpose of the study
1.0.	 Introduction
Some fifty years ago, internal auditing was Seen as
covering primarily accounting and financial matters.
Today internal auditing is concerned with all the
different
	 facets	 of	 internal	 control	 of	 the
organisation. This process has transformed internal
auditing from being a minor player to the important
position it holds today in organisations. The Institute
of Internal Auditors Inc. (I.I.A.), founded in the USA
some fifty years ago, was very instrumental in bringing
about those changes. Since its founding, national
institutes within the I.I.A. have been created in many
different countries, Israel included.
The Israeli national institute for internal auditing was
established in 1960, with 61 members. Today there are
about 1,200 members, drawn from the public, business and
15
private sectors. The national institute organises
seminars, meetings and lectures for its members and also
prepares exams in Hebrew for the certificate of
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) on behalf of the I.I.A.
The national institute represents all those active in
internal auditing in Israel, whether in governmental,
public or any other bodies in Israel or abroad.
In 1959, the central government in Israel decided that
each ministry should have its own internal auditing
unit, and in 1964 common rules for all these units were
published (Friedberg 1995a:550-569).
Under these rules, the remit of the auditors for each
ministry was expected to include not only the specific
operations of that ministry but also such topics as
maintenance, manpower, and the implementation of
corrective action in response to the State Comptroller's
findings. Their audit had to be based on auditing
concepts such as economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
The internal auditors were expected to establish the
cause of any deficiencies found in their audit, and to
suggest ways to correct them and to prevent them in the
future. Reports of the auditors' findings were also to
be submitted to the heads of the ministerial units
concerned and to the general director of the ministry.
Most internal auditing related to budget and finance, in
the different ministries, was to be performed by a
special internal auditing team from the Ministry of
16
Finance, since those responsible for the budget in the
different ministries are employees of the Ministry of
Finance.
In 1986, the State Comptroller's report described the
internal auditing units in the central government as
weak and not very effective. This prompted the State
Audit Committee of the Knesset - the Israeli parliament
- to conduct meetings with the Israeli national
institute for internal auditing, the State Comptroller
and representatives of other related bodies, with a view
to new legislation to strengthen the internal auditors'
position (Friedberg 1995a:553, Mizrahi 1993:10).
New legislation on internal auditing was finally
approved by the Knesset in 1992. The law covers all
ministries in the central government, governmental
institutions and other institutions in whose management
the government is involved. The law also applies to
companies whose shares are traded on the stock market,
banks, insurance companies and institutions of higher
education. In all those organisations, an approved
internal auditor must head the internal auditing
operations.
The law requires the internal auditor to be an
individual, not a company. However, it does not dictate
whether the internal auditing service should be provided
by an internal unit or externally; that decision is left
to the organisation concerned.
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In the central government ministries, the law requires
the internal auditor to report to the minister, directly
or via the general director, as the government may
decide. In other public organisations, including quoted
companies, the internal auditor will report to the
chairperson of the board of directors or to the general
manager, as the board may decide. In banks, the
internal auditor will be appointed by the board,
following the recommendations of its audit committee.
The internal auditor will report to the chairperson of
the board, the general director and the chairperson of
the audit committee. In insurance companies and in
governmental companies, the internal auditors will be
appointed by the board, and will report to the
chairperson of the board and to the general manager.
The law did not alter anything regarding internal
auditing in municipalities, which was already covered by
the Municipality Ordinance. The Ordinance, which
established the legal framework of internal auditing in
municipalities, will be described in Chapter 2.
Mizrahi (1993:19) considered that the 1992 law adopted
the principle of dual contact with the internal auditor;
This principle enables the internal auditor to be in
direct and continuous contact with the management for
directives are needed in order to prepare the annual
plan. On the other hand, the fact that the internal
auditor also report's to the level beyond the executive,
18
be it the minister (in a governmental office) or the
chair of the board or the audit committee, strengthens
the internal auditor's independence and facilitates, if
necessary, the audit of the operations of the executive
itself.
A few years ago (in Friedberg 1995b:404-410), four
general managers of large companies in the public sector
in Israel were asked to draw a profile of their ideal
internal auditors. All of them agreed that the
directors of the internal auditing unit should: hold a
senior position; report directly to the general manager
of the organisation and enjoy the general manager's full
support; possess integrity, maturity and the ability to
analyse problems and set them in the right context;
handle all matters, including suspected fraud, with
great care, and assess objectively every part of the
operation to be audited. The general managers differed
as to whether the internal auditor should be appointed
from among the senior officers in the organisation or be
hired from outside. In favour of the former, some
thought it important that the internal auditor should be
already familiar with the goals and operations of the
organisation from the inside. Others recommended hiring
someone external to the organisation with fresh views
that could invigorate the organisation's internal
control.
19
According to Arieli (in Friedberg 1995b:419), the ideal
auditor is someone who has risen to a secure and
powerful position in the organisation: "Without power
and status, the internal auditor will not survive long;
who likes to be told the problems they are responsible
for and had to be corrected?!".
Professor Zamir, the former legal advisor to the
government of Israel, has stressed the growing
importance (in Friedberg 1995b:411-418) of internal
auditing in governmental bodies and also in public
companies in the business sector. The internal auditing
unit is charged with combating any deficiency in the
administration. In the civil service, the internal
auditor must be particularly vigilant in detecting
political nominations, which are by definition bad:
people are selected on the basis of political
affiliation, rather than any objective criterion such as
professional skills. The internal auditors are in a
delicate position when dealing with a situation for
which the minister, or the top management, is directly
responsible; they cannot lightly criticise those upon
whom their own position depends. Still, in Professor
Zamir's view, the internal auditors must confront the
problem as best they can, and do their utmost to have it
corrected.
It is important to mention that, as in most countries,
one of the biggest sectors in what is referred to as the
20
public administration, is the local government. As the
awareness and importance of the 'quality of life' grows,
the role and importance of local government is on the
rise, and its activities become more complex. In the
modern social welfare state, each citizen has different
contacts, on a daily basis, with the many services
provided by official offices. In Israel, a major part
of those contacts is connected to the local government,
which is responsible for such daily necessities as water
supply,	 sanitation,	 construction,	 roads,	 parks,
education and more.
The local authorities are a wide field of action for
political and financial forces having an impact both for
the present and the future way of life of large
populations. An effective audit function is very
important and instrumental for a good control of the
operations of the local authority.
There might be disagreements as to what should be the
right organisational structure of internal auditing
within the organisation, but no one today questions its
importance.
In the USA government (central or local), the audit
function is central to the process of governing (Wheat,
1991) and this seems to be the trend elsewhere too.
In Israel, as in England, the central government has
been demanding that local authorities reduce their
21
expenditure and have their budget balanced. On the
other hand, local authorities are concerned to provide
more services to their electors or at least maintain the
same level of services. While costs are on the rise,
income is not keeping up. 	 Central government is not
willing to fund local government as it used to, and
legislation limits local tax. The result of those
economic and political realities is that local
authorities have to do more with less. Therefore, the
local government has to use its resources with greater
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 	 The internal
auditing unit plays an essential role here.
Internal auditing in municipalities in Israel prompts
the following questions:
. Is it really doing what it is supposed to do?
•What is its effectiveness?
• How do we evaluate it?
• Who will evaluate it?
This study will present a model for the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel. This
model will make possible the evaluation of that
effectiveness. The importance of the research lies in
the fact that it indicates empirically how the different
parties concerned perceive that effectiveness. Analysis
of the results could identify the weak areas of internal
auditing in the Israeli municipalities.	 The more
22
effective the municipality internal auditing unit, the
greater its contribution to the municipality. Therefore
correcting weak areas should improve the effectiveness
of the municipality internal auditing unit and the
internal control as a whole.
In Israel,	 among the different types of local
authorities, internal auditing is required by law only
in municipalities.	 Hence, the study focuses on
municipalities. This is not to say that there is no
need for internal auditing in the other forms of local
authorities. On the contrary, the author hopes that the
experience of internal auditing in municipalities,
together with the results of this study in respect to
its effectiveness, will eventually lead to the
introduction of internal auditing in the other types of
local authority organisation.
As a matter of fact, Mr. H. Ramon, the Minister of the
Interior, announced in February 1996 his intention to
require all local and regional councils to appoint
internal auditors, like the municipality internal
auditors. This was approved by the State Audit
Committee of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in May
1996.
It should be noted that the large majority of the
population and of industry is under the jurisdiction of
municipalities.
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For the sake of consistency, the present study will
adopt:
a) The definitions of what is internal auditing and
what it stands for on the basis of the terminology
of the I.I.A. (see Appendix A).
b) The definitions of local government and other
related terms as they appear in the Webster
International Dictionary (see Appendix B).
1.1.	 Objectives of the research
(1)To present a model for evaluating the effectiveness
of internal auditing in municipalities in Israel.
(2)To test the model.
(3)To evaluate the effectiveness of internal auditing
in municipalities in Israel, on the basis of the
model.
(4)To find out whether there are differences of
perceived effectiveness between different groups.
(5)To recommend ways to improve the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel.
1.2.	 The need for the research
Many articles have appeared in periodicals on internal
auditing in local government. These include: Montondon &
Meixner (1992), Sharp & Bull (1992), Friedberg (1994),
24
just to mention a few. However, no study has been found
that evaluates the effectiveness of internal auditing
specifically in municipalities.
The municipality environment is distinctive.
Politicians, local residents who are the electors of
tomorrow and the main clients of today, civil servants
and others are all mingling together. This creates a
delicate situation where the internal auditing unit has
an important role to play. The check and balance system
in the Israeli municipality relies heavily on the
municipality internal auditor.
Beginning with the amendment of the Municipal Ordinance
in 1979, the municipality internal auditors were
supposed to enlarge their scope of work to include
scrutiny of the operations performed by the councillors
and the mayors. Whether or not they have the power to
do so is another matter. The fact is that mayors have
been charged with offences which were not detected by
municipality internal auditors.
The newspaper Ma'ariv (15/7/94: 7-12) reported in 1994
that "in the last eight years, six heads of local
authorities have been taken to court: four were
convicted, two were discharged. Others are still under
investigation." The main reasons were allegations of
involvement in preferring certain contractors in return
for personal or political favours.
25
Some of the mayors were subsequently exonerated.
Often, it appears that political motives are behind the
accusations. At all events, the process in the court of
justice takes a long time.
	 Even if at the end the
mayors are declared not guilty, their political careers
have often already come to an end. Therefore, the
Minister of Justice and others are discussing the
possibility of forming a new central police unit which
will specialise in the investigation of mayors (Globes
22/3/96:4-10). This unit would operate with great care
and discretion but would, where appropriate, recommend
to sue the mayor in court.
Huge amounts of public money are being dealt with in all
municipalities. The municipality owes it to its citizens
to safeguard or to make proper use of the money and
other resources or assets that are in its jurisdiction.
Hence, the need for internal auditing to be effective.
This	 study	 aims	 to	 evaluate	 empirically	 the
effectiveness of internal auditing within municipalities
in Israel. Results of the study may lead to
recommendations to strengthen any weak areas revealed in
the empirical survey.
	 Improving the effectiveness of
internal auditing in any organisation creates better
internal control. Improving the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel should
improve the operation of the municipalities.
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1.3.	 Methodology
The model of effectiveness of internal auditing in
municipalities in Israel, as presented in this study, is
based on the Standards issued by the I.I.A. see
Appendix C.
I.I.A. (Israel), the National Institute within I.I.A.,
is	 officially recognised by all
	 the	 relevant
institutions in Israel. Internal auditors in
municipalities do not have to be members of the I.I.A.
Still, as a member of the I.I.A. (Israel) Admission
Committee, the author can attest that most municipality
internal auditors and their staff do join.
The model is based on five attributes:
(1)independence
(2)competence	 (professional	 proficiency
	
in	 the
Standards - the change of term is explained in
section 2.3.2 (2))
(3)scope of work
(4)performance of audit work
(5)management of internal auditing department
The components and criteria of the model were assessed
and developed through meetings with representatives of
the different types of user of the municipality internal
auditing product in Israel. This was performed through
two stages. The first comprised meetings with a sample
27
of major users. The second, included a larger number of
respondents. The respondents were asked to give their
opinion whether or not the different components and
criteria suggested should be part of the model; at this
stage they were not asked actually to evaluate the
different criteria.
The empirical research was conducted through the use of
a survey questionnaire.	 The target population
represented the different groups of users of the
municipality internal auditing product. Before sending
the final questionnaire, the questionnaire was pilot
tested for validity and reliability, with a
representative sample of the targeted population.
In the survey itself, the respondents were asked, in the
questionnaire, to evaluate the effectiveness of internal
auditing in municipalities in Israel. They evaluated
the different criteria which, according to the model
presented in this study, are associated with that
effectiveness.
Statistical analysis was used to analyse the data
collected from the empirical survey.
The relatively high significance level of 5% has been
chosen in this study, though many of the results turned
out to be significant at 1% or even 0.1%.
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The users of the internal auditing in municipalities are
discussed further on in this study. They may be listed
as follows:
Within the municipality: 
• The mayor
• the council (including the audit committee)
• the different departments (including the internal
auditing unit).
• the general director
Outside the municipality: 
• The State Comptroller's Office (the department
auditing the Local Authorities)
• The Ministry of the Interior:
The external accountants assigned by the ministry to the
municipalities and the ministry's own small auditing
team.
• the public (represented by journalists covering
municipality affairs).
Regarding the departments within the municipalities, the
study chose departments representing a cross-section of
different types of departments existing in the
municipality:
• Technical - such as the engineering department
• Line - such as the education department
• Service - such as the Finance department
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Three levels of management took part in the research
process. These included, the head of the department,
who is an elected member of the council, the chief
officer of the department and a middle level officer.
The public, which forms an important group of users, was
represented in this study by journalists. The yearly
report of the municipality internal auditing unit is
made available to the public through the newspapers.
The public does not read the whole report, but will read
what the newspaper (mainly regional) publishes. The
author has contacted journalists covering the subject
and requested their participation in the research as
representatives of the public. Fan (1988) stresses that
media messages have great influence on the populace,
especially in open societies where trust in the press is
more likely. Israel is such an open society with a free
press.
Zeller (1992) points out that a single news story does
not have a great effect, but the cumulative effect of
many stories over a period of months or years may be
large. At least once every year when the municipality
internal auditing report is published, the local
newspapers discuss it and print out the main items.
This, one can infer, has a cumulative effect on the
local population. Therefore, it is fair to say that the
journalists are not only representatives in proxy for
the public, but active players in creating public
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opinion regarding the municipality internal auditing
product.
In addition to the questionnaires sent to the parties,
the municipality internal auditors were asked to provide
demographic information regarding their municipality's
internal auditing department.
1.4.	 Limitations of the research
1. A self administered questionnaire was the basis of
the data collected and then analysed in this
research. There is always a doubt in such tests
that the non-respondents are biased in some way and
therefore that the data collected may not represent
correctly the target population. This is especially
true in places like Israel where the response rate
is expected to be low because such tests are not in
very common use. Still, this method of collecting
the data was the only way to reach the target
population, which was composed of numerous people
scattered all over the country. Every possible
precaution was therefore taken to ensure that the
data collected are not biased and that the target
population is fairly represented.
In particular, it might be argued that those who
took the trouble to respond to the questionnaires
tended to be sympathetic to the municipality
internal auditing operation.
	 Since the rate of
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responses was particularly high among the internal
auditing respondents, this suggestion could be made
mainly about the other respondent groups. There is
of course no way to know whether there is any
systematic difference in opinion between those who
responded and those who did not; and very little has
been written in Israel on response rates by mail
questionnaire. As an added precaution, however, the
author consulted experts from the Central Bureau of
Statistics (a governmental agency), from Israeli
universities and from a leading public opinions and
research analyst company.
From these consultations, the author learned that
willingness on the part of respondents to take part
in such research is mainly determined by the
respondents' readiness to fill in questionnaires in
general, and by their interest in the topic of the
research.
It would have been useful if some research were
available on the reasons why people in Israel
respond, or fail to respond, to mail questionnaires.
As matters now stand, however, there is no reason to
believe that those sympathetic (in whatever sense)
to the subject of the questionnaire behave
differently from any other respondent group in their
readiness to respond.
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In any case, it is reasonable to expect that, in the
evaluation of each component of the effectiveness of
the municipality internal auditing operation, the
different respondent groups stood in more or less
the same order relatively to one another. It
follows that, even if people sympathetic to the
internal auditing operation were over-represented in
our sample, the only effect was to raise each mean
values somewhat above the levels that would have
been obtained had the whole population participated.
The general results of the research would still be
valid.
2. The author had intended to include in his research
other respondent groups outside the municipality
besides the journalists. Those other groups were
linked either to the State Comptroller or to the
Ministry of the Interior. Although top executives
of those groups did co-operate with the author at
different stages of the research, they were
unexpectedly prevented by legal formalities from
participating in the final test. It is to be hoped
that those institutions will, in the future, change
their policy so as to make available their
perception of the effectiveness of internal auditing
in municipalities in Israel.
3. This research has focused on municipalities since
these are the only types of local authority in which
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internal auditing is obligatory. In the second half
of 1996, the Ministry of the Interior passed a
proposal to require internal auditing in local
councils as well. The implementation of such a
aecision is a long process, and at present (in 1997)
this proposal is still in its initial stages.
4. Since this research has been performed in Israel, the
model adopted for evaluating the effectiveness of
internal auditing is appropriate primarily to Israeli
municipalities; it may need to be modified to take
account of future changes. However, there are some
general results which may find application elsewhere.
1.5.
	 Outline of the study
The study is divided into four parts.
Part one: Purpose and theoretical background of the
study. 
• Chapter one is an introduction to the study.
• Chapter two contains a review of relevant
literature. It is followed by the suggested model
and by the hypotheses the research aims to test.
Part two:
	 Survey design and methodology. 
• Chapter three explains the research methodology.
• Chapter four covers interviews that were held with
representatives of different groups of users of
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internal auditing in municipalities in Israel.
Those interviews were used to refine the suggested
model and, to a certain extent, the underlying
hypotheses.
• Chapter five is about questionnaire development,
sample selection and pilot testing.
• Chapter six describes and evaluates the respondents'
participation in the self administered mail
questionnaire and the data collected.
Part three: Empirical survey analysis. 
• Chapter seven presents the descriptive analysis on
the basis of the data collected.
• Chapter eight is about the factor analysis for the
questionnaire used in the empirical research.
• Chapter nine tests the research hypotheses in the
light of the data. It also looks for relationships
between variables in the questionnaire and the
components used in evaluating the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel.
Part four: Conclusion and recommendations 
• Chapter ten will summarise the study, describe the
conclusions and recommendations.
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Chapter two
Municipalities and internal auditing in Israel
2.0.Introduction
This chapter is divided as follows:
The first part describes the environment in which the
internal auditing operates in Israeli municipalities.
The term environment is used in a broad sense and
includes:
(1)Historical perspective - A review of modern local
government trends that have made the municipalities in
Israel what they are today.
(2)Organisational structure - Elected members, council,
committees and departments.
(3)Political aspects - Inside the municipality and the
relationship with the central government.
(4)Audit - Internal auditing and external auditing.
(5)Legal aspects - "Ultra vires" principle and the legal
basis for internal auditing.
The chapter will also analyse, from a theoretical point of
view, whether the internal auditing unit in the Israeli
municipality is perceived as having power. Then the model
suggested by the study will be presented, followed by the
hypotheses which the research sets out to test.
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2.1.	 Perspective on the environment of municipality
internal auditing
2.1.1.	 The Municipal Ordinance ("the Ordinance")
The modern development of local government started in this
region in the second half of the nineteenth century. In
1877, the Ottoman empire adopted the Municipal Act, which
required the election in every city of a council of six to
twelve members, elected for four year terms. Every two
years, half of the members were elected. The mayor was
appointed by the central government from amongst the
council members.
Only in 1934 did the British Mandate (which lasted from
1917 to 1948), replace the Ottoman legislation with its
own Municipal Ordinance. The Ordinance itself was, as
Gurion (1957:183) mentions, influenced by the municipal
British legislation.	 Few amendments were made in the
Ordinance during the Mandate.
Since the independence of Israel in 1948, the Ordinance
has been amended more than fifty times.
Being a piece of "main" legislation, this Ordinance, which
has never been replaced, may be amended only by the
Knesset. The original Ordinance empowered the High
Commissioner to install a municipality, if it was the
population's wish and on recommendation of 	 an
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investigation committee.
	
This power was, after 1948,
transferred to the Minister of the Interior.
Local authorities are empowered to act within the
limitations of the "Ultra Vires" or "outside their power"
principle. They may formulate subsidiary legislation,
which must be approved by the Minister of the Interior
and, if necessary, by the minister in charge of the
specific subject as well.
2.1.2.	 Development of the local authorities in
Israel
After gaining independence, the new Israeli government
initiated new local authorities. It wished to strengthen
the local government institutions. But, as Elazar
(1987:11) points out, matters did not turn out as
foreseen.
The opposition parties in the Knesset lost control of most
of the local authorities that were under their control
before independence. Instead, new coalitions were formed
under the leadership of the Labour Party ("M.APAI"), which
was also leading the central government, and the Workers'
Union ("HISTADRUT").
As waves of new immigrants arrived in Israel (1948-53),
the apparatus in the political parties gained strength.
The political parties started playing the role of broker
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between the State and the local authorities, since they
were forming similar coalitions in both.
In the mid-fifties, local government reached its lowest
point in the political scene. The new immigrants were not
yet seen as mature enough to participate in local
government. The governing positions in those new
municipalities were taken by outside representatives of
the parties till "an adequate local leadership" would
emerge.
In the late fifties, the situation started to change and a
certain co-operation started between the central and local
governments. The State took the responsibility for
initiating new programs and formulating policies and
budgets, while the actual operation of the services was
more and more transferred to the local government. Such
was the case with social welfare and education.
The significance of that co-operation lay, as Elazar
(1987:12) stresses, in the necessity of the local
government to form a cadre with administrative skills
capable of supplying the required services.
The result, in the present author's opinion, was that the
new local authority political leadership, aware of its
electorate power, came to demand an increasing share of
the national political power. The effect can be seen
today in the high number of current or former heads of
local authorities that are members in the Knesset.
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2.1.3.	 Services provided by municipalities in
Israel
The services provided by the municipalities in Israel
encompass:
• Personal social services
• Education and related services (libraries, museums,
arts and crafts)
• Housing and town development
• Town and country planning (local plans, development
controls, parks, roads in urban areas)
• Environment services (local sewers, waste management,
street cleaning)
• Recreation and tourism
• Religious services
Services requiring a statutory authority over areas wider
than one local authority are run by joint authorities.
Such is the case for fire fighting services or sewage.
The police in Israel is not part of the local authority.
It operates as a national body under the central
government.
The role that the local authority plays in social life
enhances its importance in Israel. Local authorities need
funds to maintain such services. Since they are limited
in their tax-raising powers, their representatives have to
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seek a financial contribution from the central government.
As a result, according to Elazar (1987:16), those
representatives spend nearly as much time in meetings with
the central government as they spend in managing their
local authority's affairs. Since the general trend is
that the central government is transferring less and less
funds, many local authorities find themselves in a
deficit. On the one hand, the services are costly; on the
other, the elected body will not volunteer to cut them
back because they have an eye to re-election and most
politicians do not plan beyond the voting date.
2.1.4.	 Local government — central government
relationship
As Reuveni in Elazar (1987:167) points out, the balance of
power between local and the central government varies from
one local authority to another, depending on their size,
their location and their economic and political
specifications. In the financial area, the local
authority's own sources of income and its ability to
obtain public funding are very important.
	
In the
political arena, there is great importance in: a) the
level of the local authority's integration in national
politics. b) the use of political leverage due to its
electorate's importance on the national scene.
	 c) the
level of the local residents' involvement in public life.
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Following a governmental decision of December 1976, a
Committee for Local Government Affairs was appointed.
This Committee, named after its chairman, Mr. Zanbar, gave
its final report in June 1981. The general trend of the
Zanbar Committee report was its recommendation to diminish
the control of the central government over local
government. The present author's impression is that so
far not much has been achieved in that direction. In some
cases, the opposite is occurring. As an example, the
Ministry of the Interior decides by what percentage local
taxes are raised. Even municipalities that do not want to
raise their local taxes that high must obtain the approval
of the Ministry of the Interior.
This may change. In Globes (29/7/96), the new Minister of
the Interior, Mr. Swissa, declared his intention to
allocate more power to local authorities. This meant, as
he explained, more freedom in their finances, including
the raising of local taxes. In fact, as reported in
Globes (18/11/96), the Knesset rejected the central
government proposition of the previous week, to enable the
local government to raise the municipal tax by up to 10%
above inflation (about 11% in 1996).	 Instead a maximum
increase of up to 5% above inflation was approved.
The reluctance of central government to increase local
government's share of power is understandable. In the
past, many heads of local authorities authorised certain
operations without asking the approval of the central
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government, even though legally - as Weiss (1972:84)
mentions - it was not in their power to do so. In many
local authorities, for example, local taxes collected did
not comply with the legal restrictions nor were tenders
always performed where needed (Gilon (1966:207). More
recently, the State Comptrollers' reports covering local
authorities (1992 and 1995) confirmed those findings.
Because of those related discrepancies and others, the
central government is tightening its control on local
authorities. This is mainly done by the Ministry of
Finance controlling the budget.
For example, the Municipality of Tel Aviv was paying, in
1993, high salaries in the form of special contracts to
some of its top executives. The Ministry of Finance
ordered the municipality to stop those salaries, described
as far above the norm. Instead, the municipality was
requested to restrict the salaries to the levels approved
by the ministry. The executives in question were asked to
pay back the difference to the municipality.
Another example of a perceived abuse of power is that
regardless of their own financial situation, local
authorities were giving reductions in municipal taxes to
different groups of the population. As a result, the
central government restricted the freedom of the local
authorities to give reductions. New criteria for
reductions were fixed for all local authorities in Israel.
The new criteria fixed the maximum permissible reduction.
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The State Comptroller, Mrs. Ben Porat (1993), stated that
the deficiencies in local authorities' conduct were found
across the whole political spectrum.
Kapach (1994) confirms the impression that something is
wrong with the system. He explains that problems are
inevitable in the different services where the local
authorities act as the agent of central government (Health
services, Education, Social work and Religious services).
There ought to be a clear definition of what the local
authority is allowed to spend; instead, at present, the
expenditure is made and the local authority expects a full
refund. This leads to deficit situations, when the refund
is late or only partial. The present author would add
that this situation is counterproductive to an effective
control of the budget on an ongoing basis.
2.1.5.
	 Direct election of mayors
During the British Mandate, the High Commissioner
appointed the mayor from amongst the council members that
had been elected. The High Commissioner could dismiss the
mayor on the basis that he considered this to be in the
interest of the city.
From 1949, the city council chose the mayor and the
mayor's deputies. Since 1975, following changes in the
law, the mayor has been directly elected by the electors.
Elections in local authorities are held every five years
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for both the council members and the mayor at the same
time in the same ballot box.
Electors, men and women, must be over eighteen and reside
in the local authority's jurisdiction. A candidate has to
be over twenty-one to be elected to the council. Besides
directly voting for the mayor, the elector will vote for a
party, which in effect means voting for its list of
candidates. There is no obligation to vote and the
elector also has the right to insert a blank sheet for
abstention in either election or both.
For historical reasons, the heads of the local authorities
must be at the top of the candidate list of any party
taking part in the elections. They must hold ' Israeli
citizenship. Because of the voting system, it may happen
that a candidate who is head of the local authority is
elected, while the candidate's party does not have a
majority in the council. That makes the task of the head
of the local authority nearly impossible, unless the
candidate manages to form a coalition with other parties
upon which the candidate will greatly depend.
Kapach (1994) mentioned that from a control point of view,
the best situation is when the council is composed of a
majority representing the coalition and a minority
representing the opposition. The two other possibilities
are unsatisfactory situations:
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(1)When all the members of the council belong to the
coalition so that there is no opposition.
(2)When the party in opposition to the mayor holds the
majority of the seats and is able, for political
reasons, to paralyse the municipality.
Each mayor is entitled to appoint one deputy to serve as
substitute during the mayor's absence. In addition, there
are two or three other deputies per municipality: three
are permitted only when the population of the city is
above 250,000. Among the councillors, only mayors and
their deputies receive a salary from the municipality.
The principle is that the municipality operates through
the mayors. It is their duty to ensure that all the tasks
for which the municipality is responsible are properly
performed. Thus, the mayor is at the same time the
political leader of the council and the top executive in
the municipality.
In 1987, another amendment to the Ordinance recommended
that municipalities with more that twenty seven council
members should elect among themselves a chairperson apart
from the mayor. This recommendation, however has not
generally been put into practice.
It is noteworthy that, following the model of direct
elections for mayors, which greatly strengthens the
standing of the mayor, a similar law was passed by the
Knesset for the direct election of the prime minister in
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the central government. This law was implemented for the
first time in the general elections of May 1996. _Again,
following the experiences of the mayors, some members of
the Knesset, from both the coalition and the opposition,
had reservations because they felt that it could
strengthen the prime minister's position excessively.
2.1.6.	 The mayor — council relationship
The concept is that the mayor is the "operator" while the
task of the council is to make policy.
Mayors may delegate some of their own power to their
deputies, to the executives and to the municipality's
employees. In fact, in order to be able to operate in
conjunction with the council, the mayors very often need
to form a coalition of different parties. The mayors will
then delegate some of their own power to their deputies as
part of a political deal. The national parties play an
important role in local government and it is very rare to
find a local party and not a national party holding power
in a local authority.
This does not imply that the party in power in central
government will also dominate local government. Looking
at the situation before May 1996, the coalition in the
central government was headed by the Labour party while
two of Israel's biggest cities, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem,
had coalitions headed by Likud party members. At that
time the Likud was in the opposition to the central
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government. This did not prevent Labour and Likud
representatives from continuing to form a ruling coalition
in some municipalities, the best example being in Tel
Aviv.
The mayor submits an annual report in writing to the
council every April and copies are made available to the
public at the municipality office. The mayor must also
present the councillors with quarterly reports, regarding
the financial situation and the activities of the
municipality.
The annual municipality budget, prepared by the mayor, is
submitted to the council for discussion, in order to
formulate a policy for the following year.
The municipality internal auditors in turn have to present
the mayor and the audit committee with an annual report of
their audits. Within three months, the mayors have to
submit their comments on that report to the audit
committee and to all the members of the council. Within
the next two months, the audit committees are supposed to
submit their conclusions and recommendations to the
council. The annual reports are published and are given
general coverage by the newspapers, mainly the local
press.
In addition, municipality internal auditors are entitled
to present the mayor and the audit committee with an audit
report whenever they think it necessary.
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2.1.7.	 Committees in the local authority in Israel
2.1.7.1.	 Compulsory Committees
(The members are generally council
members only)
(1)The Management Committee - It is compulsory for the
local council, but whether such a committee is needed
in the municipality is for the council of each
municipality to decide. If the council sets up a
committee, its members will include the mayor, the
mayor's deputies and other council members as decided
by the council.
(2)The Audit Committee - The task of this committee is to
discuss the external audit reports, mainly that of the
State Comptroller (when there is a report related to
the municipality) and the municipality internal
auditor's report.
In a famous verdict, the court (High Court Justice
531/79) forbade the participation of any member of the
management committee in the audit committee of the
municipality, since — it declared — there was a
conflict of interest between those two tasks. The
court held that it was not possible for the auditors
to audit themselves. The law had previously debarred
only the mayors and their deputies from being members
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of the audit committee; and the court created a
further limitation.
The number of members in this committee is limited to
seven. Its members will represent, as far as
possible, the different political components of the
council.
The head of the audit committee must be from a
different party than the mayor's, and traditionally
this position is offered to a member of the
opposition.
The members, more often than not, lack any appropriate
professional background. They are representatives of
political parties, both from the coalition leading the
municipality and from the opposition. In either case,
political affiliation may interfere with the
objectivity of the individual in the audit committee
and may therefore impair the operation of the audit
committee as a whole.	 This situation weakens the•
audit	 committee	 and	 indirectly	 affects	 the
municipality internal auditing unit.
It is worth pointing out that the Treadway Commission
(COSO, 1992) recommended that all public companies be
required to establish audit committees composed solely
of independent directors, who are professional and
objective.
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In the context of USA local government, Sharp and Bull
(1992) recommended that in municipalities the
chairperson and the majority of the audit committee -
which they preferred to call the "information
oversight" committee - be composed of people who are
outside of city government. Those outside members
should have the competence and bring with them the
objectivity, without any political agenda, needed for
the committee.
Sharp and Bull's recommendation, which does not
exclude councillors from the audit committee, seems
equally applicable to audit committees in Israeli
municipalities.
(3)The	 Tender	 Committee	 Compulsory	 in both
municipalities and local councils.
(4)The Finance Committee - This committee is compulsory
in municipalities but not in local councils.
The present author agrees with Shafat (1992:39), that
in municipalities the finance committee, being
compulsory, tends to be granted "de facto" all the
tasks that would otherwise have fallen on a
management committee. That may be the reason why the
management committee is not obligatory in
municipalities.
(5)The Security and Special Emergency Committee
Compulsory in both municipalities and local councils.
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In this committee, there is an obligation to include
not only the council members, but also representatives
of the Ministries of Defence, Police and Education and
other members, as the council itself may decide.
(6)The Agriculture Committee This committee is
compulsory in municipalities having a population of
less than 100,000, subject to certain criteria
(minimum number of farmers among the population,
minimum agricultural area).
2.1.7.2.	 Non-compulsory committees
These are not limited as long as at least one fourth of
the members are council members (representing adequately
the political components of the council). A common
example is the Education Committee.
2.1.7.3.
	
General rules for all committees
Committees are in power as long as the local authority
council is in power. Committees are sovereign to form
sub-committees.
	
Committees will fix their own work
procedures. The head of a committee has to call for a
committee meeting if a third of its members or the council
or the mayor requests it.
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Committees
Council
Mayor
Spokesperson General
Director
Legal
Adviser
Environment
Services
Welfare
Services
Education
	
Treasurer,
Finance
Administration
Compulsory
_J Finance
Audit
_ITender
H
Security and Special
,Agriculture
HManagement
Non-compulsory —j Education
Municipality
internal auditor
Personnel,* Kindergarden,* Incomes,* Sanitation,* Social
Secretariat, Elementary Tax Parks and Services,*
Security schools,
Junior
Schools,
Youth,
Sport
Collection,
Accountancy,
Computer
center
Landscape Health
services
*The internal subdivision is not shown in this diagram
The author designed this diagram on the basis of different reported oral and written
information from official sources in Israeli municipalities.
Figure 2.1 Example of a typical Israeli municipality
internal organisational structure
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2.1.8.	 Statutory positions in municipalities
There are some statutory positions in municipalities: the
municipality secretary (in other words, the town clerk),
the treasurer (who is the chief financial officer), the
engineer, the sanitary supervisor, the medical and
veterinarian officers, the internal auditor and the legal
advisor. The literal translation from Hebrew of the
municipality internal auditor is "the municipality
auditor", but this study will use the term "municipality
internal auditor".
All the holders of these statutory positions must be
appointed with the approval of the council. Other
positions do not need the council's approval. The
appointment of a general director of the municipality,
which started first some twenty years ago in Jerusalem,
has gained popularity in other municipalities as well. In
many ways, this position is a new version of the
municipality secretary. Since they do not need the
approval of the council, the heads of the local
authorities can appoint whoever they wish to this
position, in addition to the municipality secretary. This
is possible even when the head of the local authority is
not supported by the majority of the council.
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2.1.9.	 Internal auditing in municipalities
In the late sixties, it was suggested in the Knesset that
municipalities should appoint internal auditors. The
idea, according to Shafat (1992:91), was that they would
audit the activities of the whole municipality
administration, as well as the elected members of the
council. They would report to the audit committee only.
In the amendment approved by the Knesset in 1971, the
concept was different: the internal auditors of the
municipality were seen as "the eyes and ears" of the
mayor. As such, they could fulfil their job by following
the mayor's directives.	 They could not audit the
activities of the mayor or of the other elected members.
Nevertheless, they were asked to present their annual
reports to all the members of the council. The amendment
declared that there should be a municipality internal
auditor in every city with a population of at least
30,000. Even if its population was smaller, the city
could be asked to appoint one by the Minister of the
Interior. Later on, in another amendment to the
Ordinance, approved by the Knesset on 7.2.90, every city
council was requested to appoint a full time internal
auditor. However, if the population was less that 30,000,
the Minister of the Interior could approve a part-time
(not less than half time) internal auditor, as long as the
appointee's additional job was as an internal auditor in
another municipality.
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The present author believes that the reason that part-time
municipality internal auditors were not allowed to hold
any additional post other than as a part-time auditor in
another municipality, was to avoid any conflict of
interest between the holder's jobs. However, the
requirement is more restrictive than was necessary to
achieve that aim. In the present author's opinion, it
would have been enough to require the municipality
internal auditor not to hold any other job that may create
a position of conflict of interest. However, the whole
problem no longer arises. Following another amendment in
1995, no municipality is allowed to have less than a
full-time municipality internal auditor.
In meetings with the Knesset, held before the amendment of
7.2.90, the I.I.A. (Israel) — including representatives of
the municipality internal auditors — hoped that the
subject of the budget would also be included. They
requested a law to ensure that the budget of the
municipality internal auditing unit would not be lower
than 0.5% of the total regular budget of the municipality.
This request was not granted. There are as yet no
directives for the municipality regarding the budget of
the internal auditing unit or the size of its staff. An
article in Haaretz (26/12/90) recommended in that context,
without entering into details, the idea of setting up
criteria to fix the size of the municipality internal
auditing unit's budget and staff. The present author
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agrees with this recommendation, which can help the
municipality internal auditing unit in fulfilling its
task. Proposed criteria should take into account
different variables such as:
(1)The municipality budget
(2)The municipality staff size
(3)Population
(4)Municipality jurisdiction area
(5)The different activities in which the municipality is
involved.
According to Amrani (1996:30), the Ministry of the
Interior intends to publish criteria upon which the size
of the municipality internal auditing staff will be
decided.
Friedberg (1994) - has compared local authorities in the
USA in respect of population, annual budget, annual
internal auditing budget, percentage of internal auditing
budget as part of the total budget, and the members of
professional and administrative personnel of the internal
auditing unit. He concludes that in the USA also, local
authorities do not have criteria for fixing the budget and
personnel numbers needed to perform the jobs of internal
auditing. The present author wonders whether this is
because of genuine difficulty in deciding on the criteria
or whether there is a desire to limit the power of the
internal auditing unit, out of apprehension on its
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potential criticism of government. Without adequate
budget and personnel, even the most independent internal
auditors will not be able to perform their jobs properly.
From 1979 onward, the amendment made it clear that the
municipality internal auditing unit is entitled to check
"the operations of the municipality and the operations of
the municipality's employees". Previously, the
municipality internal auditing unit could check only the
activities of the municipality's employees. The use of
both terms in the amendment ensured that the municipality
internal auditing unit could audit all the activities of
both the employees and the elected members of the
municipality. According to Rozevitch (in Interior
(1989:210)), the rise in the status of the directly
elected mayor was the impetus for strengthening the
position of the municipality internal auditor and for
making the audit committee compulsory.
Quoted in Haaretz (29.12.93:11), the former chairperson of
the audit committee in the municipality of Tel-Aviv states
that the directly elected mayor has absolute power. Such
power neutralises the council. In contrast to small local
authorities with very small budgets, big municipalities
have a high concentration of business and income, and thus
can spend more in development. The former chairman of the
audit committee claims that the mayors can do whatever
they like. He explains that the mayors can compensate
different officials in different ways:
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a) the councillors, members of the coalition 	 by
delegating power. (In addition, if necessary, the
mayor can also reach an ad-hoc agreement with members
of the opposition by contributing to projects they
support, in return for their backing the mayor on
certain resolutions.)
b) the top executives in the municipality - by improving
their benefits.
That creates a dependency on the mayors.
In the same article the mayor of Tel-Aviv answers this
criticism. He agrees that the mayor is the dominant
person in the municipality but he considers that that is
exactly what the job entails. The mayor is in charge of
Tel-Aviv and will be judged by the electors according to
the results.
The supreme court, when requested, does not hesitate to
intervene in implementing the law regarding the
municipality internal auditor and the audit committee. At
the end of September 1994, it commanded the mayor of
Affula to explain why a municipality internal auditor was
not being appointed in the municipality. The mayor was
also requested to explain why the appointment of a
councillor from the coalition as chairperson of the audit
committee was not annulled. The appeal to the court was
made by councillors of the opposition in the municipality
of Affula.
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By law, the municipality internal auditors prepare their
work plan, taking the following points into consideration,
in this order: their judgement, the mayor's request to
check certain subjects and, as far as possible, the audit
committee's recommendations. The municipality internal
auditors will decide, using their own judgement, how to
perform the audit. They can audit any subject. Any
document they need, either from the mayor, the mayor's
deputies, the councillors or the municipality employees,
must be provided at their request. The same goes for any
other information they need.
2.1.10.	 Other auditors
2.1.10.1.
	 The State Comptroller's Office
By contrast with England, the State Comptroller's scope of
work includes not only the central government, but also
the local government. There is a special department in
the State Comptroller's Office in charge of performing
that audit. The scope of this department includes the
auditing of many local authority bodies. However, there
is only a limited number of personnel to fulfil the job.
Therefore, the audit of local authorities is performed at
a low frequency and cannot replace the municipality
internal auditing unit. When the State Comptroller audits
a certain municipality, it may assess the internal
auditing unit and make use of that unit's reports.
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Friedberg (1988:45) noted that in order to solve the
manpower problem, the State Comptroller had moved to
tackle horizontal assignments. The State Comptroller
would check out a certain subject in many different
authorities. From a personal communication (1994), the
present author was informed that comparisons between
different authorities from those horizontal assignments
were not conclusive. Therefore the State Comptroller is
still continuing to audit individual local authorities
fully. In the State Comptroller's report on local
authorities of 1995, which covered about three years,
there were not only three horizontal assignments, but also
ten reports on individual local authorities. A similar
pattern appears in the State Comptroller's report on local
authorities of 1996, where there are, in addition to
horizontal assignments, eight reports connected to
individual local authorities.
Employees in public administration have requested
protection against losing their jobs when warning against
irregularities, or in other words whistle-blowing. This
may happen to anyone, but due to the nature of their job,
internal auditors will find themselves particularly often
in such situations: the municipality internal auditor
included (Haaretz 12/1/89:12).
The State Comptroller was active some three years ago, in
her other capacity as the State's Ombudsman, in the
passing of an amendment protecting any person reporting on
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irregularities in the administration. According to the
amendment, such persons if dismissed would have to be
reinstated. Regarding the municipality internal auditors,
the problem is that in such cases, they could not expect,
upon reinstatement, to have the co-operation they need.
This is true for any internal auditor, but more so for
municipality internal auditors. The latter are the only
internal auditors who publish their reports to the public.
As such, they must, by law, report their findings, some of
which may be very sensitive. Their reports may be used by
political forces against the present elected body.
Therefore, the right to reinstatement is not a real
solution to the problem.
	 The solution must be found
elsewhere.
The dilemma is between having:
a) Internal auditors who, by definition, report to a
superior at a high level of the body they audit.
These superiors in fact decide on the internal
auditors' promotion and position. Therefore, it is
doubtful whether the internal auditors will be eager
to start an audit related to the very people who
decide their future.
b) Auditors appointed by an external body, who will not
be genuine internal auditors.
Later on in the study, following the empirical research,
some recommendations will be suggested on that topic.
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2.1.10.2.	 The Ministry of the Interior auditors
The Ministry of the Interior has its own small auditing
unit (half a dozen auditors) which audits local
authorities.
In 1994, with a new director in charge of the unit, there
was a change in policy. The unit, instead of mainly
receiving reports, put more emphasis on performing its own
audits in different local authorities. In 1994, as
reported by Amrani (1995), it performed 25 audits: 9 in
municipalities, 11 in local councils, 3 in regional
councils and 2 in joint authorities for fire fighting. The
council on which the report is made has to discuss it. In
fact, members of the opposition will find ways to quote
from it in the local newspapers for political reasons.
This, according to Amrani (ibid.), creates additional
pressure to correct any deficiencies discovered.
According to the amended Ordinance, the local authority's
chief financial officer has to submit the local
authority's financial report to the municipalities'
accountant, appointed by the Minister of the Interior. As
of January 1996, the function of municipalities'
accountant is discharged by the director of the department
which audits local authorities in the Ministry of the
Interior. The auditing unit and the municipalities'
accountant generate rules and procedures for the financial
control and supervision of the local authorities'
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operations. These include auditing the annual financial
reports and analysing the financial results.
The local authorities are asked to submit their financial
reports five months after the end of the financial year.
Until 1994, it was not compulsory for these reports to
have been audited by certified public accountants. Every
year, the Ministry of the Interior would hire the services
of private CPA firms to verify the financial reports
submitted and to prepare audited financial reports for
some of the local authorities. 	 In 1990, the ministry
appointed	 some	 seventy accountants'	 offices	 for
eighty-five local authorities (Education and culture
(1991:284)). From 1994 onwards, however, all local
authorities are being audited by external CPA firms. A
proposition has been submitted to amend the law so that
local authorities, rather than the Ministry of the
Interior, can hire their own external CPA firm (Globes
30/10/96).
2.1.11.
	 The municipality internal auditor's reports
and the media
The role of the municipality internal auditor was very
much modelled on that of the State Comptroller. Still, it
is important to bear in mind that the State Comptroller
performs an external audit, while the municipal internal
auditor performs an internal audit. Moreover, the State
Comptroller is appointed by the Knesset while the
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municipality internal auditor is appointed by the council.
In the Knesset, the head of the State Audit Committee is
from the opposition and membership of the committee is
confined to Knesset members only. In the council, the
structure is analogous, with the audit committee composed
of council members only. One other common feature, is
that the municipality internal auditor, like the State
Comptroller, submits an annual report which is open to the
public and covered by the media. There are many important
differences as well. However, it is not the intention
here to present a full comparison.
According to Sharkansky (1987) all that the auditors can
do is to produce and publish the report, since they do not
hold any operational authority. Here the remark by
Richards (1983:178) is apposite, that publicity has a
stronger impact in the local context than on the central
government administration. However, even for those who
see publicity as the audit's ultimate weapon, one has to
remember that the news of today is history of tomorrow.
There are close relations between big business
contractors, the mayor and the councillors. This is
natural, given that the mayor and councillors wish to
develop the city and attract investors. On the other
hand, this situation is quite delicate and could lead to
"special arrangements" between contractors and certain
persons who have a say in the municipality.
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In recent years, as stated earlier, there were many cases
of heads of local authorities being brought to court to
face corruption charges. One recent case concerned the
former mayor of Ramat Gan. This mayor was found guilty by
the court of having accepted a so-called donation. That
money was, in fact, intended to fuel a public relations
campaign for himself. In return, the mayor was expected to
present a positive view in the municipality regarding the
donor's request (Globes 2/9/94).
An article in Globes (26/8/94) called for a strengthening
of the municipality internal auditors' position. The idea
was to make them more independent. The suggestion was to
form a group of municipality internal auditors in the
State Comptroller's Office, that would be assigned by the
State Comptroller to the municipalities. The idea may
have some merit, but it is doubtful whether, in the
municipality, the audit will be seen as an internal audit
any more. The auditors will instead be seen as the
representatives of the State Comptroller rather than as
integral parts of the municipality organisation. This idea
will be discussed later, on the basis of the results of
the empirical research.
The media has an ambivalent relationship with the
municipality internal auditors: On the one hand, it is
very sympathetic to their delicate situation in the
municipality and presents the public with the main
findings in their report.
	 On the other hand, it
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criticises the inability of the municipality internal
auditors to enforce the implementation of changes. As
stated in Haaretz (31.12.90:9), based on the chapter
dealing with follow-up in the annual internal audit
report, most recommendations of previous reports had not
been implemented. More recently in the Tel Aviv Journal
(27.6.97:22), the same criticism was made concerning the
annual Tel Aviv internal auditing report.
2.2.	 Power of the municipality internal auditing unit
theoretical analysis
2.2.1.	 Introduction
The trend today is for the director of the internal
auditing unit to report to the highest levels in the
organisation, such as the chairperson of the board, audit
committee, or chief executive officer (Reinstein &
Gabhart:1987; O'Shaughnessy: 1990; and others). In
Israel, in paragraph 5 of the Internal Auditing Act of
16.3.92 regarding various public bodies, it is provided
that the director of the internal auditing unit in a
central government ministry will report either to the
minister or to the general director of the ministry. In
public sector companies, usually the director of internal
auditing reports to the chairperson of the board.
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Turning specifically to local authorities, the position of
the internal auditing unit in the organisational structure
of the municipality differs from one country to another.
In the USA there is no one model of organisational
structure for internal auditing in municipalities. The
whole spectrum exists from the internal auditing unit
being part of the financial department to being an
independent unit (Friedberg 94).
In England, the internal auditing unit is part of the
finance department, and the head of internal auditing
reports to the chief financial officer.
In Israel it is an independent unit and the head of
internal auditing, the municipality internal auditor,
reports to the mayor and to the audit committee.
Since the present study invited the participation of
respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of municipality
internal auditing, it is important to introduce the
concept of perception.
Another important concept is power, or more specifically,
power in organisations. Though internal auditing, as a
control, must lie outside the routine operations in the
organisation, the question remains whether it exerts power
over other units inside the municipality. The question is
particularly relevant in Israel, since the internal
auditing unit is an independent unit that is supposed to
operate at all levels of the municipality.	 The
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municipality internal auditor thus enjoys high status; but
this need not imply the power to enforce changes, directly
or indirectly, when deficiencies are found.
2.2.2.	 Perception
People respond to what they perceive. These perceptions
may vary from one observer to another.
As Coxon & Jones (1978:1-2) report, empirically oriented
sociologists have found that the perception of occupations
is statistically related to a host of other
characteristics, such as formal educational qualifications
or socio-economical background. The term "perception" as
applied to occupations does not refer solely to perceptual
processes that occur when an individual is confronted with
relevant stimuli. Rather, it also refers to the complex
of beliefs and assumptions which exist in the individual's
memory.
According to Trope (1986), human perception has two major
components: Behavioural identification (what is the actor
doing?) and attributional inference (why is the actor
doing it?). The first of these processes involves
categorising an action — in the context of this study, it
would mean naming the type of work the internal auditing
unit is doing. The second process involves causal
reasoning about the categorised act — in the context of
this study, it would mean allocating the work to the area
of internal auditing.
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Users make decisions about products and services based on
their perceptions of them. The entity making the
decisions may even be the "self" creating the products and
services.	 The "self" in this study is the internal
auditing unit.
Wright & Bargranoff (1995) have examined the gap that may
exist between internal and external auditors regarding the
image each group has of internal auditors. The external
auditors are users who make decisions about how and when
to use the services of internal auditors in conducting the
financial audit. The population used by Wright and
Bargranoff for their research comprised the members of the
Central Virginia and Washington, DC chapters of the
Institute of Internal Auditors and the Richmond and
Washington, DC chapters of CPAs. It was found that the
internal auditor's self image is significantly higher than
the external auditor's user image. Wright and Bargranoff
concluded that "image problems and communications may
impede the efficiency and effectiveness of financial
statement audits and should be addressed by both groups."
In the present study, different groups of users and
municipality internal auditing staff were approached, in
order to identify each group's perception of the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities.
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2.2.3.	 Power in organisations and internal auditing
in municipalities
The president of Israel has the highest status in the
State, but not much power. The president is mainly
expected to represent the State on formal occasions. For
that, not much power is needed.
The municipality internal auditors are among the highest
ranking officials of the municipality. They are in charge
of an independent unit, which has a certain job to fulfil.
Yet, as the chapter regarding follow-up in the internal
auditors' report shows again and again, many of the same
deficiencies detected were not corrected. This is
stressed by the media, covering the annual reports
presented by the municipality internal auditors. The
explanation given by observers is that the internal
auditing unit has "no teeth", i.e. no power. Does this
show that the internal auditing unit in municipalities
needs greater power, direct or indirect? Indeed, does the
internal auditing unit need power at all in order to
perform its job?
In England, the municipality internal auditing unit is
part of the finance department. 	 The heads of internal
auditing report to the chief financial officers. The
status of the heads of internal auditing, in comparison to
their Israeli counterparts, is lower; but they may have
the power that will make the English auditees correct the
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deficiencies pointed out to them by the internal auditing
unit.
Hall (1972:204-242) has summarised, in the section
dedicated to the nature of power in organisations, the
essence of what has appeared in many treatises on the
subject. He points out that most treatments of the
concept of power in organisations are in general agreement
that power has to do with relationships between two or
more actors, in which the behaviour of one is affected by
the other. Hall (ibid.) quotes the political scientist
Robert Dahl who defines power as follows: "A has power
over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B
would not otherwise do." Therefore, a person or group
cannot have power in isolation; it has to be in
relationship to some other person or collectivity. The
present author believes that the ideal final report of an
internal auditor is a report written at the end of an
audit in which deficiencies, have not only been found and
pointed out, but actually corrected by the department in
charge before the completion of the audit. This would
seem to mean that the internal auditing unit "A" has power
over the department "B". What power, if any, will be
determined later on. If the concept of the internal
auditing unit working in "real time" is accepted, then the
idea of power may also have to be accepted. Hall (ibid.)
mentions, quoting Emerson, that the parties in a power
relationship are tied to each other by mutual dependency.
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This dependency is particularly obvious in organisations,
since the very nature of organisations requires
interdependence of personnel and subunits.
Hall (ibid.) proceeds to quote the sociologists French &
Raven, who classified the power concept on the basis of
interpersonal power. Their conclusions can easily be
extended to the organisational level. Their typology is
based on the nature of the relationship between the power
holder and the power recipient:
(1)Reward power	 - based on the power holder's
ability to reward
(2)Coercive power - based on the recipient's
perceptions that the power holder
can distribute punishments.
(3)Legitimate power - based	 on	 the	 recipient's
knowledge that the power holder
has the right to influence the
recipient.
(4)Referent power - based on the fact that the
recipient identifies with a power
holder and tries to behave like
the power holder.
(5)Expert power - based • n the special knowledge
attributed to the power holder by
the recipient.
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Hall (1972:208) concludes that all these forms of power
are found in organisations.
The next step is to analyse which categories of power
relate to the municipality internal auditing:
(1)The internal auditor cannot reward. Therefore, it
cannot be reward power.
(2)It is conceivable that the auditees would perceive the
municipality internal auditing unit as capable, if not
directly then indirectly, of distributing punishments,
in the sense that a bad report may harm the auditees.
Therefore coercive power is possible.
(3)It is not clear whether the auditees perceive the
municipality internal auditing unit as having the
right to influence them. The answer may depend on the
management level of the auditees, in relation to the
auditor.
(4)It is not referent power, since there is no reason why
the auditees would try to behave like the auditor.
(5)To some extent, depending on the auditor's and
auditees' educational and professional background and
on the field audited, there is a possibility of expert
power. In most cases, however, on the contrary, the
auditees feel they are the experts and have nothing to
learn from the auditor.
This typology was based on the nature of the relationship
between the power holder and the power recipient. Since
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the present study is concerned with the operation of the
unit rather than the individual, it will later use the
concept that organisations are systems of interdependent
units, in order to evaluate the power of the municipality
internal auditing unit.
Perrow and Crozier (Hall (1972:225-227)) arrive at the
conclusion that the most critical function in an
organisation tends to have the most power. Since internal
auditing is not part of the ongoing operation, its
function may be important, but not critical. The finance
department would be a much better candidate. As
Landsberger deduced, when money was scarce and uncertain,
the accounting unit was powerful (Hickson and others
(1971:226)).
Pfeffer (1992:69-70) stresses that the factors that create
the power of an organisational position are: control over
resources, control and access to information and formal
position. According to him, the most critical source of
power is being at the right place, rather than any
individual attributes. Pfeffer (1992:87) describes the
situation in the motor companies, where finance became the
most important function at Ford and General Motors.
Finance came to power when it gained control over the
planning, capital budgeting and operations research
processes. It was then able to convince others that the
critical functions in the operation of the company were
located in the finance department.
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On the basis of the concept that organisations are systems
of interdependent subunits, Hickson and others (1971) have
presented a 'strategic contingencies' theory of
intraorganisational power. This theory states that the
power of a "subunit is related to its coping with
uncertainty, substitutability and centrality through the
control of strategic contingencies for other dependent
activities."
	
A contingency is a requirement of the
activity of one subunit which is affected by the
activities of another subunit.
According to this theory:
(1) The better a subunit copes with uncertainty, the
greater its power within the organisation.
(2) The lower the substitutability of the activities of a
subunit,	 the	 greater	 its power within the
organisation.
(3) The higher the pervasiveness and the immediacy of the
workflows of a subunit, the greater its power within
the organisation.
(4) The more contingencies are controlled by a subunit,
the greater its power within the organisation.
Each factor is necessary but not sufficient for control of
strategic contingencies. Together they determine the
variation in interdependence between subunits.
The model is based on the assumption that power relations
in the organisation are based on contingencies.
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Organisational dependency is caused by the fact that the
organisation depends on different external sources. Those
sources are controlled by different subunits in the
organisation.	 The	 power	 distribution	 creates
interdependency between the subunits of the organisation.
The	 'strategic	 contingencies'	 theory	 of
intraorganisational power integrates different approaches
that have been briefly presented in this chapter. The
internal auditing unit in Israeli municipalities is, as
has been noted already in this study, a separate
department. The 'strategic contingencies' theory of
intraorganisational power does not take account of
personal factors as it deals with the power of a subunit
and not of an individual. Therefore, it seems appropriate
to use this theory to analyse the nature of the power of
the internal auditing unit within the municipality. The
theory mentions that:
(1) "The better a subunit copes with uncertainty, the
greater its power within the organisation".
Internal auditing does not cope with uncertainty. No
department depends on the internal auditing unit for its
ongoing operations.
(2)"The lower the substitutability of the activities of a
subunit, the greater its power within the
organisation."
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According to some, internal auditing could be replaced,
not as a function but as an internal and organic unit of
the organisation. This happens in some local authorities
in England, where internal auditing is performed by
external firms in the framework of compulsory competitive
tendering (Tombs: 1992). In Israel, it is also done to a
certain extent:	 it is quite common for municipality
internal auditors to have external free-lance auditors
perform specific audits on their behalf.
In the Israeli context, it must also be kept in mind that
the State Comptroller and the department auditing local
authorities in the Ministry of the Interior audit the
municipality in much the same way as the internal auditing
unit. Therefore, it does not seem that the
substitutability of the activities of the municipality
internal auditing is low.
(3.a) "The higher the pervasiveness of the workflows of a
subunit, the greater its power within the
organisation."
The workflow pervasiveness is defined as the degree to
which the workflows of a subunit connect with the
workflows of other subunits.
The municipality internal auditing unit has pervasive
connections with all other subunits through the auditing
it performs, though not continuously.
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(3.b) "The higher the immediacy of the workflows of a
subunit, the greater its power within the
organisation."
It is hard to say that immediacy is a characteristic of
the internal auditing unit's work. Taking, for example,
the case of the annual report: it is legally permissible
to take up to five months from the time it is presented to
the mayor and to the audit committee till the council
discusses the report.
(4) "The more contingencies are controlled by a subunit,
the greater its power within the organisation."
This is not, in fact, an independent variable, but rather
a result of combining (1)-(3) above.
Since the present study used the above model as a
theoretical basis, it seems that based an (13-3 the
municipality internal auditing unit in the Israeli
municipality would score low in power.
The high status of the municipality internal auditor
explains the high expectations people may have of internal
auditing in municipalities. However, the lack of power as
analysed in this chapter may prevent the internal auditing
unit from being instrumental in the application of
corrective measures, when needed, in practice. This gap
between expectations and performance is expected to affect
the perceived effectiveness of the municipality internal
auditing unit. This may be even more true among the users
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that do not take part in the ongoing operation of the
municipality. This situation sharpens the importance of
this study to evaluate, in an empirical manner, how the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing unit
is perceived.
2. 3. The audit expectation gap in the literature
The present thesis demonstrates a gap, in public
perception, between expectations and the actual
performance of the municipality internal auditor. That
perception may be expected to be relatively rare among
internal auditors themselves. Internal auditors are
generally isolated from the public, though not in the
case of municipality internal auditors in Israel, whose
reports must by law be publically available.
There is a difference between what the public believes
to be the auditors' responsibility and what the auditors
themselves believe. This difference is commonly called
the audit expectation gap. A considerable body of
research already exists on this topic in relation to the
external audit function. The following paragraphs
summarise that research, with a view to its relevance to
the municipality internal audit.
Auditing is not an exact science, and was never designed
to verify with absolute accuracy the information
contained in the financial statements. Moreover,
professional statements and statutory declarations by
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auditors tend to rely heavily on subjective terms such
as reasonableness, adequacy, relevance and judgement.
This practice tends to cloud the audit process with a
large degree of uncertainty. Consequently, even though
the audit is in theory linked to ideals of
organisational transparency and accountability, its
results are themselves very opaque to the wider public.
The public, particularly those who use financial
statements, believe (Guy & Sullivan 1988) that auditors
should: Assume greater responsibility for the detection
and reporting of fraud and illegal acts, improve
detection of material misstatements and communicate
early warnings about the possibility of business
failure. The major investigations into the nature and
regulation of the audit services market have in fact
been closely connected to the failure of auditors either
to detect major fraud or to provide advance warning of
an impending corporate collapse (Humphrey, Moizer &
Turley, 1992; Power 1994:48).
Various commissions have been set up in the USA, the UK
and Canada to investigate the expectation gap. In 1974,
the Cohen Commission was set up by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants with the
specific task of making recommendations on the
responsibilities of auditors. In 1975, the Metcalfe
Committee was established by the US government to
investigate and suggest ways of improving the
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accountability of publicly owned corporations and their
auditors. In 1976, the Moss Committee was set up by the
House of Representatives which was also concerned with
standards of corporate accountability. In Canada, the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants established
in 1987 a group called the "Special Committee to Examine
the Role of the Auditor" (the Adams Committee). Many of
these investigations found that a gap between
performance and expectation did exist, and that this was
not due just to ignorance on the part of users of
accounting information.
More committees to deal with audit expectations were set
up in the 1980s. In the USA, two congressional
committees were established. The first was the Brooks
Committee, concerned with the quality of CPA audits of
federal expenditure which had been reported as being
substandard. The other was the Dingell Committee,
concerned with the effectiveness of independent
accountants who audit publicly owned corporations, and
with the effectiveness of the SEC who audit those
accountants.
Meanwhile, the private sector established the National
Commission of Financial Reporting, an accounting-funded
development, chaired by James Treadway, which became
known as the Treadway Commission. The Treadway
Commission reported in October 1987 with a number of
recommendations including restatements of the auditor's
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responsibility for fraud detection and quarterly
reporting. Approximately at the same time, in 1988, the
profession's Auditing Standards Board produced ten new
statements on auditing standards, known as the
expectation gap standards, covering such issues as the
detection of fraud and illegal acts, the assessment of
internal controls and audit reporting. In Canada
likewise, the Canadian Institute for Chartered
Accountants established the McDonald Commission with the
specific task of investigating public expectations
regarding audits. In the commission's view, the
expectation gap will only be narrowed by the
profession's acceptance of the need for change and
improvement.
Humphrey et al (1992) after presenting a historical
review of the expectation gap of the last 100 years,
reach the conclusion that "both the existence of a gap
and the specific aspects of audit performance it
comprises have shown considerable continuity and
resilience against solution". This intrinsic problem
has been tackled by auditors in two different ways. One
approach starts out from the fact that the nature of
auditing and the various rules and responsibilities of
auditors are poorly understood by non-auditors, and
therefore focuses on "educating" the public about
auditor responsibilities and reassuring them as to the
standards of audit performance. 	 The other approach
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regards public expectations as a guide to the direction
in which audit responsibilities ought to develop, and so
conveys a willingness to change audit activities to meet
public concern.
Humphrey (1991) analyses the content of the expectation
gap on the basis of three main aspects of the audit
function: 1) audit assurance 2) audit reporting 3)
audit independence.
Audit assurance 
Lee and Beck, separately, as quoted by Humphrey (1991),
identify different problematic attitudes regarding the
financial statements. According to Lee, the audit
report is viewed frequently as a certification, a
guarantee of accuracy, rather than a statement of
probability. Thus the users of audited accounts perceive
the audit function to be broader than that performed or
perceived as legitimate by many auditors. The usual
response, according to Humphrey (1991:10-11), is that
such public expectations are unreasonable, and are due
to a general lack of understanding of the audit
function. Beck, by contrast, found considerable support
for the view that the audit is designed to give
assurance on the efficiency of management and the
financial soundness of the company, and that the public
is entitled to high expectations.	 Humphrey comments
that this view,	 though controversial,	 is quite
84
acceptable in the context of public sector auditing.
This is especially so if one takes into account the
Audit Commission in the local government sector, where
the auditors are explicitly requested to perform value-
for-money or operational audits.
Audit reporting
The expectation gap is often framed in terms of a
codification problem: if users better understood the
code used by auditors in reporting their opinions, they
would more accurately perceive the messages intended by
the various forms of audit reports. Accordingly, the
expectation gap standards (1988) and the Treadway
Commission (1987) recommend the use of language more
understandable to non-expert readers of reports.
However, according to Humphrey (1991), as long as there
is not one all-embracing definition of the audit
function, a standard perception of audit assurance and
standard presentation of audit reporting, the confusion
will persist.
Audit independence
This topic is at the core of the audit expectations
debate. The concern has been that auditors do not
operate with sufficient independence. The Cohen and
Metcalfe Commissions and the Dingell Committee were both
worried that competitive pressures were affecting audit
quality.
	 The question is why auditors should behave
85
honestly when they are not economically independent of
their clients and hence have some economic interest to
lose by being honest.
According to Moizer (1991), there are two principal
reasons to expect the auditors to behave honestly
despite their dependent position. First, it can be
argued from the economical point of view that a false
statement can yield two accumulating damages; the cost
of a successful legal action for negligence, the cost of
a loss in reputation and consequently in fee income.
Second, from the ethical point of view, the professional
ethical guidelines on the subject are unequivocal:
auditors are expected to report truthfully irrespective
of the consequences. To guard against pressure from the
client, it is necessary either to reduce the auditor's
interest in the client or to reduce the powers of the
directors of the client company to sack the auditor.
Moizer (1991) believes that legislation or even self-
regulation by the profession would suffice to safeguard
the auditor's independence, provided the enforcement
procedures are tough enough. Turley & Sherer (1991:58)
incline towards self-regulation: they write that if
"within a basically self-regulating framework, the
auditing profession is seen to be responsible,
independent and accountable, and to have control over
its members, the state, as well as the profession, will
benefit".
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In 1991, the Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies
established the Auditing Practices Board with a balanced
membership of auditors, directors, shareholders and
users of financial information. The Board set as its
goals to develop the auditing practice in the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland so as to establish
high standards of auditing, meet the developing needs of
users of financial information and ensure public
confidence in the auditing process. Its proposal to
redefine the audit (in Accountancy, January 1993:88-94)
is intentioned to be seen not merely as adding
credibility to a company's financial statements but
rather a check and balance on the proper conduct of
enterprise in the public interest. Its perception was
that auditors have yielded to pressure by directors and
have been less than robust in standing up to them on
matters of significance arising from the audit. The
Board's impression, was that excessive competition
combined with directors' desire to reduce audit costs
may have lowered the quality and rigour of audits to
unacceptable levels.
The Board proposed the adoption of a method involving
shareholders in a direct way such as a legislation
requiring the appointment of a body to represent
shareholders' interests in the audit for all listed and
public interest companies. The Board believed that the
existence of such representatives would provide a means
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of	 resolving	 most	 problems	 concerning	 auditor
independence.
In 1990, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Scotland (ICAS) together with the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, as well as the Bank of
England and the London Stock Exchange, established a
committee to review the financial aspects of corporate
governance. The Corporate Governance Report, known as
the Cadbury Report, after the committee's chair, was
published in December 1992. One of the recommendations
was that an audit committee of independent directors
should appoint the independent auditor and assess the
audit fee (Percy 1995). This seems to be in line with
the recommendation of the Auditing Practices Board.
2. 3. 1.	 The audit expectations gap in relation to
municipality internal auditing in Israel
The audit expectations gap was analysed above in terms
of audit assurance, audit reporting and audit
independence. From the municipality internal auditors'
perspective there is not much to say on audit assurance
and audit reporting. They are not requested to present
in their reports any assurance on the internal control
system in the municipality or on any other topic. On
the contrary, they point out deficiencies in the
municipality, as found during their audit. As for audit
reporting, the clarity of municipality internal auditing
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reports is not seen as a problem. In fact, a typical
report is written in language understood by all. The
core issue in the audit expectations debate is instead
audit independence, particularly - as will be argued
below - for the municipality internal auditor.
If one assumes that the only ways to increase the
independence of auditors are to reduce the auditor's
interest in the 'client' or to reduce the powers of the
'client' to sack the auditor, then the municipality
internal auditor's independence must really be doubted.
On one hand, the municipality internal auditor has by
definition one client: the municipality internal auditor
has by law a full-time position in the municipality. On
the other hand, the municipality appoints, again by law,
the municipality internal auditor.
Yet the Standards of Conduct are unequivocal on the
subject: internal auditors are to confirm with high
standards of honesty. One may hope that municipality
internal auditors believe that honesty is obligatory,
whatever the consequences. Even so, some changes in the
operation of the municipality internal auditing are
needed. Recommendations concerning that topic are
presented in chapter ten, 'Research conclusions and
recommendations'.
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2. 3. 2.	 Perceptions of internal audit in the public
service in England
The environment in which public service bodies are now
operating is changing due to increased public scrutiny.
This creates the basis for internal audit to deliver
services that both protect the organisation from
scandals and failures and help it to achieve value for
money.
CIPFA's Audit Panel, was aware of an audit quality
expectations gap between auditors and the customers of
audit services. The panel, therefore, commissioned Bob
Hopkins from the Liverpool Business School at Liverpool
John Moores University to undertake a national survey to
look at this expectations gap in more detail.
The report, published in April 1997, provides the key
results of this survey of almost 140 organisations and
800 individuals from all parts of the public services;
The large majority come from the local government and
health sectors. The findings of the survey confirm the
existence of the quality expectations gap in relation to
internal auditing.
The survey makes clear that in a number of areas,
auditors and auditees have very different perceptions of
the meaning and 'quality value' of key auditing
concepts. The auditees included chief financial
officers, financial managers, non-financial managers,
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elected members and non-executive directors.
Significant differences of opinion were found among the
groups as to what the primary role of internal audit
actually is. Auditors see their role as adding value to
an organisation through offering appraisal and advice on
internal systems, backed up by wider business skills.
However, the auditees, particularly non-financial
managers, still primarily associate internal audit with
finding errors and preventing and detecting fraud. This
leads to a feeling that the audit process is a kind of
personal integrity assessment, a view strongly rejected
by auditors themselves.
The survey uncovered a stronger desire among auditees
than among auditors for greater involvement and
consultations at all stages of the auditing process.
This difference is caused, as explained, by fears of
loss of independence among auditors.
There was a consensus among the study groups on the
personal attributes required in a good auditor:
integrity, objectivity and independence. All agreed
that auditors should provide a service to management,
make recommendations and offer advice. Age, management
level, competitive tendering and the method of audit
provision all proved to have an influence on the
expectations gap. Older managers tended to attach more
importance to the probity role of audit (which is seen
as the historical view) than younger ones. The findings
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for auditors and auditees involved in competitive
tendering show that both groups see the need to
establish closer relationships with each other and are
moving away from the historical view of audit.
The report points out two major obstacles to improving
the image of internal auditing within an organisation:
(1) Internal auditors do not understand the perceptions
of their customers.
(2) Customers do not understand the modern role and
objectives of internal audit.
To survive and prosper, internal audit will need,
according to the report, to target its key customers,
bridge the expectations gap and establish itself at the
heart of the organisation as a facilitator of change and
a marketer of imaginative solutions. The report
proposes a new role for internal audit, with the
traditional focus on compliance with internal controls
being superseded by an emphasis on identifying,
measuring and controlling weaknesses in organisational
effectiveness.
In the present research, no real differences were found
among the different users regarding the components of
internal auditing effectiveness; Differences among the
users were found in the evaluation of the effectiveness
in respect to the different components.
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In other words, the gap was found not in the perception
of what auditors and auditees regard as key auditing
concepts, as was found in the CIPFA's survey, but in
their respective perceived evaluation. The gap in the
case of internal auditing in municipalities in Israel
was focused on the ability of the internal audit to
bring change, which the present author translated as the
perceived 'power' of the internal audit in the
organisation.
One of the main findings of the CIPFA's survey was that
auditors and auditees involved in competitive tendering
establish closer relationships with each other and are
moving away from the historical view of audit.' The
situation of competitive tendering does not exist for
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel and by law
it is an in house service. The present author wonders
whether, in a public service body, the internal audit
should be allowed to comply to the expectations of the
auditees in order to get the job or should it follow
rules formulated by relevant national organisations as
to what internal audit units are expected to do.
Though the results of the CIPFA's report are very
interesting, they are relevant for the English public
service bodies and cannot be applied to the Israeli
scene. The main conclusion is that when a gap is found
between auditors -- internal or external -- and users of
their service, it is very important to bridge the gap by
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continuous education of the different parties in order
to clarify what can be expected of the internal auditing
services, re-examination of the content of the services
periodically and adjustment to the dynamic changes of
the environment.
2. 4. Internal Auditing — Characteristics
2. 4. 1.	 Introduction
Modern internal auditing considers its scope of work to
include all aspects of procedures in the organisations -
be it technical, accounting, financial or administrative -
in relation to all operations. The appraisal of the
suitability of the procedures is performed from the
perspectives of economy, efficiency and effectiveness -
known as the "3 Es". Chambers & Selim & Vinten (1987:80)
suggest a fourth "E" for equity (see Figure 2.2).
The "4 Es" are linked together but effectiveness is the
most important. As Price Waterhouse (1990:68) put it:
"there is absolutely no point in an organisation doing the
wrong things well".
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of municipality
internal auditing, as perceived by the different
respondents in this study, one must first devise a model
that identifies characteristics of internal auditing.
94
(- Equity) 	 Planned Output
Actual Input 	
(= Economy)
Planned Input
(- Efficiency) Actual Output
(= Effectiveness)
Effectiveness: A measure of actual performance against
planned performance ("doing the right things"
- achieving objectives)
Efficiency: The ratio of resource consumption to benefits
produced ("doing things the right way" - like
a well oiled machine)
Economy:	 The resources consumed vis a vis planned
consumption ("doing things cheap")
Equity:	 The net effect of the enterprise upon society
and the environment. ("doing right")
Figure 2.2 The meaning of the "4 Es"
source: Chambers & Selim & Vinten (1987:83)
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2.4.2.	 Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal	 Auditing	 ("the	 Standards"):
The Institute of Internal Auditors (I.I.A.)
The I.I.A., founded in 1941, is the only international
organisation dedicated solely to the advancement of
internal auditing. In Chambers' words (1992:19-20), the
I.I.A. "is fortunate" to have this unambiguous mission.
The term "Standards" as explained in the foreword of the
document means the criteria by which the operations of an
internal auditing department are evaluated. Those
"Standards" — issued in 1978 — are meant to serve all
internal auditing units, in any organisation where
internal auditors are found. In other words, the
Standards are meant to establish the basis for evaluating
the effectiveness of internal auditing.
Schneider (1982) and Farbo (1985), in their studies in
internal auditing, have used models based on competence,
objectivity and scope of work to describe the internal
auditing function. Travers (1991) has used the criteria
based on professionalism, objectivity, scope,
independence, performance and audit management. Chapman
(1982) based the criteria for his study on that part of
the Standards which concerns the scope of work.
The I.I.A.(Israel) is a national institute within the
It is important to point out that the I.I.A.
(Israel) is mentioned in the Internal Auditing Act, which
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was passed in the Knesset in February 1992. It is known
as the professional body of internal auditing in Israel.
This law does not affect the municipality internal
auditors directly, since they already had a legal
framework under the amended Municipal Ordinance. Still,
the law enhances the importance of internal auditing in
Israel and of the I.I.A.
Most internal auditors in Israel, including those in the
municipalities, are members of I.I.A. (Israel). It is
therefore a logical outcome that the Standards be used as
benchmarks to find out about the evaluations of
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing units
studied in this research.	 The model used will be the
model presented in the Standards, tailored and adapted to
the purpose of this study.
The Standards encompass:
(1)The independence of the internal auditing department
from the activities audited, and the objectivity of
internal	 auditors
	
(Organisational	 status;
Objectivity).
(2)The proficiency of internal auditors and the
professional care they should exercise. Instead of
entering into the question of whether internal
auditing is a profession or not, which is not in the
scope of this study, the present author prefers to use
the term competence.
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(3)The scope of internal auditing work.
(4)The performance of internal auditing assignments.
(5)The management of the internal auditing department.
2.4.3.	 A Theoretical Evaluation and Adaptation of
the Different Standards for this Study
2.4.3.1.	 Independence
2.4.3.1.1.	 Organisational status
The position of the municipality internal auditor is clear
and identical for all Israeli municipalities.
By law, auditees from all management levels, including the
mayor and the councillors, have to co-o t mequte.
with the municipality internal auditor. The municipality
internal auditor is appointed by the council.
The municipality internal auditor cannot lightly be
dismissed or suspended. He must first be given the right
to speak in a council meeting regarding the matter of
dismissal or suspension. The councillors must be told
beforehand that this item will be on the agenda.
Dismissal must be approved in the council by a majority of
2/3 of its councillors.
The purpose, authority and responsibility of the internal
auditing department is defined in the amended Municipal
Ordinance. It includes access to records, personnel and
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assets and defines the scope of internal auditing
activities.
By law, the municipality internal auditors prepare and
submit to the mayor an annual financial budget proposal
for their departments, including staffing plans. The
finance committee and the council discuss the budget and
the staffing plans, as presented by the municipality
internal auditors, in the framework of the discussion of
the annual budget proposal.
As required by the amended Municipal Ordinance, the
municipality internal auditors report to the mayor and to
the audit committee. They are the head of a separate unit
in the municipality (see Figure 2.1) and enjoy high status
within the municipality.
2.4.3.1.2.	 Objectivity
All the books on internal auditing stress the importance
of the independence of the internal audit. Woolf (1983)
put it clearly that auditors who have lost their
independence have lost their raison d'être; they have
become dependent, and a dependent auditor is a
contradiction in terms.
Independence is always relative, since there is no
absolute independence. Independence is rather a state of
mind that should ensure the objectivity of the audit.
In his model of internal audit independence, Rittenberg
(1977) came to the conclusion that organisational aspects,
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especially top management support, have a much greater
influence on internal audit independence than individual
factors (personal character and technical competence)
have. Many articles (Reinstein & Gabhart, 1987; Penno,
1990 and others), have emphasised that the internal
auditing unit should report to the higher levels of the
organisation or at least have access to them.
The support of management is essential. Accordingly, the
director of internal audit should have direct access to
and freedom to report to all senior management including
the chief executive, board of directors and, where one
exists, the audit committee.
Chambers (1992:12) points out that "for adequate
independence to be achieved it must be tailored
appropriately to the character of the particular
enterprise". He is not in favour of a situation where the
internal auditing unit would "report administratiNely or
functionally to an executive or director who also has
functional responsibility for operations which may be
within the scope of the internal audit".
To illustrate his point, Chambers (1992:13) argues that
from the perspective of the external auditor there would
be less scope to rely upon the work of an internal
auditing unit which was closely linked to the accounting
and financial processes of the business. The external
auditor would question the objectivity of such an internal
audit function. Looking at the same question from a
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different angle, Collins & Vallin (1974) advocate that in
order to implement changes, it is best for the internal
auditing unit to report to a specialised management unit
(administrative - finance). Earlier in this chapter, an
evaluation in theory was offered of the power of the
internal auditing unit in the Israeli municipality. The
degree of power was found to be relatively low, in the
context of the other departments in the municipality. In
Israeli municipalities, internal auditing is performed by
an independent department. A low degree of power suggests
that an independent internal auditing unit may have
problems in implementing changes 	 and	 correcting
deficiencies.
The criteria for audit independence are based on the
section entitled "Independence: Organisational status and
objectivity" from the Standards, adapted to the
specifications of municipality internal auditing in
Israel.
According to the law, municipality internal auditors in
Israel are not allowed any operational responsibility. To
stress that point, it used to be a requirement of the
Ordinance, till 1995, that if the population was less than
30,000, the municipality could appoint a part time
municipality internal auditor only under two conditions:
(1)The internal auditor's job had to be at least a 50%
part time job.
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(2)Any additional position taken must also be in internal
auditing in another municipality.
An episode in the municipality of Tiberias is worth
mentioning here. The municipality was about to appoint
the former chief financial officer as the new municipality
internal auditor. Three councillors from Tiberias
appealed to the court, stating that it was a conflict of
interest. They declared that they had nothing against the
person himself. However, as the municipality internal
auditor he could not be in charge of auditing his own
former job. The Supreme Court impeached the appointment
and before the end of the juridical procedure, the council
decided to cancel the appointment (Globes 17.8.94:10).
It is probable that the Court agreed with the words of the
Standards, that "objectivity is presumed to be impaired
when internal auditors audit any activity for which they
had authority or responsibility."
The following list represents criteria from the
"independence" section in the Standards that are relevant
to the "independence" section of the model in the present
study:
• Maintaining an independent mental attitude in
performing audits.
• Avoiding potential or actual conflicts of interest or
bias in audit staff assignment.
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2.4.3.2.	 Competence
As explained in section 2.3.2(2), the term used in this
study is competence rather than professional proficiency.
In order to be successful, the internal auditing unit must
not only possess the required qualifications but must also
be seen by others to possess them. Basically, this
necessitates the technical proficiency and educational
background which will enable the internal audit personnel
to conduct the audit properly. The internal auditing
staff should collectively possess the required proficiency
in applying internal auditing standards, procedures and
techniques and maintain their technical competence through
continuing education.
The internal auditing staff should be well versed in human
relations so that satisfactory relationships with auditees
can be maintained. Communication is critical. Therefore,
the internal audit staff should possess oral and written
skills to be able to pass on their audit work. The latter
includes	 objectives,	 evaluations,	 conclusions	 and
recommendations.
In the Municipal Ordinance, there are no professional
background requirements as to the municipality internal
auditors or their staff. In Israeli municipalities,
municipality internal auditors come from different
backgrounds.	 Some have a law studies background, some
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come	 from	 finance	 or	 accounting,	 others	 from
administration studies.
According to the Internal Auditing Act (1992), internal
auditors will not be appointed to a public body unless
they have the following requirements:
(1)They must be individuals, rather than firms.
(2)They must be Israeli citizens
(3)They may not have been convicted in court of any
flagrant offence.
(4)They must hold a graduate degree, or be qualified as a
lawyer or certified public accountant.
(5)They must have at least two years of experience in
internal auditing, or have participated in a
professional internal auditing training program
approved by the Committee for the Training Program.
The Committee is defined by the law and chaired by the
delegate of the I.I.A. (Israel).
The law has also designated a special committee to assess
the appointment of internal auditors in public bodies that
do not fulfil all the requirements previously mentioned.
The committee is composed of the general director of the
Ministry of Justice (chairperson), the Civil Service
Commissioner, the Commissioner's deputy, the president of
I.I.A. (Israel), the president of the Lawyers Institute
and the president of the CPA Institute.
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2.4.3.3.	 Scope of Work
Quoting from the Standards: "The scope of the internal
audit should encompass the examination and evaluation of
the adequacy and effectiveness of the organisation's
system of internal control and the quality of performance
in carrying out assigned responsibilities."
The internal audit may be restricted by the terms of
reference to conduct reviews only in certain sections of
the organisation. The limits may be defined in terms of
level in the organisation, usually not above the director
of the internal audit's own organisational level. (This
may be a warning signal that the expectations that others
have of the Israeli municipality auditors are unrealistic,
since they are expected to audit above their level. The
question will be followed up in the empirical survey.)
Sometimes, the limit is instead defined in terms of
certain operations such as accounting and finance. Still,
even within the restricted scope, the internal auditing
unit should be concerned with all functions of management
(planning, organising, staffing, directing, controlling
and co-ordinating).
Chambers (1992:12) mentions that the audit scope should be
tailored according to the internal auditing unit's
resources. If it is too broad, it may jeopardise audit
independence - though, as he continues, "restrictions upon
the scope of internal audit may also of themselves impair
audit independence".
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In the opinion of the present author, it is preferable not
to impose any external limit on the scope of the audit.
However, the annual framework of the internal auditing
unit should take into consideration the volume of work
feasible subject to the unit's limited resources.
The criteria for "scope of work" in the model used in the
present study are identical with the criteria of the
Standards for "scope of work". They encompass:
(1)the reliability and integrity of information
(2)compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and
regulations
(3)the safeguaraing of assets
(4)the economical and efficient use of resources
(5)the accomplishment of established objectives and goals
for operations or programs
The criteria converge with what is expected from the
municipality internal auditing unit's scope of work.
2.4.3.4.	 Performance
The criteria for "performance" in the model for this study
adhere to the criteria in the "performance" section of the
Standards.
Quoting from the Standards: "Audit work should include
planning the audit, examining and evaluating information,
communicating results and following up."
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2.4.3.5.	 Management of the internal auditing
department
The criteria in the Standards include:
(1)Purpose, Authority and Responsibility - The Ordinance
gives a general framework. Even so, it might be
useful if in every municipality there was a charter
for the internal auditing department, approved by the
mayor and accepted by the council. However, that is
not the case.
(2)Planning - The municipality internal auditor is
required, by law, to prepare an annual plan to decide
what items to audit and what the scope of the audit
should be.
(3)Policies and Procedures - Even in big cities, the
municipality internal auditing unit is a small
department. The municipality internal auditors direct
and control the different audits on a frequent basis.
They sign every report presented by the internal
auditing department.
(4)Personnel Management and Development - In the public
sector in Israel, including municipalities, there is a
trend to look very favourably at training courses. Of
course, the situation may vary from municipality to
municipality.
(5)External auditors - In Israeli municipalities, as
explained previously, there are different external
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auditors: The State Comptroller's Office, the
external CPAs reviewing the accounts, the unit in the
Ministry of the Interior auditing local authorities.
There is sometimes a problem of co-ordination between
these parties. When starting an audit, those parties
would generally be in touch first with the
municipality internal auditor. They verify whether
the municipality internal auditor's existing reports
and other work may be useful for them.
Many years ago, the State Comptroller of Israel,
reported more than one case in which he was not
satisfied by the quality of work performed by the
internal auditing unit in municipalities. Nowadays it
seems that far better qualified personnel are hired
for internal auditing in municipalities and no such
official remark has been heard for at least fifteen
years.
(6)Quality Assurance - There is no knowledge of regular
internal or external reviews, as mentioned in the
Standards, in the Israeli municipality internal
auditing.
To summarise, the model used in this study to evaluate the
effectiveness of internal auditing in Israeli
municipalities is based on the five main components
described in the Standards. The model takes into account:
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(1)Independence
(2)Competence
(3)Scope of work
(4)Performance
(5)Management of internal auditing department
2.5.	 Hypotheses
To direct the collection and analysis of the data, the
following hypotheses were established.
All hypotheses refer to Israeli municipalities.
2.5.1.	 Hypotheses concerning the independence of
the municipality internal auditing unit
2.5.1.1.	 Hypothesis one:
"The respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the independence of the
municipality internal auditing unit than the other
respondent groups have."
2.5.1.2.
	
Hypothesis two:
"The respondent groups outside the municipality have a
lower evaluation of the independence of the municipality
internal auditing unit than the respondent groups within
the municipality."
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2.5.1.3.	 Hypothesis three:
"There is a difference in the evaluation of the
independence of the municipality internal auditing unit
between the different levels of auditee respondent
groups within the municipality."
2.5.2.	 Hypothesis concerning the competence of the
municipality internal auditing unit
2.5.2.1.	 Hypothesis four:
"The respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the competence of the
municipality internal auditing unit than the other
respondent groups have."
2.5.2.2.	 Hypothesis five:
"The respondent groups outside the municipality have a
lower evaluation of the competence of the municipality
internal auditing unit than the respondent groups within
the municipality."
2.5.2.3.
	
Hypothesis six:
"There is a difference in the evaluation of the
competence of the municipality internal auditing unit
between the different levels of auditee respondent
groups within the municipality."
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2.5.3.	 Hypotheses concerning the scope of work of
the municipality internal auditing unit
2.5.3.1.	 Hypothesis seven:
"The respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the scope of work of
the municipality internal auditing unit than the other
respondent groups have."
2.5.3.2.	 Hypothesis eight:
"The respondent groups outside the municipality have a
lower evaluation of the scope of work of the
municipality internal auditing unit than the respondent
groups within the municipality."
2.5.3.3.	 Hypothesis nine:
"There is a difference in the evaluation of the scope of
work of the municipality internal auditing unit between
the different levels of auditee respondent groups within
the municipality."
2.5.4.	 Hypotheses concerning the performance of the
municipality internal auditing unit
2.5.4.1.	 Hypothesis ten:
"The respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the performance of the
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municipality internal auditing unit than the other
respondent groups have."
2.5.4.2.	 Hypothesis eleven:
"The respondent groups outside the municipality have a
lower evaluation of the performance of the municipality
internal auditing unit than the respondent groups within
the municipality."
2.5.4.3.	 Hypothesis twelve:
"There is a difference in the evaluation of the
performance of the municipality internal auditing unit
between the different levels of auditee respondent
groups within the municipality."
2.5.5.
	 Hypotheses concerning the management of the
municipality internal auditing unit
2.5.5.1.	 Hypothesis thirteen:
"The respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the management of the
municipality internal auditing unit than the other
respondent groups have."
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2.5.5.2.	 Hypothesis fourteen:
"The respondent groups outside the municipality have a
lower evaluation of the management of the municipality
internal auditing unit than the other respondent
groups."
2.5.5.3.	 Hypothesis fifteen:
"There is a difference in the evaluation of the
management of the municipality internal auditing unit
between the different levels of auditee respondent
groups within the municipality."
113
PART TWO
SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Chapter three
The research methodology
3.0. Introduction
The objective of the present study is to evaluate the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities in
Israel. This involves testing of hypotheses in order to
be able to suggest policy recommendations. 	 The
hypothesis testing is best conducted within the
framework of a model representation of reality. The
model, described in the previous chapter, makes it
possible to evaluate the effectiveness of internal
auditing in municipalities in Israel. It is based on
five components: independence, competence, scope of
work, performance, and management, all relating. to the
internal auditing unit (Figure 3.1)
This model	 was	 presented	 in	 interviews	 with
representatives of the different respondent groups.
They were asked to comment on whether any component or
criterion was missing from the model, or if any
component or criterion should be removed from the model
(the interview process is described in chapter 4 of this
study).
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CoMPetence Scope of Work
Effectiveness
Figure 3.1: Components	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of
municipality internal auditing - Model I
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The model was accepted with minor changes. There were
respondents that thought that some criteria were not
needed, mainly criteria under the heading of management
of the internal auditing unit. The reason was because
of the small size of those units in municipalities in
Israel. Still, as some other respondents thought these
criteria important, and after consultation with
Professor Selim, it was decided to leave the component
of the management of the internal auditing unit as part
of the model for the empirical research.
3.1.	 The target population of the study
The population selected for this study is composed of
users of the internal auditing product in the
municipalities in Israel. These comprise users both
within the municipality and outside of it.
The users consulted within the municipality include: the
mayor, the council including the audit committee, the
general director, three important departments - the
finance, education and engineering - representing the
different types of departments (service, line and
technical) within the municipality, and the internal
auditing unit itself.
Three different levels of management - councillors,
chief officers and middle level management are
identified with the targeted population. This is to
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verify, whether the management level of the auditees
influences their perception of the internal auditing
effectiveness in municipalities in Israel.
The users outside the municipality include: the
Comptroller's Office (the section in charge of the local
authorities), the Ministry of the Interior (the
department for auditing the local authorities and the
CPA of the municipalities), and the public as
represented by journalists of local newspapers covering
municipality affairs.
All the municipalities in Israel are by law required to
have a municipality internal auditor. 	 There are more
than 50 municipalities, but the number is increased from
time to time, when the status of a local authority is
changed to that of a municipality. Municipalities
having municipality internal auditing units comprise the
scope of the research.
3.2.
	 The approach
The different hypotheses of this study compare the
evaluation of the five different components of the model
by different groups of respondents within the
municipality and outside the municipality. Depending
whether the data analysis confirm the different
hypotheses or not, it will be possible to assess whether
different respondent groups have different perceptions
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of the various components which together comprise the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit.
Analysis of the different components according to the
different respondent groups should be very instructive
in the study of each group's perception of the
components. It could also point out weaknesses in the
internal auditing process.
In order to gather the data and test the hypotheses, a
method of collecting the data had to be chosen.
3.3.	 Range of data collection tools
The data needed for testing the hypotheses of this work
had to be collected by the researcher through a survey
covering the different groups of users of the
municipality intenal auditing product. The processing
of survey data through advanced analytical methods has
become one of the foremost means of social
investigation. On the most basic level, the idea of a
survey begins with the desire to measure some
characteristic of a population. A survey can be useful
for describing populations as well as for building
models for analysis. In fact, the data gathered through
a survey are often put to both descriptive and analytic
uses. A government survey, for example, can tell us the
total number of adults who were unemployed last month.
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These same date are used by sociologists, economists and
others with interests quite different from obtaining
those simple point estimates.
In data collection, two main concerns are to select an
interview method appropriate to the questions that will
be asked, and to obtain co-operation from as many
respondents as possible. Typically, there are three
survey approaches: mail (self-administered), telephone
and face-to-face (personal interviewing).
There is no one best survey method: each has strengths
and weaknesses. It is important to know what these are
and to evaluate research objectives with reference to
the advantages and disadvantages of each method. In
addition, there are administrative factors (geographic
distribution of population, cost, length of data
collection period) that must be taken into account in
choosing the method of data collection.
Based on Fowler (1993) and Czaja & Blair (1996), a list
of different methods of data collection follows:
Personal interviewing
Advantages:
'Most effective in enlisting co-operation for most
populations.
'Advantages	 of	 interviewer	 administration	 (e.g.
possibility of interacting with respondent).
119
'Multi-method data collection,	 including facilities
for observations, visual cues and self-administered
sections.
Disadvantages:
'Hesitancy of respondents to report sensitive. issues.
'More likely to yield socially desirable responses.
'More costly than the alternatives (travel and travel
time costs to meet respondents in their home)
'A trained staff of interviewers that is geographically
near the sample is needed.
Telephone interviewing
Advantages:
*Lower cost than personal interviews
'Random-digit-dialling sampling of general populations
*Better access to certain populatisms, especially as
compared to personal interviews. Likely better
response rate from a list sample than in mail surveys.
*In comparison to personal interviewing, smaller staff
of interviewers is needed, without any requirement to
be geographically near the sample.
*Shorter data collection periods.
*Advantages of interviewer administration, in contrast
to mail surveys.
120
Disadvantages:
'Less appropriate for sensitive questions, if no prior
contact.
'Non response associated with random-digit-dialling
sampling is higher than personal interviews.
'Measurement restraints, including limits on response
alternatives, on use of visual aids and on interviewer
observations.
Mail survey
Advantages:
'Successful in the collection of data about sensitive
topics, since the respondent does not have to share
answers with an interviewer.
'Questions can be asked with complex response
categories.
*Batteries of similar questions can be asked.
*Provides access to widely dispersed samples and
samples that for other reasons are difficult to reach
by telephone or in person.
*Relatively low cost.
*Can be accomplished with minimal staff and facilities.
*Respondents can choose when to answer, at their own
convenience.
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Disadvantages:
'Especially careful questionnaire design is needed.
'Open questions usually.are not useful.
'Good reading skills by respondents are needed.
"Low
3.4.	 Choosing a method for the present research
The purpose of the empirical survey was to collect data,
related to the evaluation of the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities, from different
respondent groups.
The targeted populations, which included internal and
external users, professionals and councilors, may be
characterised as follows:
(1)They are well educated; therefore no problems in
reading or writing skills were expected.
(2)They are very busy. 	 The councilors in Israel are
not paid for their work in the municipality and also
have their own careers.
	 Therefore, between those
obligations, they are pressed for time.
The professionals, both within and external to the
municipality are under a lot of pressure and will
not allocate much time to an academic research.
er rate of responses.
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(3)They are scattered geographically all over the
country, since the research covered all Israeli
municipalities.
The author believes that the geopolitical situation of
Israel in the Middle East vis a vis its neighbours and
an history of persecution have moulded most Israelis to
be quite suspicious by nature.
It seems that when the literature mentioned that in
order to collect sensitive data, one has to use
non-personal methods, it is very true for the Israeli
scene.
Relating to the local government in Israel, which is the
area where this research took place, it is important to
bear in mind that the different local authorities have
been criticised harshly by the central government and
others for the large deficits in their budget. Any
research aiming at any operation of the local government
will have to overcome the given general suspicious
nature, as explained above and in addition a certain
antagonism from respondents from within the local
government towards an external researcher.
The logical outcome leads to the conclusion that even
before touching the issue, the threshold of what is
perceived by the respondents in local authorities as
sensitive is quite low.
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As the topic itself was perceived as sensitive, honest
answers could not be obtained without an anonymous
method of data collecting. This was made clear from the
very first stages of the research, either by the
different users the researcher met or by people that
approached Dr. Rozevitch, knowing he was the external
supervisor.
Comparing those requirements and the different survey
approaches limited the possibilities:
(1) Personal interviewing was not possible because it
would have been too difficult to meet with each
respondent, not only because of their busy schedule
but also because of their geographical dispersion.
In addition, as Czaja & Blair (1996:47) point out,
the more personal the method of data collection, the
less likely respondents are to collaborate on
sensitive topics. This is equally true for Israel.
People will collaborate on sensitive issues and give
honest answers only if they are assured that the
collection of the data is genuinely anonymous,
meaning that the researcher is not able to make
connections between individual respondents and their
responses.
(2)Telephone interviewing was also not possible because
of the difficulty in reaching the respondents before
being screened and stopped by a secretary. Even if
this obstacle is overcome, it is quite probable that
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the respondent would be in the middle of some other
work and not co-operate with the interviewer. In
addition, this method could hardly be called
anonymous. Therefore it was not appropriate for the
purpose of this survey.
(3) The remaining alternative was a mail survey. These
are of two types: some form of group administration
may be provided, or the survey may be wholly
self-administered. Group administration was not
possible in this research because it was not
possible to bring together respondents in groups.
Even the minimal administration of dropping off (and
later picking up) questionnaires at offices was not
acceptable, as it would compromise anonymity.
Consequently, a wholly self-administered mail survey
was seen as the most appropriate method for this
research.
Mail (self-administered) surveys have been successful in
the collection of data about sensitive topics (Czaja &
Blair 1996:35 and Fowler 1993:58). This method also
suits the situation of the scattered populations of this
research. The main disadvantage was that this method is
known to yield a lower rate of responses. In this case,
since there was no other possible way to perform the
survey, that was a price to be paid. A carefully
designed, very clear and understandable questionnaire
may facilitate the participation of every willing
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respondent. The researcher, as explained in chapter five
'Questionnaire development' and in chapter six
'Respondents', did everything possible, such as careful
questionnaire design and follow-up, to minimise the
problem.
The questionnaire is based on the criteria developed in
this model and grouped according to the five different
components.
The questionnaire appears in this study both in English
and in Hebrew (see Appendices H and I). Since the
survey took place in Israel and all respondents are
Hebrew speakers, only the Hebrew version was used. The
self administered questionnaire was sent by mail to the
respondents (see also chapter 5 on the questionnaire).
3.5.	 Collecting the data
The respondents were asked to send back the
questionnaire using the collect paid envelope provided
with the questionnaire package. One standard
questionnaire was used for all respondents. The first
section of the questionnaire requested demographic data
(mainly from municipality internal auditors) and
information about the respondents to associate them with
the appropriate group of users. The second section was
composed of five parts. Each part represented a
different component of the model presented in this
study. The questions in the second section were in fact
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based on actual statements. The respondents had to tick
how strongly they agree/disagree on a six level scale
with each statement. The even number of options was
chosen in order to avoid fence- sitting. In addition to
the individual boxes for the six level scale, there was
an additional box that the respondents could tick when
the information regarding a statement was not available
to them or they did not know the answer.
The answers to the questionnaire created the data for
the research. For each respondent, in each targeted
group, there was a set of answers related to the
different criteria of each component of the model. As
Peacock & Pelfrey (1991) suggested, the Likert type
scales - as used in this study - provided a mechanism
for quantifying responses. In the absence of any
contrary indication, the same weight was given to each
question in each component and to each respondent.
3.6.	 The testing of the hypotheses
The research aimed to investigate the relationships
between the different components of internal auditing
effectiveness among different groups of users. For
every component, an array of figures was produced, which
represented the responses of the different subjects.
From these arrays, correlation coefficients and multiple
regression analysis were calculated to allow the
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relationships among selected respondent groups to be
investigated.
Keppel & Zedek (1989:550) recommend the MRC - Multiple
regression and correlation - techniques for the analysis
of non-experimental designs and correlation data.
The most	 accessible	 procedures	 for	 performing
correlation and regression calculations are based on
Pearson's approach.	 This also supplies significance
tests that are readily applicable.
Pearson's approach assumes that the data follow an
interval scale. In fact, however, the data are based on
Likert type scale responses, of which the following is
typical:
"completely disagree — strongly disagree — disagree —
agree — strongly agree — completely agree".
These responses cannot be measured externally. On that
ground, the premise that they follow an interval scale
could be challenged. If the Pearson-type methods were
not used, the analysis would have to be performed,
instead, on the basis of non-parametric methods, i.e.
methods that do not assume the data to follow an
interval scale. These methods involve more
sophisticated and cumbersome analysis, especially for
significance testing.
Any objection to the use of Pearson-type statistics to
analyse the present data can be countered by two
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arguments. First, a good case can be made out for the
view that the data indeed follow an interval scale, even
though no external measurement is possible. Weisberg &
Bowen (1977:50) maintain that in non-metric
psychological research, people can distinguish up to
seven different degrees reliably. In this research, the
six alternative responses may well be perceived in the
respondent's mind as equally spaced out. There are
certainly many precedents for the application of
Pearson-type coefficients to data that is not externally
tangible, such as marks in intelligence tests or college
examinations. Kerlinger (1986:403) points out that
"most psychological and educational scales approximate
interval equality fairly well".
Second, experience shows that the results obtained from
the special non-parametric methods do not as a rule
differ greatly, in numerical terms, from those obtained
by the methods that assume an interval scale. For
example, if from the same data one calculates both the
Pearson correlation coefficient (which assumes an
interval scale) and the Spearman correlation coefficient
(which makes no such assumption), the results in
practice will almost always be very similar.
Consequently, the assumption of an interval scale was
made. In this way, it was possible to apply the full
range of Pearson-type correlation and regression methods
to the analysis of the data.
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In addition, after collection of the data, the
distribution of all components was analysed to find out
whether it was a normal distribution. This was done by
using kurtosis and skewness measures over all the
components. For all the components, the data was found
to be compatible with a normal distribution.
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Chapter four
Criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities in Israel
4.0.Introduction
Since the intention of the study was to develop a
practical model to evaluate the effectiveness of
internal auditing in municipalities, it was necessary to
consult in advance the people involved. To achieve this
goal a two phase survey was adopted.
In the first phase, the author conducted meetings with
prominent representatives of "users" involved in one way
or the other with the internal auditing "product" in
municipalities. The idea was to seek their views
regarding the criteria and components important for the
model.
The second phase, presented to a larger group the
criteria and components that emerged from the first
phase.	 This	 larger	 group	 was	 composed	 of
representatives of the different groups of users of the
internal auditing product in municipalities. They were
asked to give their opinion on the existing criteria and
components, and on whether others should be added.
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4.1.	 First phase meetings
4.1.1.	 Introduction
The first phase meetings had to ascertain quickly and
reliably whether the suggested model was on the right
track, and how it might be refined.
The inner circle of users of internal auditing in
municipalities comprises, without any doubt, the users
inside the municipality. 	 They are in charge of the
ongoing business. They are the first to encounter the
municipality internal auditing unit and they are
supposed to correct whatever deficiencies are pointed
out to them.
The author decided, on those grounds, to meet with a
mayor, a general director, a chief financial officer and
a municipality internal auditor all prominent
representatives.
In addition, in order to have the perspective of a
prominent user outside the municipality, the author met
with the director of the department in the Ministry of
the Interior which audits local authorities.
There were various theoretical possibilities for
conducting the meetings:
(1)by assembling the different representatives in one
session
(2)by meeting them individually
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(3)a combination of sessions for those who could attend
and individual meetings for those who could not
Options (1) and (3) were not practicable, because of the
difficulty in arranging for all or even most of those busy
people to be available at the same time and place. As a
matter of fact, there was a plan to meet in one session
with the general director, the chief financial officer
and the municipality internal auditor of a single
relatively big municipality which has a reputation for
good operation and management. Even that meeting was not
held as	 expected.	 Instead,	 meetings	 were	 held
sequentially. The reason may have been that the
respondents preferred to speak to the author separately
and therefore freely, though the reason given was a
technical one.
The different individual meetings lasted between half an
hour and more than two hours.
The meetings were held between January and March 1995
with:
• The mayor of a medium size municipality who represents
the new generation of mayors that is taking over quite
rapidly from the old guard.
• The general director of a relatively big municipality,
on the verge of leaving his post, after many years in
his present position. He moved to the job after being
the chief financial officer of the municipality for
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many years. Before that, he served as an executive at
the Ministry of Finance in the central government.
• The municipality internal auditor of that same
municipality, who was in post for more than seven
years.
• The chief financial officer, also from that
municipality, who came to the office three years
before from the private sector. He had worked in the
past as an internal auditor in the private sector.
• The director of the department auditing local
authorities in the Ministry of the Interior. The
department had played quite a minor role till the
arrival of this new director, some two years earlier.
Since then, the department has performed numerous
audits in local authorities with its enlarged, but
still small professional team, now comprising
half-a-dozen personnel.
Demographic facts will be added further on, along with the
comments of the representatives.
4.1.2.
	 The approach used for these meetings
The same structured method was used with all respondents
in order to avoid bias. At the beginning of each meeting
the author explained that he hoped to have their opinion
on what criteria and components should be part of a model
to evaluate the effectiveness of the municipality internal
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auditing unit. The author told them that they would be
provided with a list of components divided into criteria
(Appendix D). The list was based on the Standards of the
Institute of the Internal Auditors (1978). The components
in the list were supposed to give an indication of
internal auditing effectiveness in general.
The respondents were requested to:
(1)Give their opinion whether each criterion and
component in the list could and should be part of the
model evaluating internal auditing effectiveness in
municipalities in Israel. It was stressed that the
evaluation was concerned with the municipality
internal auditing unit as a whole, and not the
individual internal auditor.
(2)If possible, specify which components/criteria were
more important or not important.
(3)Add any other component/criterion that was missing
from the list, which they felt was important to
include in the model.
Each component was read aloud and the respondents gave
their comments.
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Table 4 .1 :	 Summing up first phase meetings
Components for
evaluating the
effectiveness of
municipality
internal auditing
Mayor Municipality
internal
auditor
General
director
	 of
municipality
Chief 
financial
officer
Director
of the
department
auditing
local
authorities
- Ministry of
the
Interior
Independence
—
+
—
+
—
+
+
+
+
+
- Organisational
. status	
• •	 •
-Objectivity
Competence + + + + +
Scope of work + + + I- +
Performance + + + 4- +
Management of — — —
(did not
comment)
4-
.
(- against
coordination
with external
auditors.)
the municipality
internal auditing
p_r_tit
•	
•	
•
Comments:
.
.
•	 •
	 • 
•
1) The most
crucial is to
audit the
economical
and efficient
use of
resources,
2) Important
to fix
criteria for
allocating
budget and
adequate
personnel,
1) The fewer
audits resulting
from requests of
councillors, the
more
independence
there is.
2) Important to
know what users
think of topics
included in annual
plan.
3) Important to
have adequate
budget and
personnel.
The most
crucial is to
audit the
economical and
efficient use of
resources,
1) Challenge
the whole
existing
system.
2) The most
crucial function
is to check the
compliance
with policies,
plans,
procedures,
laws and
regulations.
1) Must include
in the scope of
work, the
checking of all
participants in
the municipal
arena.
2) Important to
audit the
compliance with
policies, plans,
procedures,
laws and
regulations.
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4.1.3.	 Meetings and opinions
4.1.3.1.	 Meeting with the mayor
The city with a population of 60,000 - is located in the
centre of Israel. The population is young and mainly
composed of white collar liberal professionals. It has no
heavy industry, some hi-tech and many small businesses.
The mayor's comments:
(1)Regarding independence:
The organisational status of the internal auditing unit
should not be a criterion because it is clearly defined by
the Municipal Ordinance. The mayor believes that the
existing high status of the municipality internal auditor
enables the municipality internal auditing to operate
satisfactorily.	 Much has to do with the municipality
internal auditor's personality.
The mayor accepted the component of objectivity.
One of the dangers that the municipality internal auditor
should avoid is to play into the hands of councillors from
the opposition parties. They will try to use the internal
auditing unit for their own political purposes to attack
the mayor. The municipality internal auditor must be
careful not to he misled by the opposition on the one hand
and not to be perceived, on the other hand, as the mayor's
man.
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(1)Regarding competence: 
The mayor accepted the list of criteria.
(2)Regarding scope of work: 
The mayor accepted the list of criteria. At the same
time, he considered that the greatest emphasis should be
given to checking the economical and efficient use of
resources in the municipality. According to the mayor,
that is the area to which the internal auditing unit
should devote most of its efforts.
(3)Regarding performance: 
The mayor accepted the list. 	 He believed that the
follow-up factor was extremely important.
(4)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
a) The law already defines the goals, authority and
responsibility of the internal auditing unit.
There is therefore no need to have another charter
dealing with the subject. Therefore there is no
need for this criterion.
b) The law requires a working plan, of which the
mayor receives a copy. Therefore there is no need
for this criterion.
C) Policy and procedures: None of this is relevant in
his specific municipality since there is only one
internal auditor.
	 It might be important in the
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bigger municipalities where there are more
auditors in the internal auditing department.
d) Management and training of personnel: Management
is not appropriate in the case of that specific
municipality as explained previously.
e) Co-ordination of internal and external auditing:
This would have been important, but it is not
applicable.	 It is not in the power of the
municipality internal auditing unit to change the
level of co-ordination.
f) Quality control: This sounds good, but does in
fact not exist on a regular basis.
General comments by the mayor
The mayor believed that since the whole municipality is in
fact operated by the mayor, the relationship between the
mayor and the municipality internal auditor is critical
for the good operation of the internal auditing unit.
It is obvious that the mayor, being a political figure, is
eager to appear in public or in the media. Municipality
internal auditors that are eager to attract the media to
themselves and their own findings may jeopardise their
relations with the mayor.
The municipality internal auditors, being internal,
receive their salary from the municipality. 	 Their
situation is different from that of the external auditors,
who spend one day inside the municipality and the day
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after working elsewhere. The municipality internal
auditors are there day after day with the same people. In
order to succeed in their jobs, they must be impartial.
Their organisational status is adequate and there is no
need for any change.
In his municipality, the municipality internal auditor
submits an interim report three or four times a year and
obtains a response from the mayor and his team.
After each report, the mayor calls a meeting with the
people involved. It is there that the mayor makes his
decisions regarding the issues raised in the report.
In his published annual report, the municipality internal
auditor will refer to those decisions and follow up
whether they were implemented. The mayor gave much
importance to the follow-up. The mayor explained that he
conceives the task of the municipality internal auditor as
constructive: to recommend ways of correcting defects, and
ultimately to assist the mayor in the correct functioning
of the municipality.
The mayor approved of the law that no restraint should be
put on the scope of work of the municipality internal
auditor.
In the mayor's opinion, many mayors reach their positions
without any adequate background to assist them in standing
at the top of an organisation of the size of a
municipality.	 The mayor therefore, believed that the
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municipality internal auditor should give greater emphasis
to finance management. Any improvement in finance matters
may save the municipality a great deal of money. Though
the mayor in this case is himself a professional
economist, he does not find the time nor the opportunity
to check all financial matters.
Very seldom will the mayor ask the municipality internal
auditor to check a certain subject. In general, the
municipality internal auditor will himself pick the topics
to be checked.
The mayor believed that there should be clear criteria for
the number of staff and the budget allocated to the
municipality internal auditing unit, in relation to the
size of the municipality. The salary of the municipality
internal auditor should also be clearly defined and not be
decided by the municipality which employs the municipality
internal auditor.
To conclude, independence (only objectivity), competence,
scope of work and performance are all important as
criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of municipality
internal auditing. The management of the municipality
internal auditing department is not relevant for small
municipalities.
Meetings at the second municipality
The city concerned has a population of 120,000 and is
located south of Tel Aviv. The city has heavy industry
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plants, while also being very tourist-oriented with • an
adequate infrastructure. It has a very heterogeneous
population.
Each meeting with the officials of the municipality took
place separately.
4.1.3.2.	 Meeting with the municipality internal
auditor
The municipality internal auditor's comments:
(1) Regarding independence: 
a) The organisational status of the municipality
internal auditors is sufficient. They are among
the top employees in the municipality. Their
status enables them to have independence of mind.
He did not think that organisational status should
be part of the model as a criterion.
b) Objectivity is an important criterion. He
suggested to use as an (inverse) indicator the
percentage of the total number of investigations
made by the municipality internal auditing unit
which follows requests made by others. Requests
for an investigation are often politically
motivated and the municipality internal auditor
should not be an instrument in the hands of
others. Hence, the smaller the percentage, the
higher the independence of the internal auditing
unit. Another aspect of objectivity is whether
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the staff and budget are sufficient for the
internal auditing unit to operate adequately.
(2)Regarding competence:
He agreed with the different criteria. It is important to
meet at reasonably frequent intervals with the mayor. It
is also important that in-depth meetings are held to
discuss the recommendations included in the internal
auditing report.
(3)Regarding scope of work:
He accepted the different criteria. There is a gap here
between theory (in this case the law) and practice. The
law prescribes a virtually unlimited scope of work
including the mayor, the council and the top executives.
In "real life", the municipality internal auditor had
better not audit the mayor! He gave the example of a
municipality internal auditor who was in conflict with the
mayor and was continually asked to leave his office for
another room due to "maintenance work". .
There is a significant difference between the external
auditors, such as the State Comptroller, and the internal
auditor. The external auditors come for a relatively
short time to the municipality, and do not depend on the
municipality staff, executives or elected members, neither
for the presentation of their reports, nor for their
personal salaries.
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(4)Regarding performance:
He accepted the different criteria. He believed that an
important indicator is the pace at which the correction of
deficiencies, recommended in the municipality internal
auditing reports, is implemented.
(5)Regarding the management of the internal auditing
unit:
•The purpose, authority and responsibility of the unit
are clearly defined in the law for all municipalities.
Consequently there is no need to include it as a
criterion.
•A work plan is also required by law. The relevance of
topics in the work plan influences the perceived
effectiveness of the internal auditing unit. This is
even more true if one bears in mind that the
municipality internal auditor is mainly responsible
for choosing the topics included in the plan.
•Most municipality internal auditing units are small.
There is no need to have a criterion checking policy
and procedures inside the unit.
•Training is important.
•Co-ordination does not depend on the internal auditing
unit. This is because the external auditors do not
seek co-ordination with the internal auditing unit.
The external auditors are unwilling to divulge their
working plan to the municipality internal auditors and
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he has not been asked to present his plan to them.
There ought to be co-ordination but in practice it
does not exist. Therefore, co-ordination cannot be a
componnt.
* Checks on the quality of work of the internal auditing
unit by an external body do not exist formally. The
State Comptroller does not generally perform such a
check, unless it is the topic of the audit (This had
not happened, at least not for as long as he had been
in office.) In a way, the CPA firms employed by the
Ministry of the Interior inquire into the quality of
work of the internal auditing unit, but very
superficially. As it is now, checks could not be a
criterion, but if things change in the future, it
should be.
4.1.3.3.	 Meeting with the general director
The general director's comments 
(1)Regarding independence: 
The organisational status of the municipality internal
auditors is clearly defined by the law. This enables them
to perform their job properly. He did not think it should
be a criterion.
He believed that much has to do with the personality of
the municipality internal auditor. The resources
available, in staff and budget, are linked to the
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auditor's willingness to fight for the place of the
internal auditing unit in the municipality.
If the municipality internal auditors are not looking for
sensation, but are task oriented, there is no reason why
they should not audit the senior members of the
municipality. In his view, the present situation already
safeguards independence of mind.
He did not think that the municipality internal auditors
could find themselves faced with a conflict of interest.
(2)Regarding competence: He accepted the criteria.
As for satisfactory relationships, he saw it more as the
problem of the auditees. The greater the self confidence
of the auditees, the less they will feel "threatened" by
the internal auditing unit and the better they will
understand that it is intended to help them correct
deficiencies.
The recommendations for correcting the deficiencies form a
very important part of the internal auditing unit's work.
(3)Regarding scope of work: He accepted the criteria.
The most important criterion, which is the heart of the
audit, is the economical and efficient use of resources.
In his view, internal auditors should put more emphasis in
that direction, since only internal auditors will perform
such a check. (That had also been the opinion of the
mayor of the first municipality.)
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(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
The right selection of topics in the plan is very
important, because of limits on resources and the
inability to include all possible topics.
The respondent, who was the general director, also
commented on the follow-up regarding the correction of
deficiencies mentioned in the municipality internal
auditor's report. After the meetings with the mayor,
where decisions are made, he, the general director, was
expected to implement and follow up on the correction of
deficiencies. He believed that the follow-up of the
municipality internal auditing unit's recommendations was
important.
(5)Regarding the management of the internal auditing
unit: 
It is not relevant in the case of municipalities because
of the small size of the unit.
There are very seldom external auditors coming to the
municipality because of "the good reputation" of the
municipality.
4.1.3.4.	 Meeting with the chief financial officer
The chief financial officer's comments 
(1)Regarding independence: 
He accepted the criteria.
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The present situation does not make true independence
possible for the municipality internal auditor. The
municipality internal auditors are in fact dependent on
the mayor. In order for municipality internal auditors to
be independent, there should be an external body that
would assign them to particular municipalities. This body
would decide the conditions of work, the staff and the
budget needed to run the internal auditing unit in the
municipality. It was recommended that criteria should be
drawn up to determine what the staff and budget should be,
according to the specifications of the municipality.
Also, there should be rotation between municipality
internal auditors, such that each municipality internal
auditor stays in one municipality for (say) three years.
He did not believe in the good operation of the audit
committee since all the members are politicians (council
members). Neither should one rely on council members from
the opposition to keep a close eye on the ongoing
operations, since the mayor can "buy" their agreement to
certain measures. That is done by accepting to move
forwards certain topics that are important for those
council members' electorate. Therefore, only an
independent municipality internal auditor would improve
the standard of internal auditing in the municipality.
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
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It is important to test the ability of the municipality
internal auditor to stand firm under pressure. Speaking
of formal education, he would like to see a law school
graduate or a certified public accountant, in that order
of preference.
The municipality internal auditor should have the
personality to initiate work. Otherwise, a dangerous
situation could occur in which no internal auditing work
is performed and everyone is satisfied.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
The internal auditing unit should allocate most of its
efforts to compliance with policies, plans, procedures,
laws and regulations. This criterion should be the most
important for the internal auditing unit working within
the municipality.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
The follow-up is important. The problem is that the
departments in the municipality do not give enough
importance to the municipality internal auditor's reports.
This impression is reinforced if one compares their
attitude towards the State Comptroller's reports.
The municipality internal auditor's reports are generally
summarised in the local newspapers. However, people give
less importance to local newspapers than to the national
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newspapers, and tend to forget very soon what they have
read. If the reports were published in the national
newspapers, they would be viewed as more important, and
the unit's recommendations would be likelier to be
implemented.
(5)Regarding management of the municipality internal
auditing unit: 
He did not have anything to say about the criteria.
Today, he said, there is no quality assurance, but that
should change.
4.1.3.5.	 Meeting with	 the	 director	 of	 the
department auditing local authorities in
the Ministry of the Interior
The Ministry of the Interior is the link between the local
authorities and the central government.
The department receives the annual reports from
municipality internal auditors.
The director's comments:
1)Regarding independence: 
He accepted the criteria.
The tendency today is to strengthen the municipality
internal auditor's independence through changes in the
Municipal Ordinance.	 The existing situation is
problematic.	 For example, the mayors can prevent the
municipality internal auditors from checking a particular
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topic by instructing them to investigate some other
specified topic. He believed that one important question
in relation to independence was who appoints and dismisses
the municipality internal auditor. The proposed changes
include criteria for size of staff and budget necessary
for the municipality internal auditing unit.
	 The
municipality internal
	 auditor	 should have	 total
independence to decide what topics to tackle. Internal
auditors in municipalities are in a very special position.
On one hand, they perform all the usual tasks of an
internal auditor. On the other hand, their annual reports
are published as are the external auditors'.
2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the different criteria.
It is important that the internal auditors be university
graduates with a knowledge of computers. The municipality
internal auditing unit has to be perceived as constructive
and capable. It must be able to call upon a good
knowledge of administrative relations inside the
municipality and with the central government.
A good understanding of organisations and management is
also important.
3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
He stressed the importance of integrity both in policy and
in practice in the municipality, and the role of the
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municipality internal auditing unit to ascertain that it
is kept.
Checking compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws
and regulations is the most important criterion. (That
was also the opinion of the chief financial officer of the
municipality consulted in this study.)
4) Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
The follow-up is very important. For the last two years,
the director said he had received all annual reports of
the municipality internal auditors. He believed that this
helps force the municipalities to address these reports in
a serious manner.
5)Regarding management of the municipality internal
auditing unit: 
He did not accept the criterion of co-ordinating between
the external and internal auditors because he did not
believe that such co-ordination was desirable. He
instructed his staff that every audit they perform in a
municipality must include an evaluation of the quality of
the operations of the internal auditing unit.
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4.1.4.	 Analysing the results of the meetings from
the first phase
As a result of the meetings, one criterion, "maintaining
an honest, objective and fair ongoing process in decision
making" was added to the scope of work component.
Most components and criteria were accepted by the
respondents at the meetings.	 Some respondents were
inclined to delete certain criteria, or to emphasise the
importance of others.	 The recommendations, however,
differed in detail between the different respondents.
Though not requested, they did in some instances enter
into technical details on how to evaluate certain
criteria.
Four of the five meetings were with people involved in the
day-to-day work in the municipality.
Three of them — the mayor of the first municipality, and
the municipality internal auditor and general director of
the second municipality — wished to delete the same
criteria. They suggested the deletion of items on the
organisational status and on the management of the
municipality internal auditing unit. The chief financial
officer of the second municipality, did not wish to delete
any criteria, but did not feel that he could comment on
the management of the municipality internal auditing unit.
The only reservation in the mind of the director of the
department for auditing local authorities in the Ministry
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of the Interior was that he was against any co-ordination
between the internal and the external auditors.
The differences among the four representatives of the two
municipalities could lie in the fact that the chief
financial officer was relatively new to the municipality
system. He was appointed some three years before. He
might have therefore seen everything as a newcomer and
questioned everything. The three others may already have
been used to the existing system and not conceived the
need to challenge it. A difference of conception may also
be the key to the different approaches.
Taking into consideration the results of this first round
of meetings, it can be inferred that:
(1)The components for evaluating the effectiveness of the
internal auditing unit, as they appear in the I.I.A.
Standards, seem to cover the different components
which the different respondents expected to find in
such an evaluation relating to Israeli municipalities.
(2)The varying emphases placed on different criteria were
all connected to performance but showed variation
between the different criteria forming the performance
component.
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4.2.	 Second phase meetings
4.2.1.	 Introduction
The purpose of this phase was to reach a broader and
stronger basis among the users of the municipality
internal auditing product. As in the first phase, the
respondents were asked their opinion regarding the
components and criteria for evaluating the effectiveness
of internal auditing in municipalities.
The results of the first phase showed that three out of
five did not think that either organisational status nor
management of the municipality internal auditing
department needed to be included among the list of
components and criteria. Nevertheless, it was decided not
to reject them and instead to leave the decision until
after the second phase. On the other hand, another
criterion was added at that stage under the component
'scope of work', regarding the necessity to maintain an
honest, objective and fair ongoing process in
decision-making in the municipality (see Appendix D).
This should not be altogether surprising since, as already
mentioned, a number of mayors are under investigation by
the police. That is probably the reason why many users
would wish to know explicitly that the internal auditing
unit includes this item in its scope of work.
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The technique employed to elicit the different users'
comments on what the components and criteria should be was
the same as in the first phase.
The users chosen to participate in the second phase were
mostly represented groups of users which did not take part
in the first phase. The reason was to include
representatives of all the groups of users and to check
what their attitude was regarding the components and
criteria of the suggested model. Two additional
participants from the municipality internal auditing body
were added in order to reinforce their representation in
those meetings, as they are at the core of the study.
The meetings were held in June and July 1995. Each
meeting was held separately and lasted between half an
hour and more than two hours.
The author met with:
a) The senior deputy general director of the State
Comptroller's Office, in charge of the audit of all
local authorities in Israel. After many years in
the position, he has an overall view of the
situation.
The State Comptroller's Office publishes every few
years (not on a regular basis) a special report
devoted to local authorities.
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b) A senior director in the division which audits local
authorities in the State Comptroller's Office.
C) A municipality internal auditor.	 Though the city
has a huge deficit, the current municipality
internal auditor has an excellent reputation for
performance.
d) The former director of the Education department in a
big municipality, who has moved to direct a national
educational network in the public sector.
e) A journalist, writing for a main local newspaper in
Tel Aviv. He is in charge of covering municipality
affairs, including municipality internal auditing
reports.
f) The Chairman of the Audit Committee in one of the
largest municipalities.
g) The internal auditor, in one of the biggest
municipalities,	 in charge of the education
institutions.
h) A councillor from a medium size municipality.
i) An accountant from one of the CPA firms appointed by
the Ministry of the Interior to audit financial
reports of local authorities.
j) The deputy general director and director of human
resources of a medium size municipality.
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4.2.2.	 The approach used for these meetings
The approach used for these meetings was similar to the
approach used in the first phase.
4.2.3.	 Meetings and opinions
4.2.3.1.	 Meeting with the senior deputy director of
the State Comptroller's Office, in charge
of the audit of local authorities in
Israel
The senior deputy director's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
The organisational status is clear.
Objectivity is a valid criterion. A conflict of interest
may occur if the municipality internal auditor is
asked to join active committees, notably the tender
committee or the management committee, where the
participation of the municipality internal auditor may
be problematic.
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(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
He stressed the importance of correct relationships with
auditees, as long as the internal auditing unit's proper
function was never compromised.
He had some reservations about the internal auditing unit
giving recommendations on how to correct deficiencies.
Here it was necessary to heed carefully, since often there
might be different ways to solve the problems and the
internal auditor's recommendation might not be the best.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
In his mind, checking compliance with policies should
rather be the task of the external audit, and even then
great care was needed.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
He did not think it was relevant.
About co-ordinating internal and external auditors efforts
- this is not a reciprocal relationship, since the
municipality internal auditing unit is an integral part of
the auditee.
	 In big cities, the State Comptroller's
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Office asks for the municipality internal auditors' work
plans as well as their annual reports.
After an audit, the State Comptroller's Office sends the
report directly to the mayor. It is up to the mayor
whether or not to involve the municipality internal
auditor.
He did not reject the idea that in the future his division
would perform quality assurance upon the municipality
internal auditing unit.
General comments by the senior deputy general director
He believed that just as the number of years that the
State Comptroller can remain in post is limited by law,
the municipality internal auditor's tenure should be
similarly limited. He himself, in his own division,
performs rotation among his auditors to limit the
relationship between the auditors and the auditees whom
they audit.
The mayors can if they wish easily neutralise the
municipality internal auditors by not giving them the
tools needed to perform their job.
The State Comptroller expects the municipality internal
auditors to be able to check any subject, even if it
brings them to a situation of direct confrontation. Still
it does not expect them to check items that are directly
connected to the mayors, such as the salary of the latter.
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The true test of the municipality internal auditing unit
is which subjects they choose to check. In particular, it
is worth considering which problems the municipality
internal auditing unit has been instrumental in solving
when others did not want to tackle them. He did not think
that the audit committee in the municipality at present
has any substantial role.
4.2.3.2.	 Meeting with a senior director in the
division auditing local authorities in
the State Comptroller's Office
The senior director's comments:
(1) Regarding independence: 
The formal organisational status is clear.
Objectivity is a valid criterion. There may be a conflict
of interest situation if:
1. The municipality internal auditor or other members
of the unit are appointed from within the
municipality and in their new positions find
themselves auditing an item in which they were
involved through their former jobs. (This situation
is increasingly unusual nowadays since most auditors
are recruited from outside the municipality.)
2. The municipality internal auditor or the internal
auditing staff avoids auditing certain issues,
fearing possible personal retaliation (For example,
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the municipality internal auditor or the internal
auditing staff may refrain from investigating
manpower if the director of manpower has some
influence over the promotion of the municipality
internal auditing staff).
3. The municipality internal auditor or the internal
auditing staff are on friendly terms with the
auditee socially. (In that case, only the results
of the audit can show whether that relationship may
have been influential. A priori, it is difficult
for a third party to interfere because the limits
are not clear.)
(2) Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria, except for the supervision of
internal audits, since in most municipalities it is not
relevant. Even in the big three cities, the internal
auditing units are quite small (in fact less than a
dozen).
Nowadays, contrary to some twenty years ago, the State
Comptroller's Office does not criticise the professional
level of the municipality internal auditing staff. The
recruited staff are university graduates with relevant
professional background.
Correct relationships with the auditees are a much more
important issue for the internal auditing staff than for
the representatives of the State Comptroller's Office.
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The latter come from "outside", stay as long as is needed
to finish their audit and leave. The municipality
internal auditing staff will have to continue to work with
the same people day after day.
(3) Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
In his view, the municipality internal auditing unit has
an advantage in this area over the State Comptroller's
Office. The reasons are that the municipality internal
auditing unit knows the municipality well, and that the
information reaching it, both formal and informal, is on
an ongoing basis.
He stressed the importance of the economical and efficient
use of resources and did not think much time should be
allocated to the safeguarding of assets.
(4) Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
The follow up component is, from a technical point of
view, the simplest. The municipality internal auditing
just has to check whether the decision to correct a
certain deficiency was implemented or not. In practice,
many deficiencies are not corrected. In this, the
municipality internal auditing unit is in much the same
position as the State Comptroller's Office, where the
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correction rate in local authorities reaches an average of
about 50%.
(5) Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
He did not think it relevant.
A statement of purpose or any other statement regarding
policies or procedures more detailed than the Municipal
Ordinance is not practical and will not add anything.
Training for the staff of the internal auditing unit is
always desirable.
The relationship between the State Comptroller and the
municipality internal auditor is not reciprocal. The
municipality internal auditing unit should not repeat an
audit recently performed by the State Comptroller's
Office.
The work program is important to plan how to use the
scarce resources available to the municipality internal
auditing unit.
Quality assurance does not exist in municipality internal
auditing.
General comments by the senior director
There is a parallel between the audit committees in the
Khesset and in the municipalities. Both are composed of
political members.
	 Often political affiliations play a
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primary role and interfere with the functioning of the
audit committee.
The State Comptroller receives the annual reports
presented by the different municipality internal auditors,
and the range in the quality of work is broad.
4.2.3.3.	 Meeting with a municipality internal
auditor
With a population of more than 160,000, the city is one
of the largest in Israel. It suffers from high
unemployment and is seeking investors to create new jobs.
The municipality internal auditor's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
The present formal organisational status of the internal
auditing unit is clear. She expressed her wish to see an
internal auditing unit not depending on the good will of
the municipality for its resources.
Objectivity may differ according to the situation in each
municipality.
(2)Regarding competence: 
She accepted the criteria. She stressed the importance of
clear communication skills and the recommendations to
correct deficiencies.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
She accepted the criteria.
166
She stressed the importance of reliability and integrity
of information. Checking integrity in the decision making
or daily work is very important in theory, but very
difficult in practice (The treatment of tenders is a prime
example — it is very difficult to know who is connected to
whom, and parties do not have to bear the same names to be
connected).
(4)Regarding performance: 
She accepted the criteria.
From her experience, most of the deficiencies pointed out
by the municipality internal auditing unit are corrected,
though it sometimes takes a long time. In some cases, the
delay is due to objective reasons, such as lack of budget.
The follow-up component is very important.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
She thought it is not relevant.
Quality assurance did not exist but should be taken into
consideration in the future.
General comments by the municipality internal auditor
Her municipality internal auditing unit comprised five
people, including herself.
She believed in a constructive way of auditing. When she
submits a report, either the mayor or the general director
of the municipality — according to the subject of the
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report — call for a meeting with all the parties involved
to table resolutions.
She had been at her job for some six years. She had not
audited the implementation of decisions taken by the
different committees in the municipality, but she intended
to do so shortly.
She did not send her reports to anybody outside the
municipality, nor did she try to be in contact with
journalists. When approved to be published, the annual
report is brought to the knowledge of the media —
generally local newspapers — by the councillors, mostly
from the opposition. Though the economic situation of the
municipality was very bad, due to huge deficits, ' she had
her own budget, whose purpose was to hire services from
external professional consultants when needed. She used
this budget also if she needed an audit on the human
resources division, so that her staff would not find
themselves in a conflict of interest situation. The human
resources department decides on the conditions of
employment of the staff.
4.2.3.4.	 Meeting with the former director of the
education	 department
	
in	 a	 big
municipality
The former director of the education department's
comments:
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(1) Regarding independence: 
He accepted the criteria.
Though the organisational status of the municipality
internal auditors is known, it is very important that they
should bring with them a certain prestige when appointed
to the job.
He emphasised particularly the importance of objectivity.
He expected total objectivity towards employees and
elected members of the municipality (including the mayor).
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
He placed great importance on clear communication skills,
especially in recommendations for correcting deficiencies
and on mastering techniques and procedures of internal
auditing.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the different criteria.
He believed that the criterion of accomplishment of
established objectives and goals for operations and
program was relevant only when the auditor could quantify
the results, and that it was not a matter of opinion.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the different criteria.
He stressed the importance of follow up.
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(5) Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
He could not refer to this part.
General comments of the former director of the education
department
During the time he had worked for the municipality, there
were three different municipality internal auditors, one a
former bookkeeper and two lawyers. Beyond question, the
two lawyers had a quite different image — they were seen
much more objective.
He believed that in order to enhance the objectivity of
the internal auditing unit, a body external to the
municipality should decide on the employment conditions of
the internal auditing staff.
His impression was that the municipality internal auditing
unit was somewhat apprehensive about tackling subjects
where the "strongmen" of the municipality were in charge.
The follow-up should be undertaken by a competent external
body and not by the municipality internal auditing unit,
which does not have the power to enforce it.
4.2.3.5.	 Meeting with a journalist
The journalist was covering municipality matters,
including municipality internal auditing, for a main local
weekly magazine of Tel Aviv.
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In general, he accepted the different criteria. Instead
of reviewing every component separately, he rather
preferred to mention a few points regarding the subject.
(1)It was important to take into account the level of
independence of the municipality internal auditing
unit because it influences the range of subjects
audited.	 In other words, the range of subjects
audited reveals the degree of independence of the
internal auditing unit.
To enhance the unit's independence, the appointment of
the municipality internal auditors and all decisions
regarding their conditions of employment should be
transferred from the municipality to the Ministry of
the Interior.
(2)The reports presented after each audit by the
municipality internal auditing unit are very important
in correcting deficiencies. They are dealt with
immediately either by the mayot or the general
director, according to the subject, who call for a
meeting where decisions are taken.
(3)The yearly work plan of the municipality internal
auditing unit is fundamental because the subjects
included will attract the public interest according to
their importance for the public.
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(4)He could not say much about the management of the
municipality internal auditing unit. He himself was
only in touch with the head of the unit.
4.2.3.6.	 Meeting with the chairman of the audit
committee	 of one of the
	 largest
municipalities
The chairman of the audit committee's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
The organisational status of the internal auditing unit is
defined by the Municipal Ordinance.
Regarding objectivity, he accepted it as a valid
criterion.
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
It is important that the municipality internal auditor be
an auditor with experience and knowledge.
He stressed that it was important to recommend
improvements to correct defects.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
The municipality internal auditing unit is not supposed to
criticise the policy of the municipality, unless it is
clearly opposed to the law. The municipality internal
auditing unit should check the implementation of decisions
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taken at all levels of the municipality. Proper care
should be taken in maintaining an honest, objective and
fair ongoing process in the decision making, but he
considers the remaining criteria equally important.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
He emphasised the importance of follow up. He believed
that special power should be given to the municipality
internal auditor if the same deficiencies repeat
themselves.
The present author was present at the municipality council
when the chairman suggested that in such a case, the
municipality internal auditor would be empowered to add
the specific name of the responsible person to the report
being published and not just the function. (The proposal
was rejected by the council.)
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
He could not refer to this part.
General comments by the chairman of the audit committee
The chairman considered that the appointment or dismissal
of the municipality internal auditing staff should be the
responsibility of the State Comptroller's Office to ensure
independence. The municipality internal auditing unit in
this municipality, has not audited any subject which
directly concerns the actions of the mayor or his close
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circle. In the very few cases in other cities where this
occurred, the auditor was dismissed.
He believed that the audit committee is entitled to know
and enquire into everything that happens in the
municipality. He knew, however, that others disagreed.
He considered that council members both from the coalition
and from the opposition in the audit committee were
anxious to see deficiencies corrected - much depends on
who chairs the committee.
4.2.3.7.
	
	
Meeting with the internal auditor, in one
of the biggest municipalities, in charge
of the education institutions
This internal auditor works in the municipality internal
auditing unit.
The internal auditor's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
He accepted the criteria.
In the present situation, political persons (meaning the
council) appoint the municipality internal auditor. That
creates a situation of dependence. The municipality
internal auditing unit is therefore limited to the level
of department directors.	 Above that level, the unit
cannot act freely.
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
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His expectation from a good municipality internal auditor
was a combination of a good director with an adequate
professional background.
He emphasised the importance of clear communication
skills.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
He attached more importance to:
• compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and
regulations because, in his opinion, the main goal of
the municipality was to give a better service to the
public.
• economical and efficient use of resources.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
It was not so relevant.
General comments by the internal auditor
Of particular importance is the choice of topics included
in the internal auditing work plan. They should deal with
major control systems.
In the municipality, most deficiencies pointed out are
corrected through the intervention either of the mayor or
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of the general director, according to the importance of
the topic.
4.2.3.8.	 Meeting with a council member of a medium
size municipality
The councillor was also a lecturer in political sciences
at a university.
The city, with a population of 85,000, is located in the
centre of Israel.
The councillor pointed out from the beginning that he does
not have much contact with the municipality internal
auditing unit, apart from being given the annual report,
like all councillors.
The councillor's comments 
(1)Regarding independence: 
In his opinion, independence of mind is important in
relation to the internal auditing unit.
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
He emphasised the importance of mastering techniques and
procedures of internal auditing.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
He accepted the criteria.
He thought the most important criterion was compliance
with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations.
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(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
The follow-up criterion was the most important.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
This was not relevant.
General comments by the councillor
The councillor was a candidate, on behalf of the
opposition, to chair the audit committee in the
municipality. Other members of the opposition opposed his
nomination. They feared he would use this position to gain
publicity, especially since he had made no secret of his
plan to run for mayor in the next election.
In the municipality, he was in closer contact with the
legal advisor, from whom he was inquiring about certain
legal facets of the municipality's operations. On very
few occasions, he had met with the municipality internal
auditor and suggested that he check certain topics.
4.2.3.9.	 Meeting at a CPA firm, appointed by the
Ministry of the Interior to audit local
authorities
The firm was auditing a relatively small local authority
in the northern part of Israel as its external auditor.
Before that, the firm was the external auditor of a medium
size municipality.
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The firm's final report is submitted to the Ministry of
the Interior. In the questionnaires received from the
ministry, they are asked not only to check subjects
relating to the financial audit but also subjects relating
to the administration of the local authority (including
questions about the internal auditing operation).
The CPA's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
He accepted the criteria.
(2)Regarding competence: 
He accepted the criteria.
He considered that it was very important to understand how
the municipality works.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
All the criteria included are important.
(4)Regarding performance: 
He accepted the criteria.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
This was not so relevant.
There was no mutual co-operation between the external
auditing and the internal auditing operations. It was all
one-way. The external auditors will ask to look at the
internal auditing unit's reports but not vice versa.
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General comments by the CPA
It was not important to stick religiously to the work
plan. Sometimes it was necessary to leave a topic that
had been planned and to concentrate on another topic that
had priority from the internal auditing point of view.
4.2.3.10.	 Meeting with the deputy general director
and director of human resources in the
municipality
The city is of medium size and is located in the centre of
Israel with a population of about 65,000.
The deputy general director and director of human
resource's comments:
(1)Regarding independence: 
By looking at the organisational structure, one can infer
that there was a problem of dependency upon the auditees.
This dependency ultimately creates a conflict of interest
situation. In practice, the mayor's attitude towards the
municipality internal auditor will determine the latter's
situation. The problem is not just with the top levels of
the municipality, but with all levels.
(2)Regarding competence: 
She accepted the criteria.
She emphasised the importance of interpersonal and
communication skills.
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She believed that much effort should be given to checking
the integrity of operations in the municipality.
(3)Regarding scope of work: 
She accepted the criteria.
(4)Regarding performance: 
She accepted the criteria.
She attached much importance to follow-up.
(5)Regarding management of the internal auditing
department: 
It was not relevant.
She would welcome quality assurance control, performed by
external specialists.
General comments by the deputy general director and
director of human resources
The municipality internal auditing should pay a great deal
of attention to tenders, as it is such a sensitive issue.
4.2.4.	 Conclusions from the first and second phase
of	 meetings	 with	 the	 different
representatives of users
All of the first four components (independence,
competence, scope of work and performance) were accepted
by all the respondents as valid in the evaluation of the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities in
Israel.
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Table 4.3: Summing up first and second phases
meetings
• :	 :•'''
	
*Components for 	
	
........ evahiating the ..!
	 	 effectiveness of
munieipality internal.
:	  	 auditing "...: .
........
•
Useii
Within the
municipality.
Used sOUtSide
• •••
tie 	
:••••	 Independence	 •i
4*
10
3
5
5 2- Organisational
status
•	 •	 Objectivity
Competence 10 5
Scope of work 10 5
Performance 10 5
Management of the
1** 2 7 3municipality internal
auditing unit
* one respondent did not refer to that item
** two respondents did not refer to that item
Emunicipali
Regarding independence, there were some reservation from
users about the need to include the organisational status
of the internal auditing unit as a criterion. There was
no suggestion that it was not a factor important for
independence. Rather, it was felt that the organisational
status of the municipality internal auditor was explicit
in the Ordinance, and so could not elicit differing
responses. Even so, to quote one respondent mentioned in
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this study, "the mayors' attitude towards the municipality
internal auditors will determine their situation". In
other words, the mayors may, by their attitude, influence
the perceived organisational status of the municipality
internal auditor, even though the latter's official
organisational status is the same for all municipalities.
It was therefore decided to leave the organisational
status as a criterion in the independence component of the
model.
Many respondents rejected criteria within the component of
the management of the internal auditing unit. Those
criteria were, in their opinion, irrelevant because of the
small size of the internal auditing unit in Israeli
municipalities. Still others accepted the criteria
related to professional development, to co-ordination
between external and internal auditors and to quality
assurance.
It was finally decided to retain the component regarding
the management of the internal auditing unit, together
with its criteria. One must however remember that many of
the respondents in the research may have decided not to
answer this section of the research because of a perceived
lack of knowledge or relevance. The responses in the
empirical research regarding this component proved
decisive in deciding whether or not this component should
remain part of the model.
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Based on the different components and criteria decided
upon in the model, a questionnaire was prepared. The
questionnaire was used as the research tool in the
empirical survey of this study.
Chapter five
Questionnaire development
5.0.	 Introduction
There are different ways of collecting information:
observations, interviews, experiments, content analysis,
questionnaires, etc.
	 Here the chosen means was a
questionnaire. The use of a questionnaire makes it
possible to standardise information which helps in the
interpretation of results. Questions must be specific
and the language must be clear so that there will be no
room for ambiguity or misunderstanding.
Weisberg & Bowen (1977:43-57) identify two types of
questionnaires with their characteristics:
(1)The open ended questionnaire, which basically
enables the respondents to answer the question in
their own words.
(2)The close ended questionnaire, which gives a number
of alternative answers from which the respondents
are to select one or more.
Here the close ended format was selected, for the
following reasons:
(1)The questions are quick to answer.
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(2)The respondents classify the responses themselves,
thus avoiding any misunderstanding by the researcher
of what the respondents meant.
(3)The	 format	 does	 not	 discriminate	 against
inarticulate respondents.
De Vaus (1986:75) quotes the view of Gallup that closed
questions are well suited for finding out how strongly
an opinion is held, which is a principal concern of this
research.
The questions in the empirical survey were of
Likert-style formats. This involves providing the
respondents with statements and asking them how strongly
they agree or disagree.
Weisberg & Bowen (1977:50) maintain that in non-metric
psychological research, people can distinguish up to
seven different degrees reliably. In this study a range
of six alternative answers will be given for each
question. The number six was chosen to give a broad
range of choice and at the same time avoid fence
sitting. A seventh alternative "not available or do not
know" was given in order to avoid forcing people to
offer opinions on issues on which they have no
knowledge.
185
5.1.	 Pilot testing
Every questionnaire must be tested and refined under
real-world conditions.
Sudman and Bradburn (1982:283) declared that although
together, they had more than fifty years' experience in
questionnaire construction, they did not know any
professional social scientists who claimed to be able to
write questionnaires that need no revision.
The ideal questionnaire is one that communicates to the
respondents and, in return, obtains the required
information.
Account has been taken of the recommendation by Czaja
(1996:90) that self administered questionnaires should
not exceed eight pages.
A few preliminary steps were taken before the
questionnaire was finalised:
(1)The present author played the role of the
respondents and answered his own questions. Often
even at this basic stage some problems could be
detected and solved.
(2)The questionnaire was presented to peers for
comments.
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(3)Professor Selim and Dr. Rozevitch, the research
supervisors, were asked to give their comments on
the questionnaire.
(4)The questionnaire was pilot tested, for validity and
reliability.
The questionnaire was designed to be self administered.
The pilot test was sent to 26 respondents, belonging to
the test target population (see section 3.1). The
sample included users of the municipality internal
auditing product both within the municipality (including
the internal auditing staff) and outside.
Regarding the first category, namely users within the
municipality, two municipalities were selected. One was
located in the north of the country with a middle size
population and the other was a larger municipality
located in the centre. No meetings had been held with
any officers or councillors from these municipalities at
any prior stage of the research. The users in this case
included the mayor, chairperson of the Audit Committee,
directors and deputy directors of municipality
departments.
The second category, namely users outside the
municipality, included the following: executives of
different levels from the State Comptroller's Office
(from the department in charge of local authorities), a
CPA office auditing a municipality on behalf of the
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Ministry of the Interior, and a journalist covering
municipality affairs for a newspaper. The respondents
were asked to give their comments on the questionnaire
and on the cover letter attached to the questionnaire
from all possible points of view: ambiguity, syntax,
form, clarity of statement.
In addition, the respondents were asked how much time
they needed to fill in the questionnaire. This last
information would enable the author to tell the
respondents in the final questionnaire approximately how
long they would need to fill in the questionnaire.
Fowler (1993:103) reports that the Federal Office of
Management in the USA has set a guideline that surveys
should take less than half an hour.
Eighteen out of the twenty six questionnaires were
returned in the collect paid envelopes that were part of
the package.
All respondents but one reported as requested the time
taken to fill in the questionnaire. Most of the
responses fell between fifteen and twenty minutes.
There were exceptions in the two extremes: one reported
that it took five minutes and another thirty-five
minutes. The average was eighteen minutes.
No remarks were made regarding the supervisors' letters,
which were part of the package. The questionnaires,
including instructions and statements, seemed to be
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clear since no remarks were made regarding the syntax,
form or clarity.
There was one remark from a user outside the
munizipality that was made by phone. He explained to
the author that he found it difficult to give one strict
answer to some of the statements since he was in contact
with different municipalities and the quality of
internal auditing differs from one municipality to
another. The author told him that he expected the
respondent to integrate his general impression on the
different items where he felt it to be possible. Later
on when the author received this respondent's
questionnaire, most of the statements had in fact been
answered. Nevertheless, the author took his remark into
account and added in the instructions a note to explain
what was expected from users that are in contact with
more than one municipality.
Most of the items not answered by the different
respondents,	 including the municipality	 internal
auditing staff, related - as foreseen - to the
management of the internal auditing department in the
municipality. However, the unanswered items were not
always the same.
In general, the results of the questionnaire were in
line with what the author had anticipated.
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The pilot test results opened the way to start the final
test.
5.2.	 Statements used in the questionnaire
The statements are based on the different criteria, for
each of the five components included in the model to
evaluate the effectiveness of internal auditing in
municipalities in Israel.
The criteria were checked through two phases of
interviews with representatives of the different groups
of users of the internal auditing product.
Some of the statements were inspired by questions that
appeared in the research literature on internal
auditing. Others were composed by the author. As
mentioned, the questionnaire was pilot tested before
being sent to the targeted population.
Each group of statements is related to specific
hypotheses.
The statements cover all the criteria within the
different components included in the model.
5.3. Purpose of each statement and linkage to
relevant hypotheses
The questionnaire appears in English translation in
Appendix H. The first section (Section I) serves to
characterise the respondent and to gather demographic
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data. Questions 1 to 3 are for all respondents, while
questions 4 to 14 are for the municipality internal
auditors only.
The questions addressed exclusively to the municipality
internal auditors concern their staff and budget,
educational programs, type of audits performed and other
features specific to the internal auditing unit.
The different statements of Section II will be examined
separately.
The goal in this section is to evaluate the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit. Following the model presented, the effectiveness
of the municipality internal auditing unit is
multidimensional and includes five components:
(1) The	 independence of internal
	
auditing in
municipalities.
(2) The	 competence	 of	 internal	 auditing	 in
municipalities.
(3) The scope of work of internal auditing in
municipalities.
(4) The	 performance
	 of	 internal
	
auditing	 in
municipalities.
(5) The management of the internal auditing unit in
municipalities.
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For each of these components, the author included
statements.
The respondents were asked to evaluate their agreement
to each statement, according to their perception, on a
scale of 1 (complete disagreement) to 6 (complete
agreement).
5.3.1.	 Part 1: Independence - Statements one to
seven.
The statements in Part 1 are related to the component
evaluating the independence of the internal auditing
unit in municipalities in Israel.
Independence, according to the model, is influenced by
organisational status and objectivity.
• Statement number one is about the organisational
status of the municipality internal auditor, who
heads	 the	 internal	 auditing	 unit	 in	 the
municipality.
Though the organisational status of the municipality
internal auditor in Israel is defined by the law,
the author considers it important to have the
respondents' opinion. The organisational status may
be different de facto from what the legislation
intended, or it may be as intended but perceived by
the respondents as inadequate for the requirements
of the job.
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• Statement number two is about the ability of the
internal auditing staff, in general, to operate in a
free and objective way.
• Statement numbers three and four test the freedom
enjoyed by the internal auditing unit.
	 They are
intended	 to	 complement
	 statement	 two	 in
understanding the extent of that freedom.
Statement number five has two purposes:
(1)To check that the internal auditing staff has no
operating responsibilities to design or operate
systems in addition to its regular duties.
(2)This statement is presented differently from the
former ones, in that a "disagree" answer is
expected. This should avoid what is called a
"response set", when someone after reading a few
statements, uses the same set for all the
statements.
• Statement number six is to check whether the
internal auditing unit is perceived as being free of
any conflict of interest which could compromise its
objectivity.
• Statement number seven is concerned with the
perception of the respondents as to the extent of
the mayor's involvement in deciding what items will
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appear in the work plan of the internal auditing
unit. The items included in the plan are supposed
to be the municipality internal auditor's own
decision. The more the mayor is involved, the more
the independence of the municipality internal
auditor is impaired.
Statements 1-7 are related to hypotheses one, two and
three. The data analysis according to the different
respondent groups might or might not confirm the
different hypotheses.
5.3.2.	 Part 2: Competence - Statements eight to
thirteen.
The statements in Part 2 are related to the component
evaluating the competence of the internal auditing unit
in municipalities in Israel.
Competence, according to the model, is influenced by:
Appropriate educational background (the individuals in
the internal auditing unit), knowledge skills and
disciplines (the internal auditing unit as a whole),
properly supervised internal audits, mastering
techniques and procedures of internal auditing , skill
in written and oral communication, high levels of
honesty, objectivity, diligence, and loyalty.
• Statement number eight is about the clarity of
communication of the internal auditing staff as
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perceived by all the parties involved.	 Internal
auditing staff should possess this skill.
• Statement number nine is concerned with the
perceptions of the different respondents as to
whether the internal auditing unit can call upon the
necessary knowledge, skills and disciplines to carry
out its responsibility.
• Statement number ten is about whether the internal
auditor's relationships with auditees are
satisfactory. A satisfactory relationship should be
conducive to a successful audit. An auditee whose
relationship with the auditor is satisfactory will
be more open to accept the latter's findings and
then to correct whatever is necessary.
• Statement number eleven checks whether the internal
auditing staff convey every element of their work in
a clear way both in oral and written communication.
At every point in their work, the internal auditors
must be able to clarify to the auditee the
intentions and expectations of the internal auditing
unit. Misunderstanding could impair the audit, while
good understanding could improve the effectiveness
of the audit.
• Statement number twelve evaluates the respondents'
perception of the honesty and objectivity of the
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internal auditing staff.	 Honesty and objectivity
are important in internal auditing. It should
enable the internal auditing unit even to raise
items which might make the management feel
uncomfortable. It is important that the internal
auditing unit should be seen as honest and
objective, in order for the auditees to co-operate.
• Statement number thirteen checks whether the
internal auditing unit in the municipalities in
Israel is seen as not merely pointing out
malfunctions but as actually recommending
improvement to correct them.
Statements number 8-13 are related to hypotheses four,
five and six. The data analysis according to the
different respondent groups might or might not confirm
the different hypotheses.
5.3.3.	 Part 3: Scope of work - Statements fourteen
to twenty two
The statements in Part 3 are related to the component
evaluating the scope of work of the internal auditing
unit in municipalities in Israel.
Scope of work, according to the model, encompasses the
reliability and integrity of information; compliance
with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations;
the safeguarding of assets; economical and efficient use
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of resources; the accomplishment of established
objectives and goals for operations or programs; and
maintaining an honest, objective and fair ongoing
process in decision making.
• Statement number fourteen checks the perception in
general as to whether the internal auditing unit
evaluates the adequacy of the system of internal
control in the municipality.
• Statement number fifteen is concerned with the
perception of internal auditing as checking the
reliability and integrity of information.
• Statement number sixteen is concerned with the
question whether checks on compliance with policies,
plans, procedures, laws and regulations are included
in the scope of work of internal auditing.
• Statement number seventeen is about another facet of
the scope of work: the review of the system used for
the safeguarding of assets.
• Statement number eighteen checks whether the
internal auditing unit is seen as checking the
economy and efficiency with which resources are
employed. In other words, it is not enough to look
at the end product of an operation; it is also
important to ascertain that it has been achieved in
an economic and efficient way.
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• Statement number nineteen is linked to the
conception that internal auditing reviews operations
or programs and compares the results with
established objectives and goals.
• Statement number twenty examines whether the
different respondent groups perceive that the
internal auditing unit is checking that the decision
making process in the municipality is free of
corrupt practices.
• Statement number twenty one checks whether the
internal auditing unit in its operation is seen as
impartial between the different levels of the
municipality.
• Statement number twenty two is a continuation of the
previous statement and focuses on the perception of
the respondents. The Municipal Ordinance expects
the municipality internal auditor's scope of work to
encompass the mayor's own operations. The statement
is concerned with whether the different groups of
respondents perceive that this is actually done.
Statements number 14-22 are related to hypotheses seven,
eight and nine. The data analysis according to the
different respondent groups might or might not confirm
the different hypotheses.
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5.3.4.	 Part 4: Performance - Statements twenty
three to twenty nine.
The statements in Part 4 are related to the component
evaluating the performance of the internal auditing unit
in municipalities in Israel.
Performance, according to the model, is influenced by:
Planning the audit, examining and evaluating
information, communicating results, and the follow-up to
check whether proper action is taken on report audit
findings.
• Statement number twenty three concerns the external
framework of the reports issued by the internal
auditing unit: whether the report is seen as clear,
concise (short as possible) and timely (not too far
in time from when the audit was performed - in order
to be effective).
• Statement number twenty four deals with the question
of whether the reports are constructed in a manner
that indicates clearly the objectives, scope,
results and recommendations of the audit.
• Statement number twenty five inquires whether the
internal auditing tackles subjects of central
importance in its audits. The internal auditing
unit may be very active and possess all the
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necessary skills, but still devote its energy to
problems of only peripheral interest.
• Statement number twenty six is about the planning of
the different audits performed by the internal
auditing unit.
• Statement number twenty seven inquires into the
follow-up performed by the internal auditing unit
after reports have been presented. The purpose of
the follow-up is to verify that corrective measures
have been applied on any deficiencies pointed out,
and that the audit has achieved the desired results
for the item concerned.
From the interviews performed, it seemed that if
corrective action was not taken at the time and the
same deficiencies had to be pointed out repeatedly
in subsequent audits, the perceived effectiveness of
the internal auditing unit was impaired. Since the
follow-up is concerned with implementation of
recommended corrective action, it falls logically
under the heading of performance.
• Statement number twenty eight evaluates whether the
speed of implementation of recommended corrective
actions on reported findings is perceived as
satisfactory.
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• Statement number twenty nine checks further whether
there are unnecessary delays in which case the pace
of corrective action, even if satisfactory, could
still be improved. The presentation of this
statement in the negative form was in order to
prevent a "response set".
Statements number 23-29 are related to hypotheses ten,
eleven and twelve. The data analysis according to the
different respondent groups might or might not confirm
the different hypotheses.
5.3.5. Part 5: Management of the internal auditing
unit - Statements thirty to thirty
five.
The statements in Part 5 are related to the component
evaluating the management of the internal auditing unit
in municipalities in Israel.
Management of the internal auditing unit, according to
the model, is influenced by:
	 the audit work planning,
policies and procedures, personnel management
development, co-ordinating internal and external audit
efforts and the existence of quality assurance.
• Statement number thirty is about the perceived
co-ordination of activities between the internal
auditing unit in the municipality and the external
auditor. The idea is that the internal and external
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auditors could complement each other for the benefit
of the municipality.
• Statement number thirty one inquires whether any
form of external review program exists which could
perform quality assurance of the internal auditing
unit in the municipalities.
• Statement number thirty two is about the
participation of the internal auditing staff in
professional organisations.
• Statement number thirty three checks whether the
internal auditing staff are encouraged to continue
self-development for the benefit of the internal
auditing unit in the municipality. It is
self-evident that better trained internal auditors,
up to date in fields relative to their job, will
perform better.
• Statement number thirty four inquires whether the
internal auditing unit maintains a written policy
and procedures manual. During the interview phase,
some respondents thought this unnecessary due to the
small size of the internal auditing units in
municipalities.
• Statement number thirty five inquires whether
promotion or dismissal of internal auditing
personnel is consistent with performance appraisals.
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Statements number 31-35 are related to hypotheses
thirteen, fourteen and fifteen. The data analysis
according to the different respondent groups might or
might not confirm the hypothesis.
5.4.	 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the different stages before
the questionnaire used in the empirical research was
finalised. The first step was to decide that a
questionnaire would be the best means to collect the
data from the respondents. Then, the close ended
questionnaire, with its various advantages, was seen as
the most appropriate for this research.
The Likert-style format was adopted. For each statement
presented, the respondents had a range of six
alternative answers asking them how strongly they agree
or disagree. A seventh alternative "not available or do
not know" was given. The questionnaire was pilot tested
for validity and reliability with a sample from the
targeted population. The outcome of the pilot test made
it possible to send out the final questionnaires. This
chapter also showed the connections between the
statements used in the questionnaire and the components
and criteria of the model, on the one hand and the
underlying hypotheses on the other.
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Chapter six
Respondents
6.0. Introduction
Before starting the empirical survey, the author knew it
was not an easy task to collect data through mail
self-administered questionnaires. It is common
knowledge that the percentage of responses is usually
quite low. Moreover, those who respond are not a random
sample. Regarding those who do respond, Fowler (1993)
writes that in general people who have a particular
interest in the subject matter of the research itself
are more likely to return mail questionnaires.
Bainbridge (1989) mentions that though others have
written about how to get high response rates for mailed
surveys, his own experience has consistently shown that
the proportion of recipients of a mailed printed survey
who were willing to complete and return it is about 50%.
Warwick & Lininger (1975:129) mention that "completion
rates on many mail questionnaires are notoriously low,
with figures of 40 to 50 percent considered good".
Menzel (1995) mentions an investigation by West, Berman
and Cava on the ethical environment. They conducted a
mail survey of personnel directors in USA municipalities
of 25,000 and over in population. They reported a rate
of response of 36.5%.
	 In his own research, Menzel
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reports that all regular members of the Florida City and
County Management Association (FCCMA) and all regular
members of the Texas City Management Association (TCMA)
were selected as the study populations. Mail
questionnaires were sent in Autumn 1991 to the members
of the FCCMA and in early 1992 to the members of the
TCMA. Although both associations actively endorsed the
project and co-operated fully to encourage participation
by their members, the response rate for the members of
the FCCMA was only 39.5% and for TCMA was 45.5%.
A top executive from the Central Bureau of Statistics in
Israel told the author that not much has been written on
response rates to mail questionnaires in Israel, but it
was expected to be lower that in the USA. The author
consulted two professors from the School of Business
Administration of Tel Aviv University and both Professor
Hornik (1996) and Professor Izraeli (1996) reported that
mail questionnaires in Israel yield very low rates of
response, without venturing to quantify. The author
also consulted a leading public opinion and research
analyst company. Their rough evaluation of the response
rate in Israel was about 15%, and for a questionnaire
specifically on local government, they would assess the
rate even lower.	 The reason was mainly the public's
general lack of co-operation in surveys.
The main concern when such low response rates are
obtained is to be convinced that the sample collected is
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a fair representation of the target population and that
the pattern of response has not introduced any bias.
Apart from a low response rate, there were other
obstacles for which the author was not prepared.
Representatives of official organs outside the
municipalities, who had collaborated with the author in
previous stages of the study, discovered that they were
prevented from filling in the final questionnaire. The
difficulties here were legal-procedural. Another
problem that had to be overcome was a certain reluctance
on the part of some respondents actually to evaluate the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit.
	
The percentage of responses was found to vary
among the different groups.
6.1.	 The questionnaire package
A standard questionnaire package was prepared.
The package included two cover letters from the
supervisors, the questionnaire in Hebrew (Appendix I -
the English version appears in Appendix H) and a collect
paid envelope addressed to the author.
The two cover letters were from Professor Selim in
English (Appendix F) and from Dr. Rozevitch in Hebrew
(Appendix G). In those letters, the respondent was
given some background on the City University Business
School, the research topic and its importance.	 The
respondent was also informed that the questionnaire had
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been pilot tested and that filling it in should take
15-20 minutes. Finally, the respondent was requested to
fill in the questionnaire and send it back in the
envelope provided.
Each questionnaire package was put in an individual
envelope.
During the earlier interviews, many respondents had
suggested that instead of sending the questionnaire
packages separately to all the different respondents in
a given municipality, it was better to send the packages
together to one person who could be the "co-ordinator"
in the municipality. This person would then allocate
the questionnaires to the different respondents in the
municipality, specified according to a standard list of
job titles, and would supply the appropriate names. The
list of job titles was provided in an additional letter
from Dr. Rozevitch. A translation of the job titles was
added in italics to the original and is presented in the
second page of Appendix J. The co-ordinator was able
later to follow up whether the respondents had sent back
their questionnaires. It was recommended that the
municipality internal auditor, having a vested interest
in that topic, would be the co-ordinator.
During the pilot test, the author was asked to send more
questionnaires than planned, because the "co-ordinator"
anticipated the need to give the questionnaire to
additional job holders.
	
It was not clear whether the
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reason was for internal political reasons or for the
aims of the research. To provide for this need, two
additional optional questionnaire packages were added to
each set sent to the municipality with appropriate
guidelines.
In fact, before sending the set, the author would call
and inform the municipality internal auditor about the
research and his request. About half, though, preferred
the set to be sent to the general director of the
municipality instead, and this was done.
6.2.	 The different groups planned to take part in the
survey
The aim of the survey was to find out, through the data
collected, how each respondent group evaluates the
different components composing the model of
effectiveness of municipality internal auditing in
comparison to other respondent groups.
It was planned to have two categories of respondent
groups: 1) Within the municipality 2) Outside the
municipality.
The intention was to have several respondent groups in
each category. In the category "within the
municipality" the groups were: 1) the municipality
internal auditing unit 2) the mayors 3) the general
directors	 4)	 Chief officers and middle level
management of the finance, education and engineering
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departments 5) Councillors (heads of departments, when
appropriate, in the above mentioned municipality
departments; and members of the audit committee).
In the category "outside the municipality" the groups
were: 1)	 the State Comptroller unit auditing local
authorities. 2) the CPA firms appointed by the
Ministry of the Interior to audit the books of the
different municipalities. The department auditing local
authorities in the Ministry of the Interior could not be
considered a separate group since only around half a
dozen auditors were working there. 3) journalists
covering municipality affairs.
It turned out that not all targeted groups could take
part in the research for various reasons as follows:
Among the respondent groups outside the municipalities,
the State Comptroller's Office division in charge of the
audit of local authorities was not permitted to
participate in the research. The author had met with
the director of this division at previous stages of the
research and had had his full co-operation. After
checking, however, the director of the division told the
author that neither he nor his staff were allowed to
fill in the questionnaire. As auditors of the State
Comptroller's Office, they were not allowed to present
any official or even personal view concerning their
experiences at work.
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A second external group that could not take part in the
research comprised the CPA firms appointed by the
Ministry of the Interior. Again, the person in charge
in the ministry, though he had met with the author at
length at previous stages of the research was not
allowed to provide a list of auditors.
Among the respondent groups within the municipality, it
seemed unlikely from the first that the mayors would
respond. The author nevertheless sent questionnaires to
the mayors, but hardly any responded. On inquiring
further, the author was told the mayors were counting on
their general directors to answer.
Municipality internal auditors have formed a group that
meets on a regular basis and discusses common problems.
The author was provided with the mailing list. As of
April 1996, forty two members were listed.
Henry (1990:14) suggests that when dealing with a small
population, less than 50, collecting data on the entire
population is likely to improve the reliability and
credibility of the data. The 42 municipalities with
internal auditing units were therefore all included in
the target population.
Unfortunately, at the time of the investigation, there
were serious security problems,	 including border
crossfire, in the northern part of the country.
	 The
author felt it was not an appropriate time to request
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the participation of job holders in three municipalities
in that region.
In three other cases, human error and misunderstanding
prevented the participation of the municipalities
concerned.
For those technical reasons, which should not bias the
data, only thirty six municipalities finally
participated in the survey (Appendix K). These are best
viewed not as a sample, but as the population.
6.3.	 Population base: (see also Tables 6.1-6.2)
Within the municipality: 
• The mayor (population: 36).
• The	 audit	 committee
	
(Two members	 for	 each
municipality, namely the chairperson - traditionally
a councillor from the opposition - and another
councillor from the coalition. Population: 72).
• The municipality internal auditing unit (population:
municipality internal auditors: 36, staff: 27).
• The general director (This post exists in most
municipalities. When absent, the municipality
secretary performs this function. population: 36).
•Three typical departments were chosen to represent
the different main	 departments	 found	 in a
municipality. Representing the technical departments
- Engineering. Representing the service departments -
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Finance.	 Representing the line departments
Education.	 Three levels of management were planned
to take part in the research: The head of the
department (when one is appointed it is a
councillor), the chief officer of the department and
a middle level officer. (The population of the chief
and middle level officers: 	 108 each).	 Most
municipalities
	
have
	 heads
	 of	 education	 and
engineering while many do not have heads of finance.
In the opinion of Dr Rozevitch, with which the
author agrees, the reason is that many mayors want to
have finance under their direct supervision.
Questionnaires were therefore sent to the heads of
education and engineering only (population: 72).
• Two optional questionnaires were sent for the use of
the "co-ordinator" to include additional respondents
In the municipality (population: 72). Only those
actually used were taken into consideration.
Outside the municipality
• the public - represented by the journalists covering
municipality	 affairs,	 mainly	 from	 regional
newspapers.	 (There are a few regional newspapers or
magazines in each area. On the other hand, many
cover more than one municipality. In total there are
about 50 journalists working in different regional
and local newspapers. Population: 50).
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The parcels containing the questionnaire packages were
sent to each municipality with a cover letter signed by
Dr. Rozevitch and containing the list of job titles
whose holders were hoped to participate in the survey
(Appendix J).
Following telephone calls between the author and the
municipalities, the parcels were sent either to the
municipality internal auditor or to the general director
of the municipality. The numbers were about equal, with
no correlation between the addressee of the parcel and
the size of the city.
To ensure a larger participation, a follow-up was
performed by the author using telephone calls and also
faxes. However, since many questionnaires were sent back
anonymously, which in itself did not go against the
research directives, it was difficult to find out which
respondents still had not responded.
The author was pleasantly surprised by the backing of
some general directors who added personal letters to the
other respondents in the municipality requesting their
co-operation and stressing the importance of the
research.
In the middle of April 1996, the questionnaire packages
were delivered by mail to the thirty six municipalities.
At the same time, the appropriate questionnaire packages
were sent to the journalists covering municipality
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affairs in the local and regional newspapers. The
author received the list of local newspapers thanks to
the Centre for Local Government.
The date limit for receiving the completed
questionnaires to take part in the research was June 30,
1996.
6.4.	 Response Rate
Table 6.1:	 Distribution of respondent groups - I
(including mayors)
. : Within the municipalityi:: : -: -•. "	
iiii:	 .
:018i00.:thei
niiinidOWMy
Users of municipality internal auditing services
—	 ."	 I	 ' 	 ;	 ' 	 .....	 -	 ' 	 ' 	 '..	 •	 .	 ".	 -,
, , . Murncipality, .
internal auditing
.7tiM'C.PNi„
:.lotirn.4listS::
Questionnaires
Mayor Councillors General
directors
0) .
'	 .	 :
i Chief .
officers
.	 :	 ..;
.Middle
.
dricen
.	 i'•	 .",	 ;--
Munici:
Aoality .
internal :
auditors'
Assistant
:-..'-:	 '	 '
- .. iiiteniat , :-=
: : auditOrS:':
:: . ; . : ...	 -	 •
....
	 :  ..
i: ''' 	 ......
Sad 36 144 36 117(2) 112(2) 36 27 50
Received 1 28 18 36 29 31 9 24
(1)	 Mostly general directors; in very few cases when the municipality had no general director,
the questionnaire was filled in by the municipality secretary.
(2)	 The number includes the optional questionnaires that actually were used.
After consultation with Professor Selim, it was decided
that the mayors, of whom hardly any had responded,
should be excluded from the analysis. Later on, the
author had individual meetings with mayors to have their
opinion on the results of the data collected.
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Table 6.2: Distribution of respondent groups
Users ofmunicipaliti .internal auditing
Councillors
Received
(1) As described in the next chapter, the general directors and chef officers, due to same
behaviour of responses will collapse into one group for the data analysis.
(2) The same is true for the two groups of municipality internal auditing respondents that will
merge into one.
Percent
received 86.1	 33.3	 4819.4	 50
The data collected in the empirical survey come from
different categories of respondent groups. It would not
therefore be appropriate to take an average response
rate of all respondents Each respondent group will be
examined separatel y, later on.
The general co-operation of the public with mail
questionnaires is expected to be low as described in the
introduction to this chapter. Beyond that, as Fowler
(1993) mentions, one has to consider the respondent's
interest in the subject matter of the research itself.
The incentive for answering was the same for all: the
respondents who identify their names and address will be
sent the results of the research. As it is, those
results are probably more appealing to those already
interested in the topic of the research.
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An additional factor is the follow-up, which in this
research was performed -- when possible on a
continuous basis, rather than waiting for a certain
date. There were two respondent groups on which the
author could perform an individual and direct follow-up,
namely the municipality internal auditors and the
journalists. This goes some way to explain the
relatively high response rates for those two groups.
The municipality internal auditors were more interested
than the journalists by the research topic because it
dealt with the core of their work. This probably
explains the difference in the response rate, even
though there were similar follow-up procedures for both
groups. Another respondent group which was partially
followed-up individually and directly was the group of
general directors. In half of the cases (see section
6.1), the co-ordinator was the general director, with
whose office the author was in direct contact. Half of
the general directors responded to the questionnaires.
It seems that the good response rate is related to the
direct contact which the author had with many of the
general directors. In addition, as the author was
explicitly told, in some cases the mayors expected the
general directors to respond. Last but not least, many
general directors were genuinely interested by the topic
of the research.
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For respondents outside those three groups, it was the
co-ordinator rather than the author who was in direct
contact. It is assumed that the co-ordinators delivered
the different questionnaires as requested. Two
questions still remain: 1) how much the other respondent
groups were interested in the topic of the research, 2)
how to evaluate the co-ordinator's follow up.
The second question is very difficult. Had the
responses not been anonymous, the author could have
found out which co-ordinator performed a good follow up;
but that was not the case. The first question is easier
to tackle, in relation to each of the remaining
respondent groups.
The base population of the councillors' respondent group
was composed in equal numbers of audit committee members
and other councillors. Nearly 30% of the audit
committee members did respond (the author expected more
interest from this group), while only 10% responded from
the other councillors.
Councillors are not paid for what they do in the
municipality and that may explain why they are less
willing to spend time on something that lies outside
their duties.
As to chief officers and middle level officers, their
rates of response were nearly 31% and nearly 26%
respectively.
	 The difference of about five percent
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between the chief officers and middle level officers can
be explained by the way that the municipality internal
auditing unit works. The municipality internal auditing
unit will be in closer contact with the chief officer of
a department than with any particular middle level
officer in the department. Every internal audit
performed in the department will end up on the desk of
the chief officer of the department, while only those
internal audits that relate to specific middle level
officers will be discussed with the latter. This may
explain why the chief officer shows greater interest in
internal auditing, and why this class yielded the higher
rate of response. The rate of response of the
assistants to the municipality internal auditors was
about 33%, which is surprisingly low. The explanation
may lie in the way some municipality internal auditors
perceived the questionnaire. The author was told by Dr.
Rozevitch, the external supervisor, that some
municipality internal auditors contacted him to tell him
that the questionnaire was a very sensitive issue since
it was in effect evaluating their unit. It seems that
some of them thought that this evaluation had to be
performed by them and not by other lower staff members
of the department. Their feelings seemed to be based on
questions of principle rather than any bias.
It must be recalled that the target group was not a
sample of any population, but in fact nearly the whole
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population itself. Use of the mail questionnaires was
the only way the author could reach the whole target
population. The best way to achieve that goal was, as
recommended, with the help of co-ordinators. Since the
response rate was not total, the responses have to be
seen as samples of the target population.
In order to show that the sample of the test is not
biased and is a fair representation of the target
population, the following steps were taken.
The author called on different job holders in
municipalities using the trial and error method, after
elimination, to pinpoint the reasons of those who chose
not to send back their questionnaire.
Of the twenty four "successful" random calls - covering
different municipalities and the different respondent
groups that took part in the data analysis - the author
was told by fourteen in different words that they did
not find the time to fill in the questionnaire; four
said that they did not fill in any questionnaires on
principle; four others did not remember or know what
questionnaire the author was referring to; one said he
did not need to explain why he did not fill in the
questionnaire; and one said he was new at his job and
therefore he did not know enough to fill in the
questionnaire honestly. From these answers, it appears
that the decision not to answer was not due to any
particular opinion held concerning the topic of the
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questionnaire. From that point of view there is no
reason to believe the respondents to be different from
the rest of the target population.
The next step was to check whether the distribution of
the respondents, per respondent group, properly
represents the different categories of municipalities
according to population size.
Five categories of municipalities according to
population size were defined in the questionnaire (see
Appendix H -section I, question 3). According to those
categories, the distribution of the thirty six
municipalities that took part in the empirical survey,
is as follows:
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Table 6.3:	 Distribution of municipalities according to
their population size - I
Category I II
-
:III'. IV	 . .	 -
Municipality
population
(in thousands)
less
than 40
40 to
70
70 to
100
100 to
140
more than
140
number of
municipalities 13	 [ 9 1 3	 1 3	 [ 8
I
Due to the small number of municipalities in the third
and fourth categories, those two categories were
collapsed into one in order to provide a broader base
for comparison. In addition, the percentage of the
number of municipalities in each category is presented
in	 Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Distribution of municipalities according to
their population size - II
populatlon
(in  thousands)
Mamber of
municipalities 13 9 6 8 36
Percentage... 36.1 25 16.7 22.2 100
The respondents of the different groups were also
divided	 according	 to	 the	 same	 categories	 of
municipalities. Since not all respondents mentioned
their municipality's population size, a new column of
"not known" was added. The most important figures for
the comparisons are the percentages rather than the
absolute values. Therefore, only the percentages of
number of municipalities in each category appear in
Table 6.5.
The number of respondents in each category appears in
brackets while the percentage appears without brackets.
The general impression is that the categories of
municipalities are fairly well represented in the data
collected.
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Table 6.5:	 Distribution of respondents compared to
municipality categories.
unioipality: . : less 	 	 40 to 	 	 		  :  70 to more 	 		  —	 ot
.. population
	 ,:
(in thousands) . :
than 40
:	 -
70  , 
.	 .-	 : 	
140 	 .	 	
	 	 .	
than
140
known 
. 
.	 . .
0istribution of
municipalities:
in percentage
	 .
36.1 25 16.7 22.2
.	 . .
Councillors'	 " ' 25.0 17.9 14.2 25.0 17.9
(7) (5) (4) (7) (5)
Top management
(general 24.1 24.1 16.6 22.2 13.0
directors and
chief officers)
(13) (13) (9) (12) (7)
Middle level 27.6 20.7 13.8 20.7 17.2
officers (9) (6) (4) (6) (5)
r
Municipality
internal 32.3 29.0 12.9 22.6 3.2
auditors* (10) (9) (4) (7) (1)
-
* Municipality internal auditors' staff are not represented
here as the units are not staffed in equal numbers in the
municipalities. Their representation here would have
distorted the comparison.
6.5.
	 Conclusion
It appears from the investigations made, that the
reasons that some of those who received the
questionnaire did not respond had nothing to do with
their views on any topic within the questionnaire. In
any case, the rate of response is above what could
normally be expected from such a survey in Israel.
There is a fair proportional representation of the
different categories of municipalities in the data
collected.
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It may be concluded that the data are unbiased and the
sample is a fair representation of the target
population.
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PART THREE
EMPIRICAL SURVEY ANALYSIS
Chapter seven
Descriptive analysis
7.0.	 Introduction
The	 questionnaire	 designed	 for	 this	 research
(Appendix H) had two sections.	 The first section was
mainly demographic: the purpose of questions 1 to 3 was
to help classify the respondents (in total 175). The
rest of the questions in that section, questions 4 to
14, were designated for the municipality internal
auditors only (in total 31). In those questions the
municipality internal auditors were requested to provide
data, mainly about their unit but also regarding their
municipality.
The second section, which included 35 questions, was
designed to elicit (for n=175) each respondent's
evaluation of the effectiveness of the municipality
internal auditing unit, based on the five components
that are part of the model. The questions were divided
into five groups in accordance with each component:
flPart 1, the independence of the municipality internal
auditing unit -- questions 1 to 7.
2)Part 2, the competence of the municipality internal
auditing unit -- questions 8 to 13.
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3)Part 3, the scope of work of the municipality
internal auditing unit -- questions 14 to 22.
4)Part 4, the performance of the municipality internal
auditing unit -- questions 23 to 29.
5)Part 5, the Management of the municipality internal
auditing unit -- questions 30 to 35.
This chapter will present separately the descriptive
analysis of the two sections.
7.1.	 Section I of the Questionnaire
The responses to the group of questions 1 to 3, which
made it possible to classify the respondents, will not
be repeated in this chapter since this was already done
in chapter six. The conclusion of the analysis in
chapter six, after checking the different respondent
groups, was that the sample collected from the survey
was a fair and unbiased representation of the
populations of the respondent groups.
This part will therefore focus on questions 4 to 14 of
section I, which as mentioned already, were put to the
municipality internal auditor only.
Questions 4 and 5 asked for the size of the internal
auditing staff working in the municipality and whether
there had been any increase in the last three years.
The responses to questions 4 and 5 appear in Tables 7.1
and 7.2. respectively.
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Table 7.1: Number of municipalities according to
internal auditing staff per range of municipality
population.
Municipality
:	  
	 .auditing..
staff.size*
NunicipalitY Population (In thousands)._
.	 .
	 		
 J00
8 4 1 1
.5 3
2 1 1 1
3	 . 1
4 1
• 5. 1 2
6
9 1
not reported 1
* A presentation of the ratio of internal auditing staff to
the population was not possible because the respondents
reported their municipality population size category
only.
Table 7.1 shows that there is no absolute correlation
between the size of the internal auditing staff in the
municipality and the population of that municipality.
Though there is a discernible tendency to have a bigger
internal auditing staff in municipalities with a
population of more than 140,000, there are
municipalities of 70,000 and more with an internal
auditing staff of two or less, while other
municipalities with a smaller population have internal
auditing staffs of the same or even larger size.
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Table 7.2:	 Number of municipalities according to
staff increase in internal auditing units in the last
three years per range of municipality population.
.
.Staff....:
increase
%.. Municipality popu1ation	 n. thousand	
..
:1ss:
. than
.	 40
:..40
. to
70
30.-
.to
'	 100	 .:
100
.
.
more	 	
	 	 than
Not
	 	 reported
no increase 8 7 2 1 2 1
•	 .5 1
.	 _
1
_
3
2 1 1
_
1
not reported 2 1
From Table 7.2, it can be inferred that most increases
in internal auditing staff were among the municipalities
of more than 140,000. In fact, of the municipalities in
that range that reported, most had had an increase in
their staff, as opposed to municipalities with a
population of less than 40,000, where no internal
auditing staff increases were reported for the last
three years. Combining the information provided from
the answers to questions 4 and 5, the main point that
emerges is that in the last three years, the internal
auditing staff in municipalities of more than 140,000
has increased. This may show that big municipalities
recognise the need for a larger internal auditing staff
for the sake of the work of the municipality.
Questions 6 and 7 were about the participation of the
internal auditing staff in professional organisations
(professional affiliations) and in continuing education
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programs in the last two years. Though requested, most
respondents did not provide numbers of participants in
these programs. They preferred to offer a 'yes or no'
answer. The responses to these questions are presented
in Table 7.3.
Only general conclusions can be drawn from the responses
to questions 6 and 7:
(1)Most internal auditing staff were affiliated with
professional organisations. Presumably most of them
are affiliated with the I.I.A.-Israel.
(2)There is a positive attitude towards continuing
educational programs.
Table 7.3:	 Participation of municipality internal
auditing staff in professional organisations and in
continuing education programs per range of municipality
population.
Municipality less 40 to 70 to 100 to more Mot
population (in than 40 70 100 140 than reported
thousands) 140
yes/no/
no response y n nr y n nr y nr y ni y n'nr nr
professional
affiliation 4 2 4 5 2 2 3 - - 1 - - 5 1 1 1 - -
education
programs 8 - 2 6 - 3 3 - - 1 - - 6 - 1 1 - -
Questions 8 and 9 asked for the total budget of the
municipality, and the total budget of the municipality
internal auditing unit. The author was interested in
the proportion between those two numbers.
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The percentage of the internal auditing budget as part
of the total budget of the municipality is presented in
Table 7.4. Twenty three out of the thirty one
municipality internal auditors provided the requested
information.
-
Table 7.4:
	 Distribution of municipalities per percentage i
of the internal auditing budget as part of the total
budget of the municipality per range of municipality
population.
% of
internal
auditing Unit
in total budget
* Municipality population .	n thousands
.
less
than
40
40
to 70
70 to
100
'
100
tó.	 	
140
	 	
mere
. than
140
Not
reporte
0.06 1
0.1 1
.	 044-0.16 2 2
• 0.17-0.20 2 1 2 1 2 1
0.25 2 1
'	 0.3	 . 1 1
0.37-0.38 2
.	 0.44 1
-
Average for
each category
-
0.27% 0.21% 0.18% 0.19%
.
0.17%
From Table 7.4, there does not seem to be any clear
standard rule as to the percentage of the total
municipality budget which is devoted to internal
auditing. Still, for nine out of twenty three
municipalities of different sized populations, the
percentage was between 0.17 and 0.20, as it was for most
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Municipality
_ ....... _ 
morpthan
....
Nat
re CP;r: e
.......	 .
et;::63
hire...:ekternal
	. ..... px erts 	
nr nr : n:: rrr :fir
4 5 1 4 5 3 1 5 1 1 1
of the averages of each category (see last row of Table
7.4). It may be mentioned here that in meetings in the
Knesset, before the amendment of the Municipal Ordinance
in 1990 (see section 2.1.9), the I.I.A. (Israel)
requested that the budget of the municipality internal
auditing should be set at a minimum of 0.5% of the total
budget of the municipality.	 This request was not
granted as the percentages in Table 7.4 amply shows.
Question 10 enquired whether the municipality internal
auditors have a budget to hire external professional
experts to assist them; and if so, how many times they
used this help in the last two years.
The responses to the question appear in Tables 7.5 and
7.6.
Table 7.5: Number of municipalities having a budget
for the municipality internal auditing unit to hire
external experts per range of municipality population
(yes/no/no response).
230
Number of
		 times	 j
.external.
experts:were.
	 hired
- Muh
• ...... ••
•••
Table 7.6: Distribution of municipalities per number
of times external experts were hired in the last two
years per range of municipality population.
ty population (
70 to 	 100
100 	 to
1 0
ihhot
F:thore
:;thari
1
2 112
•... 3 2 1
3-4 11
1 15-6 .
,MOre than 6. 1 1
The use of external assistance, as can be inferred from
Tables 7.5 and 7.6, is quite common among municipality
internal auditors in Israel. It also shows the
understanding of the municipalities of the need for
their internal auditing units to receive external
assistance. This is either because of lack of expertise
in a certain field or lack of manpower. Another
possibility, revealed to the author during the
fieldwork, was that there is a preference to have some
particular topics reviewed by a third party. Such an
example is the case of the manpower division, which may
have a say in the promotion and salary of the internal
auditing staff.
Eighteen municipality internal auditors, more than half,
reported that they have a special budget for hiring
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external experts for ad-hoc assignments. Only twelve of
them made use of this budget in the last two years.
Question 11 asked the municipality internal auditors who
in fact decides what items are to be included in their
annual internal auditing work plan. According to the
interpretation of the Municipal Ordinance, it is
supposed to be the municipality internal auditor's
prerogative to decide on the different topics to be
audited. The purpose of this question was to check the
theory against the facts.
The responses to question 11 appear in a yes/no
presentation in Table 7.7, 'yes' meaning that the
municipality internal auditor is the only one to decide
the plan, while 'no' means all other alternatives.
Table 7.7:
	 Distribution of municipalities according to
municipality	 internal auditor's decision over annual
audit work plan per range of municipality population.
Municipality
i population
.	 .	 (in
: thousands )
_
less than
40
.
40 to
70 .
.70 to
100
•
.100 to
..: . 1 40 --.•
-	 ......
.
more
' - 	...  :140 ' 	
. 	 -	 -	 .....
.	 	.
.
.	 -	 	 Not  . 
reported
.	 ..	 . 
munioj-pality
.internal
auditor
decides 'over
annual'audit
. work plan'.
yes no yes no yes no yes no y s nO. fir yes
5 5 3 6 3 - 1 - 4 2 1 1 -
Seventeen out of thirty-one respondents reported that
they were deciding alone on their annual audit work
plan. Leaving aside the one respondent that did not
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report, thirteen others gave an answer opposed to the
theory, that it was not their decision alone.
It seems that among municipalities with larger
populations, the proportion of positive responses rises.
This may be due to stronger internal auditing units who
can better assert themselves than the smaller units
which generally operate in smaller municipalities.
Question 12 listed different types of audit and
requested the municipality internal auditors to indicate
the types of audit their departments were performing.
All the municipality internal auditors (except one who
did not answer the questions in that section at all)
ticked the boxes in the questionnaire to show that they
were performing all the different types of audit. This
shows the acceptance of the modern interpretation of
internal auditing in municipalities, as required by the
Israeli law.
Questions 13 and 14 asked the municipality internal
auditors how many years they had already held their
position and how long they had been working in internal
auditing in general. A summary of the averages of the
responses to questions 13 and 14 per population size
category appears in Table 7.8.
There are signs of career municipality internal
auditors. Of the 29 municipality internal auditors that
responded to questions 13 and 14, sixteen moved to their
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position after previous experience in internal auditing.
The length of that previous experience was between 3 and
8 years in eight cases, and between 12 and 20 years in
the other eight cases. Twelve of these experienced
internal auditors were appointed to their present
position less than five years ago. This suggested a
trend to hire career internal auditors to the position
of municipality internal auditors.
Table 7.8:	 Signs of career municipality internal
auditors
•
Population"/
of the
municipality
_ 
Municipality Internal Auditor .
Average nUmber of
cumulative years in
internal auditing
.
-Average number .of years'
as municipality internal
.'	 .	 ' auditor
Less than
40,000	 (n=9) 7.8 2.7
40000-70,00
0	 (n=9) 11.1 4.4
701000-1400,
000
	 (n=4) 15 6
more than
140000
In=6).
11.7 6.8
(1) One municipality internal auditor was not included in
the table because the population of the municipality
was not reported
I
Still, for thirteen it was their first job as internal
auditors. All of those had been in post for less than
nine years, eleven for less than six years. It may be
too soon to describe them as career internal auditors.
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7.2.	 Section II of the Questionnaire
Section II of the questionnaire was divided into five
parts. Each part is related to one of the five
components (independence, competence, scope of work,
performance, and management, all relating to the
municipality internal auditing unit) which form part of
the model. Each part is composed of statements relating
to activities connected to the relevant component. The
respondent was asked to evaluate each statement on a
scale of 1 to 6, the value 1 being "complete
disagreement" and 6 being "complete agreement". A "not
known/not available" response was also possible for
those statements on which the respondent had no
information.
For the sake of clarity in the descriptive analysis, the
responses were divided into three categories, "disagree"
replacing values 1-3, "agree" replacing values 4-6, and
"not known/not available" responses.
The distribution of the responses is presented per
statement and for each part separately, followed by an
analysis of the results.
7.2.1.
	 Independence of internal auditing in the
municipality (statements 1-7)
The distribution of the responses collected appears in
Table 7.9.
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Table 7.9:	 Distribution of the evaluations given by the
different statements regarding the independence of
internal auditing in the municipality
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1.The	 organisational	 status	 of	 the
municipality	 internal	 auditor
	 is
adequate	 for	 the	 fulfilment	 of
his/her job.
42	 24.0 127	 72.6 6 3.4
2.The internal auditing staff	 carry
out	 their	 work	 freely	 and
objectively.
37	 21.2 135	 77.1 3 1.7
3.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff	 has
access to all information, employees
or	 elected	 members	 in	 the
municipality,	 considered	 pertinent
in the conduct of an audit.
16	 9.1 154	 88.0 5 2.9
4.All	 areas	 within	 the	 municipality
are	 allowed	 internal	 auditing
access.
23	 13.1 149	 85.2 3 1.7
5.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff	 assumes
operating	 responsibilities	 to	 design
or operate systems. 68	 38.9 20	 11.4 87 49.7
6.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff
operation	 does	 not	 encounter	 any
situation where conflict of interest
is present.
75	 42.8 92	 52.6 8 4.6
7.The mayor decides what subjects will
or will not appear in the work plan
of the internal auditing unit. 54	 30.9 100	 57.1 21 12.0
The great majority of the respondents, between 72.6% to
88%, agreed with statements 1 to 4. Most respondents
accept the organisational status of the municipality
internal auditor as adequate for the job. The results
also suggest that the respondents perceive that the
internal auditing staff has free access to people and
places and can carry out their work freely and
objectively. Yet, for statement 7, which implies that
the mayor decides what subjects will appear in the work
plan of the internal auditing unit, the majority of the
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respondents — about 57% — agreed to it. This in itself
is surprising because, according to the Ordinance, it is
supposed to be the prerogative of the municipality
internal auditor. However, even the municipality
internal auditors were divided regarding that topic
(Table 7.7): out of 30 that reported, 17 answered that
it was their decision and 13 that it was not their
decision alone.
Statement 5 had a high percentage (nearly 50%) of
respondents who preferred to tick the N/A (not known/not
available) box. A high proportion of those were
journalists, councillors and middle level management
that do not interact as often with the municipality
internal auditing unit as the top management do. It is
assumed that those respondents that ticked the N/A box
did so not because they are unaware that the internal
auditing staff is not supposed "to assume operating
responsibilities to design or operate systems" but
because they were not familiar with every day practice.
As expected, the majority of those who responded, 38.9%
as opposed to 11.4%, did not agree.
The responses to statement 6 show clearly that quite a
high percentage, 42.8% as opposed to 52.6%, of the
respondents perceive that the internal auditing staff
operation may encounter a situation involving a conflict
of interest. Such a situation could interfere with the
objectivity of the internal auditing unit. 	 If one
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compares the responses to this statement with those to
statement 2, where 77.1% agreed with the objectivity of
the internal auditing unit, there appears to be a
contradiction. In explanation, it may be supposed that
statement 2 describes the actual situation while
statement 6 describes a potential situation. The
question is whether the municipality internal auditing
unit avoids certain subjects in order not to find itself
in a conflict of interest situation. Such a case could
occur if, for example, the human resources department
has to approve the promotion of the internal auditing
staff and the internal auditing staff performs an audit
in the human resources department. This raises a grave
question of whether the municipality internal auditing
unit is indeed capable of covering all areas of the
municipality operation.
7.2.2.	 Competence of internal auditing in the
municipality (statements 8-13)
The distribution of the responses collected appears in
Table 7.10.
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Table 7.10: Distribution of the evaluations given by
the different statements regarding the competence of
internal auditing in the municipality
8.The internal auditing staff is
articulate. 25	 14.3 145	 82.8 5	 2.9
9.The internal auditing unit
possesses the knowledge, skills
and disciplines needed to carry
out its audit responsibilities.
25	 14.3 140	 80.0 10	 5.7
10.The internal auditors maintain
satisfactory relationships with
audit ees.
29	 16.6 141	 80.6 5	 2.8
11.The internal auditors convey
effectively, in oral and
written communication, audit
objectives, evaluations,
conclusions and
recommendations. 33 18.8 138 78.9 4 2.3
12.The internal auditors maintain
high standards of honesty and
objectivity.
25 14.3 144 82.3 6 3.4
13.The municipality internal
auditing unit recommends
improvements to correct
deficiencies or irregularities. 19 10.9 154 88.0 2 1.1
The great majority of the respondents, between 78.9% to
88%, agreed with statements 8 to 13. It gives the
impression that, in general, the respondents are quite
satisfied with the competence of the internal auditing
unit. It is interesting to point out that the highest
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mentioning that
improvements to
This shows that
but also	 as
percentage (88%) went to statement 13,
the internal auditing unit recommends
correct deficiencies or irregularities.
the unit presents not only findings
required — recommendations.
7.2.3.	 Scope of work of internal auditing
in the municipality (statements 14-22)
The distribution of the responses collected appears in
Table 7.11.
_
Table 7.11:	 Distribution of the evaluations given by the
different statements regarding the scope of work of
internal auditing in the municipality
' . disagree.
_	 ..
...,:.:04te 	 	
Statement with number'-
-	 ..._- 
•
  
.
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14.The	 scope	 of	 internal
auditing	 includes	 the
evaluation of the adequacy of
the	 municipality's	 system	 of
internal control.
23 13.2 101 57.7 51 29.1
15. Internal auditors examine the
reliability	 and	 integrity	 of
information. 25 14.2 138 78.9 12 6.9
16.Internal
	
auditors	 check
whether	 the	 systems	 operating
in	 the	 municipality	 ensure
compliance	 with	 policies,
plans,	 procedures,	 laws	 and
regulations.
25 14.3 146 83.4 4 2.3
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Table 7.11: continued
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17.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff
review	 the	 systems	 used	 for
safeguarding	 of municipality's
assets.
30 17.1 123 70.3 22 12.6
18.Internal	 auditing	 staff
review	 operations	 or	 programs
to	 ascertain
	 whether	 results
are consistent with established
objectives and goals. 44 25.2 121 69.1 10 5.7
19.The	 internal	 auditing	 unit
ascertains	 that	 an	 honest,
objective	 and	 fair	 ongoing
process	 is	 maintained	 in	 the
decision	 making	 in	 the
municipality	 and	 that	 no
irregularities	 or	 personal
benefits are involved. 42 24.0 128 73.1 5 2.9
20.The	 internal	 auditing	 unit
applies the same rules for all
levels of the municipality.
41 23.4 129 73.7 5 2.9
21.Municipality	 internal
.
auditing does not encompass the
mayor's own operations.
44 25.1 109 62.3 22 12.6
Statement 14 had a relatively high (29.1%) percentage of
respondents who preferred to tick the N/A (not known/not
available) box. A high proportion of those were
journalists and middle level management, who are more
familiar with the municipality internal auditing unit's
checking of individual items.
	
It is assumed that
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respondents that ticked the N/A box did so, not because
they are unaware that internal auditing is supposed to
evaluate the adequacy of "the municipality's system of
internal control", but rather because they do not know
to what extent it is actually being done. Among the
respondents, 57.7% as opposed to 13.2% agreed with the
statement.
The majority of the respondents, between 66.3% to 83.4%,
agreed with statements 15 to 21. The situation of
statement 22 is different. Since the Ordinance states
that the municipality internal auditing unit should
encompass the mayor's own operations, one would expect
that the majority of the respondents would disagree
with statement 22, but this was not the case. Most
respondents (62.3%) agreed with statement 22, as opposed
to 25.1% who disagreed. The results of statement 22 may
also be surprising if one looks at the high percentage
(73.3%) of respondents that agreed with statement 21
declaring that "internal auditing applies the same rules
to all levels of the municipality". The author believes
that there is no contradiction. The fact is that the
municipality internal auditing unit probably tends not
to audit the mayor's operations for obvious reasons, and
the users are aware of that and seem to accept it.
Apart from that, the respondents believe that the
internal auditing unit applies the same rules for all
levels of auditees.
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7.2.4.	 Performance of internal auditing in the
municipality (statements 23-29)
The distribution of the responses collected appears in
Table 7.12.
Table 7.12:	 Distribution of the evaluations given by
the different statements regarding the performance
of internal auditing in the municipality
..	
.	 -	 .	 -.-	 . 	 	 .	 	
asagree  agree 	
..	 ....	 .*.:-:	 -....*	 : .	 .	 . 	 .:..	 	
Statement with number N' -, 	 	 	 	 	 f.  -  %
23.The	 municipality	 internal
auditing	 reports	 are	 issued
in	 a	 clear,	 concise	 and
timely manner.
38	 21.7 132	 75.4 5	 2.9
24.The	 municipality	 internal
auditing reports identify such
elements	 as	 audit	 objectives,
scope, background,	 results and
recommendations.
34	 19.4 136	 77.7 5	 2.9
25.Most	 reports	 presented	 by
the	 municipality	 internal
auditor	 tackle	 subjects	 of
major	 importance	 to	 the
municipality.
41	 23.4 129	 73.7 5	 2.9
26.The	 internal	 auditing	 unit
develops	 appropriate	 audit
plans	 for	 established	 audit
objectives.
44	 25.2 108	 61.7 23	 13.1
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Table 7.12:	 continued
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•	 ..
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27.The internal auditing unit
maintains a follow-up and
reports whether corrective
actions were taken following
deficiencies and
recommendations indicated by
the unit.
28.The speed of corrective
action on the findings of the
municipality internal
auditing unit is
satisfactory.
29.There are no unnecessary
delays in taking appropriate
corrective action on reported
audit findings.
43	 24.6
80	 45.7
84	 48.0
123	 70.3
80	 45.7
76	 43.4
9	 5.1
15	 8.6
25	 8.6
The majority of the respondents, between 61.7% to 77.7%,
weed with the statements 23 to 27. This leaves the
impression that, in general, the respondents believe
that most topics tackled by the municipality internal
auditing unit are of major importance; that they are
pleased with the way the municipality internal auditing
reports are presented; and that they confirm that the
municipality internal auditing unit maintains a
follow-up and reports whether corrective action was
taken following its recommendations.
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By comparison with the other statements, the responses
to statements 28 to 29, dealing with the immediacy of
corrective action are different. The division, in those
two statements, between the respondents who agreed and
those who disagreed is equal for statement 28 (45.7%),
while for statement 29, 48% disagreed as opposed to
43.4% who agreed. This leaves no doubt that half of the
respondents are not happy with the speed of corrective
action (statement 28) and that they believe there are
unnecessary delays (statement 29).
7.2.5.
	
Management of internal auditing in the
municipality (statements 30-35)
The distribution of the responses collected appears in
Table 7.13.
Prior to the construction of the questionnaire, the
author held interviews with major representatives of the
groups of users of the municipality internal auditing
product. Many of them questioned the relevance of the
component of the management of the internal auditing
unit in municipalities in Israel. In spite of those
doubts, it was decided to leave that component in the
empirical research and wait for the outcome of the test.
In the actual results, a very high percentage of
respondents, between 40% and 66.3%, did not evaluate
statements 30 to 35 connected to this component. This
reinforces the opinion that this component is not
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relevant to the situation of the internal auditing units
in municipalities in Israel.
Table 7.13:	 Distribution of the evaluations given by the
different statements regarding the management
	 of
internal auditing in the municipality
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30.The internal auditing
department co-ordinates
activities with the
municipality	 external
auditors.
48 27.4 45 25.7 82 46.9
31.The	 internal	 auditing
department	 has	 an	 external
review program	 to	 objectively
determine	 the	 quality	 of	 its
operation.
64 36.5 28 16.0 83 47.5
32.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff
is involved with participation
in professional organisations.
22 12.6 76 43.4 77 44.0
33.The	 internal	 auditing	 staff
is encouraged to participate in
continuing education programs.
22 13.7 72 41.1 .70 40.0
34.The	 municipality	 internal
auditing department maintains a
written	 policy	 and	 procedures
manual.
24 13.7 72 41.1 79 45.2
35.Performance appraisals ensure
that audit personnel promotions
and	 dismissals	 are	 consistent
with the results of evaluators. 30 17.1 29 16.6 116 66.3
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There is no co-ordination of activities between the
internal auditors and the external auditors because the
external auditors are against it. The external auditors
look at the internal auditors as part of the "auditee",
and they object to co-ordinating activities with the
"auditee". There is also no external systematic review
program to objectively determine the quality of the
municipality internal auditing operation. The internal
auditing staff in municipalities in Israel is very
small, often composed of one or two internal auditors.
Even in the three biggest cities, the internal auditing
unit is staffed by a dozen or less.
All those facts lead to the conclusion that the
component of management of the internal auditing unit
cannot be part of the model evaluating the effectiveness
of municipality internal auditing in Israel. As a
result, statements 30 to 35 were excluded from the data
analysis.
7.3.
	 Conclusion
The descriptive analysis of the first part of the
questionnaire, based on the responses of the
municipality internal auditors, confirmed that there are
no fixed rules regarding the size of the internal
auditing staff or budget in municipalities in relation
to population size. It also showed that there are signs
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of career municipality internal auditors and that all
types of audits are performed.
The descriptive analysis of the second part of the
questionnaire, based on the responses of all the
respondents, was presented for each component
separately. The main finding of the analysis was the
high non-participation in the evaluation of statements
related to the management of the municipality internal
auditing unit. Even beforehand, consideration of the
objective facts concerning the operation of the
municipality internal auditing unit had suggested that
this component might not be relevant in Israel. This
impression was strengthened when many users that the
author met recommended that this component be excluded
from the model. The results of the empirical research
regarding this component finally led to a decision not
to include it in the model. As a result, data and
hypotheses related to the management of the municipality
internal auditing unit were seen as obsolete.
Therefore, the outcome was that at the end of the
descriptive analysis, only four components remained as
part of the model evaluating the effectiveness of
municipality internal auditing: 1) Independence
2) Competence 3) Scope of work 4) Performance.
The next chapter will enquire further into these
remaining components of the model.
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Chapter eight
Factor analysis for questionnaire used in the
empirical research
8.0.	 Introduction
The second section of the questionnaire used in the
empirical research contained the statements to be
evaluated by the respondents. The statements were
grouped according to the different components which made
up the model of this study to evaluate the effectiveness
of municipality internal auditing. The division of the
model into five components was inspired by the Standards
of the	 and	 tested	 in meetings	 with
representatives of different respondent groups.	 It
remains an open question whether the respondents in the
empirical research accept that division. The
statistical method used to check this was factor
analysis, which through the correlations between the
different items, seeks to differentiate between groups
of items having a strong connection between themselves
from other groups of items with which their connection
is relatively low. The items in this research are the
statements.
In section 7.2.5, the component of management was
removed from the model. This decision was based on
objective facts regarding municipality internal auditing
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in Israel, comments made by major representatives of
groups of users and finally the descriptive analysis.
In order to validate the questionnaire with its four
remaining factors (independence, competence, scope of
work and performance) a principal components factor
analysis was performed on the related statements. This
analysis provides the means to check if the respondents'
attitude to the different statements is in keeping with
the grouping of statements in the questionnaire. A good
match between the factor analysis and •the division of
the statements according to the groups in the
questionnaire, which formed the original components,
would confirm that the questionnaire was validly
constructed.
8.1.	 Factor loadings of statements on the four
factors
The eigenvalue, which is a parameter calculated for each
factor, indicates the importance of the factor in
relation to the other factors, in the explanation of the
variance. The rule of thumb is to chose the factors
with eigenvalue higher than 1. In this factor analysis,
four such factors were found. The four factors explained
together 67.3% of the variance.
One statement, number 5, was not grouped with any factor
and was hence excluded from the analysis. This
statement was pointed out in the descriptive analysis as
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having a high percentage of respondents who preferred to
tick the not known/not available box.
The varymax rotation used in this analysis is a method
which,	 by	 rotation	 of	 the	 factors,	 improves
discrimination of the loadings between factors. The
factor loadings of the remaining twenty eight statements
on those four factors after the varymax rotation are
presented in Tables 8.1-8.4. The names of the different
factors found in the factor analysis were given after
the different groups of statements emerged and by
comparison with the original names of the components as
they appear in the questionnaire.
Table 8.1: Factor loadings of the twenty eight
statements on the factor of independence after the
varymax rotation.
No. of
statement	 Statements		  oading
3	 The internal auditing staff has access to 	 .75
all information, employees or elected
members in the municipality, considered
pertinent in the conduct of an audit.
2	 The internal auditing staff	 carry out	 .75
their work freely and objectively.
4	 All areas within the municipality are 	 .72
allowed internal auditing access.
1	 The	 organisational	 status	 of	 the	 .63
municipality internal auditor is adequate
for the fulfilment of his/her job.
6	 The internal auditing staff operation does	 .61
not encounter any situation where conflict
of interest is present.
21	 The internal auditing unit applies the same 	 .57
rules for all levels of the municipality.
7	 The mayor decides what subjects will or 	 .47
will not appear in the work plan of the
internal auditing unit.
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From table 8.1, one can see that the factor of
independence includes not only all the statements
included in the questionnaire as related to the
independence of internal auditing in the municipality,
but also statement 21. It seems that statement 21,
which enquires whether the internal auditing applies the
same rules for all levels of the municipality, was
perceived by the respondents as a criterion of
independence and not as a criterion of scope of work.
Table 8.2: Factor loadings of the twenty eight
statements on the factor of competence and performance
after the varymax rotation.
Igo. of 	 Statements	 LoadingL
.::statement
13	 The municipality internal auditing unit 	 .76
recommends	 improvements	 to	 correct
deficiencies or irregularities.
9	 The internal auditing unit possesses the	 .75
knowledge, skills and disciplines needed
to carry out its audit responsibilities.
11	 The internal auditors convey effectively,	 .75
in oral and written communication, audit
objectives, evaluations, conclusions and
recommendations.
12	 The internal auditors maintain high	 .73
standards of honesty and objectivity.
8	 The	 internal	 auditing	 staff	 is	 .73
articulate.
23	 The municipality internal auditing	 .69
reports are issued in a clear, concise
and timely manner.
10	 The	 internal	 auditors	 maintain	 .66
satisfactory relationships with auditees.
24	 The	 municipality	 internal	 auditing	 .65
reports identify such elements as audit
objectives, scope, background, results
and recommendations.
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Table 8.2 continued
of .
].statement 
• • Sttethet
•.	 •	 • •	 •	 ......	 .
...
25	 Most	 reports	 presented	 by	 the	 .56
municipality internal auditor tackle
subjects of major importance to the
municipality.
27	 The internal auditing unit maintains a
	 .52
follow-up and reports whether corrective
actions were taken following deficiencies
and recommendations indicated by the
unit.
26	 The internal auditing unit develops
	 .47
appropriate audit plans for established
audit objectives.
From table 8.2, one can see that in the factor of
competence and performance eleven statements have a
relatively high loading. Of those statements, six
(namely 8-13) are included in the second component in
the questionnaire which is related to the competence of
internal auditing in the municipality. Five other
statements (23-27) are included in the fourth component
of the questionnaire, which is related to the
performance of internal auditing in the municipality.
The factor analysis did not discriminate between those
two parameters.
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Table 8.3: Factor loadings of the twenty eight
statements on the factor of scope of work after the
varymax rotation.
	 	 		  oadIng.
17	 The internal auditing staff review the	 .77
systems	 used for safeguarding of
municipality's assets.
18	 Internal auditing staff appraise the	 .73
economy and efficiency with which
resources are employed.
14	 The scope of internal auditing includes 	 .72
the evaluation of the adequacy of the
municipality's	 system	 of	 internal
control.
16	 Internal auditors check whether the	 .68
systems operating in the municipality
ensure compliance with policies, plans,
procedures, laws and regulations.
15	 Internal	 auditors	 examine	 the	 .66
reliability	 and	 integrity	 of
information.
19	 Internal	 auditing
	
staff	 review	 .63
operations or programs to ascertain
whether results are consistent with
established objectives and goals.
20	 The internal auditing unit ascertains 	 .60
that an honest, objective and fair
ongoing process is maintained in the
decision making in the municipality and
that no irregularities or personal
benefits are involved.
22	 Municipality internal auditing does not	 .49
encompass the mayor's own operations.
The factor of scope of work in Table 8.3 includes all
the statements, apart from statement 21, included in the
questionnaire as related to the scope of work of
internal auditing in the municipality.
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Table 8.4: Factor loadings of the twenty eight
statements on the factor of implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings, after
the varymax rotation.
29	 There are no unnecessary delays in 	 .86
taking appropriate corrective action
on reported auditing findings.
28	 The speed of corrective action on the	 .76
findings of the municipality internal
auditing unit is satisfactory.
The factor analysis has led to a partially new set of
factors: (1) independence, (2) competence-performance,
(3) scope of work. From Table 8.4, one can see that
there is also a fourth factor, even though it does not
fit with the assumptions on which the questionnaire was
built. This factor comprises two statements (28-29),
which originally in the questionnaire were supposed to
be part of the performance of internal auditing in the
municipality. However, it seems that the respondents
perceived those two statements as different from the
other statements originally related to performance. In
those two statements (28-29), the respondent is asked
about the corrective action taken following the reported
auditing findings. While the other statements deal with
the direct effectiveness of the auditors, those two
statements (28-29) deal with the corrective action taken
by the auditees.	 One has to look at the corrective
action taken following the internal audit as part of the
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effectiveness of the internal auditing. There is little
benefit in having a very competent internal auditing
unit submitting excellent reports if the organisation
does not take the right measures to correct the
deficiencies that were found, as soon as possible. In
the questionnaire, the examination of the corrective
action taken had been included in the component of the
performance. However, the respondents looked at it as a
separate factor or component, as the factor analysis
shows. This separate factor may be termed:
Implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings. This fourth factor joins
the other three already identified through the factor
analysis.
8.2.	 Conclusion
In general, the assumptions on which the construction of
the questionnaire was based were confirmed, apart from
two points. First, an additional factor has emerged,
the implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings. Second, the factor analysis
did not distinguish performance from competence. In
spite of that, it was decided to continue to separate
those two components because though they are related,
competence and performance are not the same thing. The
competence and performance should be looked at as two
subgroups within the same factor. Therefore, from this
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part of the questionnaire, five components that had the
responses of all groups of respondents were obtained
(independence, competence, scope of work, performance
and the implementation of corrective action following
the internal auditing findings - see Figure 8.1).
The same pattern of hypotheses that were presented in
the study are relevant regarding the implementation
component. They are formulated hereunder for the sake
of conformity in the methodology:
(1)The respondents from the municipality internal
auditing unit have a higher evaluation of the
implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings in the municipality than
the other respondent groups have.
(2)The respondent groups outside the municipality have
a lower evaluation of the implementation of
corrective action following the internal auditing
findings in the municipality than the respondent
groups within the municipality.
(3)There is a difference in the evaluation of the
implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings in the municipality
between the different levels of auditee respondent
groups within the municipality.
In order to check to what degree the different items of
each component belong to the same common factor — or in
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other words the internal consistency for each component
— the alpha (a) of Kronbach was used.
The common rule is that a high internal consistency
exists when a ^ .70. As can be seen in Table 8.5, a
high internal consistency was found for all five
components.
Table 8.5: Internal consistency (alpha of Kronbach) of
the components
Component Independence Competence ..
-
. Sope.
of Work
t!erfOrmance
......:.•
	 -::
,	 ...,
Imp1ementaton
....
a . 84 . 91 .92 .91 .87
From the questionnaire five components were produced
based on the average of the different statements
evaluations for each of the factors. The possible range
of the score is between 1 to 6. The higher the score,
the higher the evaluation of the effectiveness of
internal auditing in the municipality. The results of
those scores, according to the respondent groups, is
presented in the next chapter.
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ft
Effectiveness
Figure 8.1: Components of the effectiveness of
municipality internal auditing - Model II
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Chapter nine
Data analysis
9.0.	 Introduction
In order to investigate the topic of this research, the
methodology used was to formulate hypotheses and test
them empirically.
On the basis of earlier research, as well as theoretical
analysis regarding the perceived effectiveness of the
internal auditing unit and regarding power in the
municipality in Israel (see chapter two), the author has
formulated three main postulates:
(1)Respondents from the municipality internal auditing
unit have a higher evaluation of the effectiveness
of the municipality internal auditing unit than
other respondent groups have.
(2)The respondent groups outside the municipality have
a lower evaluation of the effectiveness of the
municipality internal auditing unit than the
respondent groups within the municipality.
(3)There is a difference in the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit between the different levels of auditee
respondent groups within the municipality.
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Those three postulates were applied to each of the five
components of the original model of effectiveness of the
municipality internal auditing unit, as designed by the
author and composed of: independence, competence, scope
of work, performance and management, all in relation to
the municipality internal auditing unit. Fifteen
hypotheses resulted, three for each component.
The set of hypotheses was modified in light of the
descriptive analysis, as well as the recognition of
various objective facts regarding the municipality
internal auditing unit, and various comments made by
major representatives of groups of users. In
particular, the component of management of the
municipality internal auditing unit was removed from the
model of effectiveness. The three hypotheses, numbers
thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, related to that
component were therefore no longer relevant.
As a result of the factor analysis, a new factor
emerged, namely the implementation of corrective action
following the internal auditing findings. The final
model used for this study is therefore based on the five
following components: independence, competence, scope of
work, performance and implementation.
The data analysis in this chapter will refer to those
five components. Although the implementation component
was not the subject of any hypothesis in the original
model, it will be treated in this chapter on the same
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footing as the other four components for which
hypotheses were formulated.
9. 1. Testing the hypotheses
The respondents were divided into five groups: General
directors and chief officers (top management), internal
auditors, councillors, middle level officers (middle
level management), journalists. The distribution of
these groups is presented in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1.
Table 9.1:	 Distribution of the five respondent
groups.
Groups	 number
top management	 54	 30.8
internal auditors
	 40	 22.9
councillors	 28	 16
middle level management	 29	 16.6
journalists	 24	 13.7
middle level
management
	 journalists
16.6%
	 13.7%
councillors
16.0%
	
top management
30.8%
internal auditors
22.9%
Figure 9.1: Distribution of the five respondent groups.
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9.1.1.	 Differences between the different respondent
groups for the five components of the model
The research hypotheses focus on the differences in the
evaluation of the effectiveness of municipality internal
auditing between the different respondent groups.
In order to check the hypotheses, one-way multivariate
analysis of variance aumnw analysis was used. The
aim of the MANOVA analysis is to check the significance
of the differences between averages when the number of
dependent variables is more than one. The term
none-way" implicates the fact that in this present
research there is one independent variable - the class
of the respondent group.
In MANOVA analysis one first obtains a general result
for the group of the dependent variables all together.
In statistical analysis a result will be called
significant if IDS .05. A significant level of 5% has
been adopted here, even though many of the results
turned out to be significant at 1% or even 0.1%. If the
result is significant, one can ask which variable
contributes significantly to the difference found. This
is done by the univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA)
which is an analysis of variance performed for each
component, separately.
The one-way MANOVA analysis was performed on the five
components that evaluate the effectiveness of the
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municipality internal auditing unit: 1) Independence,
2) Competence,	 3) Scope of work,
	 4) Performance,
5) Implementation.
The MANOVA analysis revealed significant differences
between the five respondent groups over all five
measures. The results were: F(20, 498) = 4.56 p<. 001;
WILKS = .49. The WILKS represent the proportion of the
unexplained variance. It varies between 0 and 1. The
smaller the WILKS, the more effective the analysis.
The means and standard deviations of the five
components, for each respondent group, and univariate
ANOVA results to examine the differences between the
groups on each component, are presented in Table 9.2.
The means also appear in Figure 9.2.
I--
Table 9.2:	 Means and standard deviations of the five
components evaluating the effectiveness in the five
groups.
Groups Independence Competence Scope of work Performance Inplenentaticti
.	 .
• MSD M	 SD	 IA	 SD	 NI	 SD*	 ...• SD
_	
.
_	 _	
_
Top
management
4.52	 .80 4.55	 1.10	 4.14	 .85	 4.26	 1.04	 3.64	 .97
Internal
auditors
4.99	 .56 5.22	 .52	 5.01	 .54	 5.07	 .49	 3.51	 .92
Councillors 4.03	 1.07 4.60	 .82	 3.78	 .93	 4.14	 1.10	 2.98	 1.33
Middle level
management
4.44	 .90 4.44	 1.01	 4.23	 .83	 4.23	 1.32	 3.48	 1.13
Journalists 3.22	 1.04 4.00	 .82	 3.25	 1.06	 3.42	 .97	 2.04	 1.01
F(4,154) 17.15* 7.69*	 18.51*	 11.04*	 10.71*
* p <	 .001
_1
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5
4
3
2 -
Independence
o Top management
^ 0 Internal auditors
0 Councillors
0 Middle level
management
Gil Journalists
Compe ence Scope of work
	
Performance	 Implementation
Figure 9.2: Means of the five components to evaluate
effectiveness in the five groups.
As can be seen from Table 9.2, univariate ANOVA analysis
which was performed on each factor separately showed
significant differences between the groups in all the
measures.
9. 1. 2. The evaluations by respondents from the
municipality internal auditing unit as
opposed to the other respondents.
In accordance to the research hypotheses, contrast
analysis were performed to show the specific differences
between the five groups. Hypotheses one, four, seven and
ten state:
Hypothesis one - "The respondents from the municipality
internal auditing unit have a higher evaluation of the
independence of the municipality internal auditing unit
than the other respondent groups have."
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Hypothesis four - "The respondents from the municipality
internal auditing unit have a higher evaluation of the
competence of the municipality internal auditing unit
than the other respondent groups have."
Hypothesis	 seven	 "The	 respondents	 from the
municipality internal auditing unit have a higher
evaluation of the scope of work of the municipality
internal auditing unit than the other respondent groups
have."
Hypothesis ten - "The respondents from the municipality
internal auditing unit have a higher evaluation of the
performance of the municipality internal auditing unit
than the other respondent groups have."
In keeping with hypotheses one, four, seven and ten -
which imply that the respondents from the internal
auditing unit have a higher evaluation of the
effectiveness for all the different components - the
first contrast was performed to compare the respondents
from internal auditing units to the other groups in the
research. Table 9.3 shows the results of that analysis.
For all four components (independence, competence, scope
of work and performance) and for p<.001, the results
show that the evaluation of the respondents from
internal auditing units were higher than those of the
Other respondent groups, as expected by all four
hypotheses mentioned above.
266
Table 9.3:	 Contrast analysis to compare between
respondent groups according to hypotheses.
...	 . 	 ..	
.. 
Contrasts , Independence ..ccmpetenCe , :'.scOpe .of .: work::.i;etibi-ina- noalilmpl ementiti on
t	 test	 •	 t	 test-::	 :::•.;	 • test::::::::::i	 :..t. , test ,ii i: i .. ;i: i :: .•::t''..test
Internal
auditing
respondent
S vs.
other
groups
Journalist
s vs.
other
groups
6.05***
5.65***
_
5.01***
2.25*
9.51***
3.25**
5.91***
3.23**
1.41
5.47***
*	 p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
The results are in line with other researches, such as
Wright & Bargranoff (1995) that have made comparisons of
the evaluation of the effectiveness of internal auditing
between internal auditors and others, and have found the
internal auditors' evaluations to be higher.
The evaluations of the journalists as opposed
to the other respondents.
Hypotheses two, five, eight and eleven state:
Hypothesis two - "The respondent groups outside the
municipality have a lower evaluation of the independence
of the municipality internal auditing unit than the
respondent groups within the municipality."
Hypothesis five - "The respondent groups outside the
municipality have a lower evaluation of the competence
of the municipality internal auditing unit than the
respondent groups within the municipality."
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Hypothesis eight - "The respondent groups outside the
municipality have a lower evaluation of the scope of
work of the municipality internal auditing unit than the
respondent groups within the municipality."
Hypothesis eleven - "The respondent groups outside the
municipality have a lower evaluation of the performance
of the municipality internal auditing unit than the
respondent groups within the municipality."
The journalists being the only external group of users
in the empirical research, the term "the respondent
groups outside the municipality" in the above hypotheses
will be replaced by "the journalists".
According to hypotheses two, five, eight and eleven, -
which imply that the journalists have a lower evaluation
of effectiveness for all the different components - the
second contrast analysis was performed to compare the
journalists with the other respondent groups of the
research.	 Table 9.3 also shows the results of that
analysis.	 For all four components	 (independence,
p<.001; competence, p<.05; scope of work, p<.01; and
performance, p<.01) the results show that the
evaluations by the journalists were lower than those by
the other respondent groups, as expected by the four
hypotheses regarding the journalists' evaluations.
These results confirm the theoretical analysis presented
in this study regarding power, perception and internal
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auditing in municipalities in Israel. That analysis led
us to expect that users of the municipality internal
auditing product, outside the municipality - in this
case, the journalists - would offer a lower evaluation
of the effectiveness of the municipality internal
auditing unit than those within the municipality.
9.1.4.	 Evaluation by respondents from municipality
internal auditing units and by journalists of
the implementation component.
Following the factor analysis, a new factor or component
was added, which is the implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings.
An analysis analogous to that performed with the other
components was done to investigate whether the
respondents from the municipality internal auditing unit
offered a higher evaluation of the implementation
component by comparison with other respondent groups
(Tables 9.2-9.3). The analysis did not reveal a
significant difference and therefore did not confirm
that the respondents from the municipality internal
auditing unit gave higher evaluation of the
implementation component by comparison with other
respondent groups. On the other hand, same analysis was
performed to find out whether the journalists, compared
to the other respondent groups, had a lower evaluation
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of the implementation component.
	
The result was
positive (p < .001) •
The journalists' evaluation of the implementation
component follows the same pattern as has been found for
the other components: 	 It is the lowest among all the
respondent groups.	 As for the respondents from
municipality internal auditing units, in contrast to the
other components, their evaluation for the
implementation component was not confirmed to be the
highest. In order to understand this result, one has to
remember that responsibility lies not with the internal
auditors, but with the top management to implement
corrective action following the internal auditing
findings. Therefore, since it is not part of what they
judge as their responsibility, the assumption that they
will rate their own effectiveness as the highest will
not apply in the case of the implementation component.
Differences in evaluation among the different
auditee respondent groups
Hypotheses three, six, nine and twelve state:
Hypothesis three - "There is a difference in the
evaluation of the independence of the municipality
internal auditing unit between the different levels of
auditee respondent groups within the municipality."
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Hypothesis six "There is a difference in the
evaluation of the competence of the municipality
internal auditing unit between the different levels of
auditee respondent groups within the municipality."
Hypothesis nine "There is a difference in the
evaluation of the scope of work of the municipality
internal auditing unit between the different levels of
auditee respondent groups within the municipality."
Hypothesis twelve - "There is a difference in the
evaluation of the performance of the municipality
internal auditing unit between the different levels of
auditee respondent groups within the municipality."
The auditees in the research are the councillors, the
top management and the middle level management. Since
hypotheses three, six, nine and twelve do not point out
specific directions as to the differences between these
groups, post-hoc paired comparisons according to Scheffe
(p < .05) were performed. In those analyses, significant
differences were found regarding the components of
independence, scope of work and implementation. In
those three components the difference was found between
the councillors and the two other auditee groups.
Between those two groups - top management and middle
level management - no significant difference was found.
According to the means presented in Table 9.2, in all
those three variables the evaluation by the councillors
is lower than that by the two other auditee groups.
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No statistically significant differences were found
between the councillors, the top management and the
middle level management regarding the components of
competence and performance. Therefore, Hypotheses six
and twelve which expected such a difference were not
confirmed in the empirical research.
As for Hypotheses three and nine, which expected
differences between the different levels of auditee
respondent groups regarding independence and scope of
work, the findings were: (1) A significant difference
was found between the councillors, on the one hand, and
the two other groups on the other. (2) No significant
differences were found between those two groups - top
management and middle level management.
As for the implementation, which was the new component
formed after the factor analysis, the same results were
collected as for the independence and scope of work:
(1) A significant difference was found between the
councillors, on the one hand, and the two other groups.
(2)No significant differences were found between top
management and middle level management.
Interpretation of Differences
It is possible to divide the five groups which took part
in the research into three sub-populations: internal
auditors, auditees and journalists. According to the
mans presented in Table 9.2, for all the components
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except "implementation", the highest evaluation was
given by the internal auditors and the lowest was given
by the journalists. The auditees stand in between.
As mentioned already, those results are in line with the
hypotheses of the research. In addition, it is worth
comparing them with verbatim data which the author
collected in interviews, prior to the empirical
research.
In those individual meetings, described in chapter four
'Criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of internal
auditing in municipalities in Israel', the
representatives of the groups of users of the internal
auditing product Were asked to assess the different
components and criteria that should be part of the
evaluation cf the effectiveness of internal auditing in
municipalities in Israel. Besides their assessments,
the representatives made additional comments, which are
instructive in their approach to different aspects of
the internal auditing operation. Most of the comments
that were made related to the independence and scope of
work components.
The municipality internal auditors that took part in the
interviews did not complain about their organisational
status, but rather were concerned about receiving
adequate resources (budget and staff) from the
municipality for the proper operation of their units.
273
As for the scope of work, different views were heard
from the municipality internal auditors. One
municipality internal auditor felt able to audit any
topic in the municipality. Another felt constrained by
the gap between theory (the law) and practice. The law
prescribes a virtually unlimited scope of work including
the operations of the mayor, the council and the top
executives. In reality, the 'municipality internal
auditor had better not audit the mayor'. The internal
auditor in charge of the education sector in a large
municipality conceded that the internal auditing unit
could act freely up to the level of department
directors.
It seems that municipality internal auditors define
their own scope of work, the limits of which might
differ from one municipality to another. Within that
framework, they feel they can operate effectively.
The senior deputy general director of the State
Comptroller's office did not define directly what was
feasible. He stressed, however, that the mayors can
neutralise the municipality internal auditors if they
wish, by not providing the tools needed to perform their
job.
This same concern led the chief finance officer of a
certain municipality to suggest that the budget of the
internal auditing unit should be allocated by an
external body.	 Similarly, the chair of one audit
274
committee suggested that the appointment (or dismissal)
of the municipality internal auditor should be the
responsibility of the State Comptroller and not of the
municipality. The journalist interviewed believed that
not only the appointment of municipality internal
auditors but all decisions regarding their conditions of
employment should be transferred to an external body,
preferably the Ministry of the Interior.
The director of the department in the Ministry of the
Interior which audits local authorities also looked for
ways to strengthen the position of municipality internal
auditors. He was hoping for changes through legislation
in the Municipal Ordinance regarding the appointment
(and dismissal) of the municipality internal auditor and
the provision of an adequate budget and staff numbers.
It seems on the basis of those interviews that the
internal auditors look at what they can achieve while
the others are more concerned with constraints. In a
simplistic way, it could be said that the internal
auditors see the glass as half full while the others see
it as half empty. The differences in attitude may
explain the higher evaluations that were given by the
internal auditors to the first four components of
effectiveness (independence, competence, scope of work,
performance).
Looking at the different inputs that were brought in
from the meetings held at an early stage of the
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research, one may discern that the users external to the
municipality - namely the State Comptroller's Office,
the Ministry of the Interior and the journalist - seem
more sceptical overall about the effectiveness of the
inte/nal auditing unit compared to the bulk of the other
users. This seems to confirm the hypotheses that the
users external to the municipality will give lower
evaluations to the components of the effectiveness than
the internal users.
However, there was only one group of users external to
the municipality who took part in the empirical survey,
namely the journalists. This group in fact gave the
lowest evaluations to the different components of the
effectiveness compared to all the other groups. This
confirmed the hypothesis (albeit just for the
journalists), together with the general impression from
the meetings with the representatives of the groups
external to the municipality.
The implementation, or in its full definition the
implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings, is seen as separate from the
performance component as was clarified in the factor
analysis. The responsibility for implementing the
corrective action lies firstly with the top management.
This is confirmed by what the general director of a
certain municipality told the author in the interview.
According to the general director, when the municipality
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internal auditcr presents his report the mayor calls a
meeting with all the parties concerned. Those meetings
result in decisions regarding the correction of
deficiencies. The implementation of those decisions is
the general director's responsibility.
Therefore, it should not be surprising, looking at the
calculated means in Table 9.2, that they gave the
highest score on this component.
One may assume that respondents from the municipality
internal auditing unit also see it from the same angle.
According to the means presented in Table 9.2, their
evaluation of the implementation was the lowest among
the five components and lower than that by the top
management. As a matter of fact, for all respondent
groups, the lowest mean was for the implementation (see
Table 9.2). This also explains why the journalists'
evaluation, which was the lowest for the other four
components, was also the lowest for the implementation.
It is obvious that the different groups see the
implementation as more problematic than any of the other
components.
In most meetings held, the respondents representing the
different groups of users reported the great importance
they attached to the 'implementation' component, albeit
without naming it. The municipality internal auditor
that took part in the first stage of interviews
considered that the pace at which the deficiencies were
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corrected in the municipality was an important indicator
of the effectiveness of the internal audit. 	 However,
according to the chief financial officer, the
departments in the municipality do not attach enough
importance to the municipality internal auditor's
reports, with the result that deficiencies are not
corrected fast enough. The senior director in the
division which audits local authorities in the State
Comptroller office admitted that in practice many
deficiencies were not corrected at all. In order to
improve the situation, the director of the department
which audits local authorities in the Ministry of the
Interior has requested that municipality internal
auditors send him their annual report. He believes that
this helps force the municipalities to address these
reports in a more serious manner. The chair of one
audit committee suggested that special powers should be
given to the municipality internal auditors if the same
deficiencies repeat themselves. By contrast, the
ex-director of education in one municipality considered
that since the municipality internal auditing unit does
not have the power to enforce corrective action, the
follow-up should be undertaken by a competent external
body.
Among the auditees, a difference was found between the
elected or political group of respondents - the
councillors, and the professional respondent group
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employed by the municipality. They are two distinct
groups, one driven by political motives and less
involved in the day to day affairs in the municipality,
and the other fulfilling its professional duties. In
the three components of independence, scope of work and
implementation, the politicians gave significantly lower
evaluations than the professionals.
It is noteworthy that the two groups representing the
population of the municipality in large, namely the
councillors - politicians - elected by that public and
the journalists who are the proxy of that public, gave
the lowest evaluations among the respondent groups.
These results seem to confirm the conclusion of the
theoretical analysis presented at the end of section
2.2.3 of this work. It was inferred there that the gap
between the high expectations from the internal auditing
unit on one hand and its inability to have the
deficiencies corrected rapidly on the other hand would
affect the perceived effectiveness of the municipality
internal auditing unit. It was anticipated that this
discrepancy would be felt even more among the users that
do not take part in the ongoing operation of the
municipality: the journalists and the councillors. This
expectation was borne out in the empirical research.
9.1.7.
	
Testing the hypotheses - Summary
The results of the data analysis of the empirical
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Table 9.4:	 Project hypotheses tested - Summary
	 •
.	 .	 •	 '	 ..	 .	 Hypotheses	 -:: 	 	  . Confirmed
.	
...	 ....
...	 ...	 .	 .	 .	 	 	
..	
.	
,Jabbreviated"format):. :.  .
	 - s "No
1.The respondents from internal auditing units have a
higher	 evaluation	 of	 the	 independence	 than	 the
other respondent groups have.
x
2.The	 journalists	 have	 a	 lower	 evaluation	 of	 the
independence than the other respondent groups have. x
3.There	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the
independence	 between	 the	 different	 auditee
respondent groups.	 (1)
x
4.The respondents from internal auditing units have a
higher evaluation of the competence than the other
respondent groups have.
x
5.The	 journalists	 have	 a	 lower	 evaluation	 of	 the
competence than the other respondent groups have. x
6.There	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the
competence between the different auditee respondent
groups.
x
7.The respondents from internal auditing units have a
higher evaluation	 of	 the	 scope	 of work	 than the
other respondent groups have.
x
8.The	 journalists	 have	 a	 lower	 evaluation	 of	 the
scope	 of	 work	 than	 the	 other	 respondent	 groups
have.
x
9.There	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the
scope	 of	 work	 between	 the	 different	 auditee
respondent groups. (1)
x
10.The respondents	 from internal auditing units have
a higher	 evaluation	 of	 the	 performance	 than	 the
other respondent groups have.
x
11.The	 journalists	 have	 a	 lower	 evaluation	 of	 the
performance than the other respondent groups have. x
12.There	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the
performance	 between	 the	 different	 auditee
respondent groups.
x
I.The respondents from internal auditing units have a
higher	 evaluation	 of	 the	 implementation	 of
corrective action than the other respondent groups
have.
x
II.The	 journalists	 have	 a	 lower	 evaluation	 of	 the
implementation of corrective action than the other
respondent groups have.
x
III.There is	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the
implementation	 of	 corrective	 action	 between	 the
different auditee respondent groups. 	 (1)
x
(1)A difference was found between the councillors and the other
auditee respondent groups.
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research as compared to the hypotheses are presented in
Table 9.4. For the sake of clarity and conformity,
though not originally part of the hypotheses, the
component of implementation has been added at the end of
the list with another enumeration, using the formulation
established in section 8.2. Hypotheses 13-15, regarding
management of the municipality internal auditing unit,
were left out since they were found not relevant in the
case of municipality internal auditing in Israel.
9.2. Relations between the components used to
evaluate the effectiveness.
In order to find out what are the relations between the
components of evaluation, Pearson correlations were
obtained (Table 9.5).
Table 9.5:	 Pearson correlation between components
used to evaluate the effectiveness of internal
auditing in municipalities.
Independence
Competence
Scope of
work
Performance
Implementation
1.00
.59*
.70*
.67*
.42*
1.00
•74*
.84*
•40*
1.00
.79*
.47*
1.00
.52*	 1.00
Independence Competence
.	 .
Scope of
work	 • •
Performance mplementation
•	 ' 	 •• .. .-- 	 :	 •	 •	 :	 ..	 "	 -	 •
.	 ...
* p < .001
-	 -
As can be seen in Table 9.5 there are relatively high
correlations between the different components of the
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questionnaire. As can also be seen in Table 9.5, the
correlations between the implementation and the other
components are lower than the correlations among the
other components. This is not surprising, since the
implementation component is related to the actual
measures of correction taken by the auditee following
the internal auditing report and not part of the
internal auditing operation. As such, it is linked to
the management and not directly to the auditing unit,
unlike the other components. Still, it is interesting
to point out that in general, those respondents that
offered relatively high evaluations for independence,
competence, scope of work and performance, also tended
to offer relatively high evaluations for implementation.
Correlations calculated for each group of respondents
separately resulted in correlations similar to those
presented in Table 9.5.
In order to check which of the components contribute to
the explained variance of the evaluation of the
implementation component, stepwise multiple regression
was executed.
In this regression only the performance component
contributed significantly (0 = . 52; p<.001; R2 = . 27) to
the explained variance while the other components were
excluded from the regression equation due to their
overlapping with the performance, because of their
correlation with the performance.
	 0 is the unique
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overlapping with the performance, because of their
correlation with the performance.	 0 is the unique
contribution of the performance, whose range is -1 ^ 13 .^.1.
R2 is the total explained variance of all independent
variables, whose maximum value is 1.
Though responsibility for the implementation of
corrective action following the internal auditing
findings lies not with the internal auditing unit but
with the management, it was found that the higher the
evaluation of performance of the internal auditing unit,
the higher the evaluation of implementation.
It seems that the respondents expect that the higher the
performance, the better the chances for better
implementation. It is a fair conclusion that when the
performance of the internal auditing unit is recognised
as good, it will be harder to postpone or reject the
corrective action which that unit recommends.
The case of the municipality internal auditor that was
interviewed in the second stage of meetings seems to
confirm this conclusion. She has, from hearsay, a very
good reputation in her job, i.e. good performance. In
her meeting she described the pace at which the
deficiencies were corrected as satisfactory. In her
case, one may trace a direct relationship between the
performance of the municipality internal auditing unit
and the implementation component.
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140,000 and up
30%
Up to 40,000
29%
40,000 to 140,000
41%
9. 3. Relationship between the evaluation of
effectiveness and the population size of the
municipality.
The respondents were divided into three groups according
to the size of the population of their municipality as
reported in the questionnaire - Section I (Appendix H).
From among the 131 respondents that gave this
information, 38 were from municipalities with a
population lower than 40,000, 54 from municipalities
with a population between 40,000 to 140,000 and 39 from
municipalities with a population of 140,000 and up (see
Figure 9.3).
Figure 9.3: Distribution of municipalities according to
population size
In order to find out whether there are any differences
between those three groups, 4X3 MANOVA analysis was
performed (based on the four respondent groups x the
three classes of population size). This analysis
enables checking whether there are any differences
between the three classes of population size, and if
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E(2, 119) 4.56*
those differences are the same for all the respondent
groups (interaction effect). In that analysis, a
significant difference was found between the three
groups of different population size, F(10,230) = 2.26;
p<.05, while there was no significant interaction effect
of respondent groups x classes of population size.
The means and standard deviations of the three groups
for the five components evaluating the effectiveness are
presented in Table 9.6. The means also appear in
Figure 9.4.
Table 9.6: Means and standard deviations of the five
components used to evaluate effectiveness in the three
groups of different population size.
Population Inidepamience .CoulOatenoaSiZe
•
M SO
	
up to 40,000 4.22
	
.91	 4.50 1.11 4.06 1.06 4.00 1.24 3.17 1.10
40,000 to	 4.66	 .86	 4.85 .98 4.41 .87 4.58 .95 3.76 1.01
140,000
140,000	 4.71	 .79	 4.82 .66 4.48 .79 4.75 .87 3.44 1.01
and up
..	 •
* p<.05
	
** p<.01
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0 Up to 40,000
13 40,000 to
140,000
0140,000 and
up
6
4.6
4
3.5
3
2.6
2
1.6
1
0.6
0
Independence Competence Scope of work Performance Implementat on
Figure 9.4: Means of the five components used to
evaluate effectiveness in the three groups
of different population size.
As can be seen in Table 9.6, univariate ANOVA for each
component revealed significant differences between the
three groups of different population size regarding all
the components except for competence. Table 9.6 shows
that the means for all the components used to evaluate
the effectiveness of the internal auditing unit, were
lower among the jobholders in municipalities with a
population up to 40,000, compared to the two other
groups. This shows a certain perceived relative
weakness in the effectiveness of municipality internal
auditing in small municipalities. However, in post-hoc
comparisons according to Scheffe, a significant
difference between the jobholders of the municipalities
up to 40,000 and the other two groups were found only in
performance.
	
The reason may be that in bigger
municipalities the internal auditing staff is generally
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larger and therefore the skill mix is better, resulting
in better quality work.
For independence and scope of work, a significant
difference was found between respondents from
municipalities with a population up to 40,000 and
respondents from municipalities with a population of
140,000 and up.	 The position of the municipality
internal auditors and their staff is stronger in the
bigger municipalities. The fact that in bigger
municipalities the municipality internal auditors hold
more senior positions, and that their staff are larger
enables the internal auditing unit to be more
independent and have a larger scope of work. Table 9.6
shows that the implementation score is higher in the
middle-sized than in the smaller municipalities, but
then fall back in the largest municipalities. There was
thus a significant difference only between the
jobholders in municipalities with a population up to
40,000 and those with a population between 40,000 to
140,000. How can this be explained? First, it has
already been shown that a higher evaluation of
performance goes together with a higher evaluation of
implementation. Since the evaluation of the performance
was found significantly higher in municipalities of
40,000 and up in comparison to those of up to 40,000,
one could expect similar findings in relation to
implementation.
	 In fact, in the case of the
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implementation, a significant difference was found only
between municipalities with a population between 40,000
to 140,000 and those up to 40,000. To interpret this,
one needs to remember that the responsibility of the
implementation component lies with top management. From
the results, it seems that the respondents are less
happy with the handling of the corrective measures
following the internal auditing reports in the category
of municipalities of 140,000 and up than in
municipalities with a population between 40,000 to
140,000. It may be that, due to the complexity of the
bigger municipalities of 140,000 and up, the process of
implementation is perceived as slower and therefore
receives a lower evaluation than in the category of
municipalities between 40,000 to 140,000.
9.4.	 Relationship	 between	 the	 evaluation	 of
effectiveness and data provided by the
municipality internal auditors
In section I of the questionnaire (Appendix H) the
municipality internal auditors were asked to fill in
some data regarding their municipality, such as the
total budget of the municipality as a whole and of the
municipality internal auditing budget alone, the size of
the municipality internal auditing staff, number of
years in internal auditing and whether they use external
experts. The author has already mentioned, in chapter
seven of the study, certain aspects of that data.
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In order to find out if there are any relations between
those variables and the components used to evaluate the
effectiveness of municipality internal auditing, Pearson
correlations were calculated. A significant correlation
was found between the relative size of the municipality
internal auditing budget - as part of the total budget -
and the independence (r =.34; p< .05) . Another
significant correlation was found between the seniority
(number of years in internal auditing) and the
independence (r = .42; p< .01) . These two correlations
show that the higher in percentage the budget of the
municipality internal auditing, and the higher the
seniority of the municipality internal auditors are, the
higher the independence was perceived.
That can also be presented by saying that the more
importance is attached to the internal auditing unit,
the more independent it is perceived to be. Also, the
more experienced in internal auditing the municipality
internal auditors are, the more independent they
perceived the internal auditing unit to be.
Regarding the use of external experts, t-test analysis
was performed between the municipality internal auditing
units that were using external experts and those that
did not. No significant differences were found, for any
component.
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9.5.
	 Differences
	
between	 councillors	 from	 the
opposition and the coalition.
The councillors were divided according to the
affiliation reported, as belonging to the ruling
coalition (n=19) or to the opposition (n=8) in the
municipality. One councillor did not report on that
topic. The purpose was to find out whether there are
any differences between the two groups in the different
components used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
municipality internal auditing unit. A oneway MANOVA
was used. The analysis did not reveal any difference
between the two groups, whether over all the five
factors F(5, 21) = 2.11; p>.05 , or in univariate ANOVA
for each measure separately. The means and standard
deviations and the univariate ANOVA performed on each
component separately are presented in Table 9.7.
The fact that no significant difference has been found
between councillors of the coalition and the opposition
is interesting. It suggests that the politics does not
influence councillors in their judgement of the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit, or at least that it influences those of the
coalition and those of the opposition similarly.
One could expect councillors of the opposition to be
more critical regarding the municipality internal
auditing unit since they may look at its report as
"ammunition" against the mayor. This research, however,
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has found no supporting evidence, though further
research is needed.
As to the audit committee, which is composed of
councillors both from the ruling coalition and from the
opposition, the author discovered from interviews that
it was no highly regarded by any of the respondents,
with one sole exception - who was himself the chair of
an audit committee. An unfavourable view of audit
committees was offered by two senior representatives of
the State Comptroller's Office, one mayor and various
top executives. All viewed the audit committee as
composed of calculating politicians, whether affiliated
to the opposition or to the ruling coalition.
A good descriptive example is the case of the councillor
of the opposition who was himself a candidate to chair
the audit committee in the municipality. He told the
author in his interview that other members of the
opposition opposed his nomination. They feared he would
use this position to gain publicity, especially since he
had made no secret of his plan to run for mayor in the
next election. This short narrative may be understood
in two opposite ways. Either the other councillors were
worried that he was not going to be serious enough in
his task and would just be interested in attracting
publicity; or they were afraid he would do take the task
so seriously that he would attract too much publicity.
Either way, this story shows that councillors suspect
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each other of putting their political agenda before the
municipality's interest.
The only favourable view of the audit committee was
offered by a serving chairman. He agreed that there was
no difference in behaviour between councillors from the
opposition and coalition; but he maintained that they
were all seriously anxious to have any deficiencies
corrected.
Table 9.7:	 Means and standard deviations of the five
components used to evaluate the effectiveness by
councillors from the coalition and the opposition.
Council/ors Independence Competence * Scope of
work	
•
Performance Implementation
•	 •	
'
M	 SD M SD M	 SD 4SD H 	 SD
From the
Coalition
From the
Opposition
4.22
	 1.06
3.59	 1.04
4.52
4.81
.75
.99
3.81	 .93
3.69	 1.01
4.20	 .95
4.01	 1.46
3.24	 1.25
2.38	 1.41
F(1,	 25) 2.05 .73 .09 .17 2.49
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Figure 9.5:
Competence	 Scope of work Performance	 Implementation
Means
	 of the five	 components used to
evaluate the effectiveness by the
councillors
opposition.
from	 the	 coalition and the
9. 6. Presenting the main results of the empirical
research to mayors and conclusion
In consultation with Professor Selim and two other
distinguished professors of the City University Business
School, Professor Collins and Professor Holtham, it was
recommended that the mayors - due to their important
role in the Israeli municipality - should also have
direct input into the research.
Knowing the difficulty in obtaining the co-operation of
the mayors, Professor Selim suggested consulting Dr.
Rozevitch and another expert as to what would be the
best feasible way to have the mayors' input.
Dr. Rozevitch and Dr. Menuchin, both leading experts in
the Israeli local government and public administration
arena, acknowledged the difficulty in having the mayors'
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input. The mayors would not "spend" their time filling
in a questionnaire, not even by dictating their answers
to the author. In order to have their comments, the
purpcse of the meeting had to be more appealing. The
recommendation was to let the mayors know that the
research had been carried out and that the main results
would be presented to them exclusively, in face to face
meetings, in order to have their comments which were of
great importance to the research.
The author collected separately the opinions of six
mayors forming, according to Dr. Rozevitch, a fair
representation of most municipalities in Israel. In the
meetings with the mayors, the author would present
briefly the purpose of the research, the means used to
collect the data and the different respondent groups
that took part in the research.
Subject to the time limitation of the meetings, the
author presented very schematically the results of the
research:
1.Respondents from the municipality internal auditing
units gave higher evaluations of the effectiveness
of the municipality internal auditing unit for all
the different components apart from implementation.
2.The journalists gave the lowest evaluations of the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing
unit for all components.
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3.No difference was found between councillors of the
coalition and the opposition.
4.The evaluations given by the councillors regarding
the components of independence, scope of work and
implementation were lower than those given by the
top management and middle level management.
5.No difference was found between the top management
and middle level management.
6. In municipalities with a population of up to 40,000,
the evaluation of all components tended to be lower
than in bigger municipalities.
The mayors, with no exceptions, accepted the results and
were not surprised by them.
Since there were no contradictions between the mayors'
comments, the author has been able to integrate their
opinions in the following comprehensive summary:
(1)The differences in the evaluation of the
effectiveness of municipality internal auditing are
correlated with the closeness of the respondent
group to the actual day to day work of the
municipality internal auditing. The closest are the
internal auditing respondents themselves, then the
professionals who are day after day at the
municipality, then the councillors who do not come
to the municipality on a day to day basis, and then
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small municipalities as co ared to those in theMO,
the journalists who are outside the municipality
work.
(2)The journalists are interested only in negative
aspects of the municipality. They, thus, point out
deficiencies, without mentioning the vast majority
of corrections which are in fact implemented
following the internal auditing findings. That is
why the journalists have the impression, which they
project also on the public, that deficiencies are
not corrected.
(3)Councillors, either from the coalition or the
opposition do not pay much attention to the internal
auditing unit. They pick up what may serve their
own goals. They are instrumental in leaking to the
journalists parts of the municipality internal
auditing report even before its official release.
(4)The mayors' relationship with their own municipality
internal auditors is a major influence on how the
other jobholders will consider the municipality
internal auditing unit.
(5)The difference in the evaluation between the
jobholders in small municipalities and bigger
municipalities lay in the difference of the
qualifications of the persons heading and operating
bigger municipalities.
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(6)In bigger municipalities, the municipality internal
auditor has more credentials, highly stature and a
larger staff, all of which makes the internal
auditing unit more impressive.
The input collected from the mayors has confirmed the
main results of the empirical research, by the fact that
the mayors have accepted them and have even looked at
ways to explain them.
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PART FOUR
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter ten
Research conclusions and recommendations
10.0. Introduction: Research summary
The first objective of the research was to develop a
model to evaluate the effectiveness of internal auditing
in municipalities in Israel.	 The model was then
validated	 through	 a	 process	 which	 included:
(a) Interviewing people involved with the municipality
internal auditing product about the components and
criteria proposed for the model; (b) Creating a
questionnaire based on the model and pilot testing it
before dispatching the final questionnaire; (c) After
the descriptive analysis, the statements in the
questionnaire were subjected to factor analysis in order
to examine to what extent the respondents accepted the
division of the model into its original components; (d)
The model was then modified in light of these findings
and in its redefined form was then used to test the
hypotheses.
The final outcome is a model for evaluating the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities in
Israel.	 This model can be used either for macro
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purposes, e.g. to explain behaviour related to the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities in
general, or for micro purposes, e.g. to evaluate the
effectiveness of the municipality internal auditing unit
in a particular municipality.
Given the nature of this study, the model was used for
macro purposes only. However, the municipality internal
auditor of one large municipality has already informed
the author that he was using the model in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of his own unit.
10.0.1.	 Developing a model
There are four different phases in the process of
building a model:	 (1) Presenting the specifications of
the model and formulating the hypothesis.
	
(2)
Collecting the data, estimating the parameters and the
different relationships. (3) Verifying the information
collected in phase two on the basis of theoretical a
priori presentation, statistical calculation and other
relevant estimates. This verification phase may lead
either to rejection, or to partial rejection (which will
necessitate a new formulation of the model), or to
acceptance of the model. Acceptance will open the way
to the next phase. (4) Applying the model to such
goals as explaining behaviour, predicting conduct and
policy-making.
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In order to develop a model to evaluate the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities in
Israel, standards of assessment are needed. In this
research, the standards adopted by the Institute of
Internal Auditors to evaluate the operations of an
internal auditing department (the Standards - Appendix
C) were used as benchmarks.
A list of criteria divided into five components,
presumed to be influential in that evaluation, was
prepared (Appendix D). 	 The components were the: 	 (I)
Independence of the internal auditing unit (2)
Competence of the internal auditing unit (3) Scope of
work of the internal auditing unit (4) Performance of
the internal auditing unit
	
(5) Management of the
internal auditing unit.
Fifteen hypotheses, three for each component, were
formulated.
10.0.2.	 Validating the components and criteria of
the model
The list of components and criteria was tested through a
process of meetings in two stages. The first stage of
meetings was held with representatives of major users of
the internal auditing product. The users were asked to
check the list and state whether in their opinion any
component or criterion was missing or, on the other
hand, if any of those listed were superfluous.
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The same process was repeated in the second stage, but
this time the meetings were held with representatives of
the larger circle of users of the municipality internal
auditing product.
Those meetings resulted in some slight alterations to
the model. Some doubts were raised about the relevance
of the component relating to the management of the
internal auditing unit, in the context of the Israeli
municipalities. Nonetheless, it was decided to leave
this component for the time being and reconsider the
issue after the collection of the data.
Based on that list of components and criteria
(Appendix D), a self administered questionnaire of the
Likert type was prepared (Appendix H). After different
steps to ensure the validity and reliability of the
questionnaire, including pilot testing, the final test
was sent. The returned questionnaires provided the data
for this research.
The high percentage of respondents that did not
participate in the evaluation of the component of
management of the internal auditing unit proved that
this component was not relevant in the context of
municipalities in Israel. Therefore, at this stage,
four components of the model remained, and the three
hypotheses (thirteen, fourteen, fifteen) related to the
management of the internal auditing unit component,
tamed out to be obsolete.
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A factor analysis was then carried out, to identify the
components to which, the various responses received from
each respondent could be referred. This yielded a new
component, namely the implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings. The
model of the research to evaluate the effectiveness of
the internal auditing unit thus turned out to be based
once more on five components the:
	
(1) Independence of
the internal auditing unit (independence) (2)
Competence of the internal auditing unit (competence)
(3) Scope of work of the internal auditing unit (scope
of work)	 (4) Performance of the internal auditing
unit (performance) (5) Implementation of corrective
action following the internal auditing findings
(implementation).
10.0.3.	 Evaluating the effectiveness of internal
auditing
Using a six level scale, the respondents had to tick how
strongly they agree/disagree with each statement in the
questionnaire. A seventh option "not known/not
available" could also be used. For each respondent, a
set of answers related to the different statements
corresponding to each component of the model was
collected. As Peacock & Pelfrey (1991) suggested, the
Likert type scale provided a mechanism for quantifying
responses.
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In the absence of any contrary indication, the same
weight was given to each statement in each component and
for each respondent.
The respondents were divided into five groups:
(1) Staff of the municipality internal auditing unit
(2) Councillors	 (3) Top management	 (4) Middle level
management	 (5)	 Journalists	 covering municipality
affairs.
The task of evaluating the effectiveness of the internal
auditing unit was divided into the evaluation of the
five components set out above.
10.0.4.	 Differences
	
in	 perceived
	 effectiveness
between different groups of evaluators
Former investigators, such as Wright & Bargranoff
(1995), who have compared the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the internal auditing unit by the
internal auditors and by others, have found that the
internal auditors offer a higher evaluation. In this
research the same situation was expected, for all
components. This expectation was incorporated in
hypotheses numbers: one (regarding independence), four
(competence), seven (scope of work), and ten
(performance).
The contrast analysis comparing the internal auditing
respondents to all other respondents showed that for all
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four of these components the evaluation by the
respondents from internal auditing units was higher, as
expected on all four hypotheses (with p < .001).
On the basis of a theoretical analysis presented in this
study regarding power, perception and internal auditing
in municipalities in Israel, it was expected that users
of the municipality internal auditing product outside
the municipality would offer a lower evaluation of the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities, by
comparison with those within the municipality. 	 This
expectation was incorporated in hypotheses: 	 two
(independence), five (competence), eight (scope of
work), and eleven (performance). Because of legal
limitations, external official users could not take part
in the empirical research. The only group external to
the municipality that took part in the research
comprised the journalists. The results of the empirical
research, therefore, relate to the journalists only and
cannot be extrapolated to all external users.
The contrast analysis comparing the journalists to all
other respondents showed that for all four components
the evaluation by the journalists were lower, as
expected by the four hypotheses (with p< .05) .
Performing the same contrast analysis on the fifth
component (implementation), it was found that the
journalists had, as expected, a lower evaluation (with
p<.001). However, the contrast analysis did not confirm
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that the municipality internal auditing respondents had
the highest evaluation for that same component. In the
author's view the reason that respondents from the
municipality internal auditing unit do not offer a
higher evaluation of this particular component of
effectiveness is that they do not see this component as
a direct part of their job. Still, one has to accept
the implementation component in the model of
effectiveness, since there is no sense in having
excellent internal auditing reports with findings and
recommendations, if the corrections needed are not
implemented.
The other hypotheses were based on the expectation that
auditees at different levels in the municipality would
differ in their evaluations of the various components of
effectiveness,	 on	 account	 of	 their	 different
perspectives.
	
This expectation was incorporated in
hypotheses: three (independence), six (competence), nine
scope of work), and twelve (performance).
There were three auditee groups in the municipality: the
councillors, the top management and the middle level
management. Since the hypotheses concerned did not
indicate specific directions as to the differences
between those groups, post-hoc paired comparisons
according to Scheffe were performed. In those analyses,
the councillors' evaluations of the components of
independence, scope of work and implementation were
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found to be significantly lower than those of the top
and middle level management (p<.05). In other words,
the evaluation by the political representatives was
found to be, on those three components, lower than that
of the professionals. No significant differences were
found between the top and middle level management.
Also, no significant difference was found between the
councillors from the opposition and those from the
ruling coalition. One of the mayors who was asked to
give his opinion on the results of the empirical test
felt that the farther the respondent was from the
internal auditing unit, the lower the evaluation would
be, because of lack of involvement in the internal
auditing process.
Hypotheses six (competence) and twelve (performance)
were not confirmed since no significant differences were
found regarding those two components between the
councillors, the top management and the middle level
management.
A different analysis was performed to investigate
whether differences would be found between the
respondents' evaluations and the population size of
their municipality. The municipalities were divided
into three population size categories: (1) up to 40,000
(2) between 40,000 to 140,000 (3) 140,000 and upward.
The mean values for all the five components used to
evaluate effectiveness were lower among the respondents
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in municipalities with a population up to 40,000
compared to the two other groups. This indicates a
certain perceived relative weakness in the effectiveness
of	 municipality	 internal	 auditing	 in	 small
municipalities.
The only component for which a significant difference
was found involving all three population size categories
was performance, between the municipalities up to 40,000
and the two other groups.
	
An explanation for these
differences lies in the fact that in small
municipalities the staff of the internal auditing unit
is often limited to one person - the municipality
internal auditor only. This influences performance,
since the internal auditing unit does not have the
advantage of a larger auditing staff which generally
will have a better mix of skills.
Significant differences were also found between the
respondents of municipalities up to 40,000 and those
municipalities of 140,000 and upward, regarding the
components of independence and scope of work. The
mayors to whom the author has spoken implied that in big
municipalities the stature of the municipality internal
auditors and the size of their staff lend importance to
the internal auditing unit. The unit is then perceived
as more independent and as having a larger scope of work
than in the case of municipalities with a population of
up to 40,000.
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With regard to implementation, a significant difference
was found only between the respondents in municipalities
with a population of up to 40,000 and those with a
population between 40,000 to 140,000. A possible
explanation lies in the fact that, in small
municipalities, the evaluation of performance was lower.
Since this research has found a positive correlation
between performance and implementation, a lower
performance would contribute to a lower implementation.
Following the same logic, one might expect that a
significantly higher evaluation of performance by
respondents from the two other categories of
municipalities should also lead to significantly higher
evaluations of the implementation component for both
categories. However, this is not the case for the
municipalities with a population of 140,000 and upwards.
These are the municipality internal auditing units that
are supposed to be the "strongest" and perhaps the
expectations of the respondents are higher for •that
reason. Once more the author points to the problem of
perception and power. High status does not mean power
and it is possible that high expectations when compared
with the reality lead to a certain disappointment in the
evaluation of the implementation of corrective action
following the internal auditing findings. In the middle
level category of municipalities,
	 those with a
population of between 40,000 and 140,000, the stature of
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the municipality internal auditor is lower, the staff is
smaller and the expectations are more moderate. This
seems to be the reason why this category yielded the
highest evaluation of implementation.
Using Pearson correlations for responses given by the
municipality internal auditors in Section I of the
questionnaire (Appendix H), significant correlation was
found between the relative size of the municipality
internal auditing budget - in relation to the total
budget - and the independence score (r= .34; p<.05).
Independence was also found to be significantly
correlated with seniority, defined as the number of
years that the municipality internal auditor has worked
in internal auditing (r=.42; p<.01). The higher the
percentage budget of the municipality's internal
auditing unit, the higher the component of independence
was perceived to be; and the higher the seniority of the
municipality internal auditors, the higher their
perceived independence. The stronger the municipality
internal auditors feel their own position to be, whether
because of a relatively larger budget for their units or
because of their experience in their job, the more
independent they perceive their internal auditing unit
to be.
309
10.1. Conclusion
(1)Journalists and councillors, both representing the
public, gave lower evaluations of the effectiveness
of municipality internal auditing than the other
respondent groups. This suggests that, in spite of
its high status, municipality internal auditing does
not fulfil the public's expectation of what
Rozevitch in Interior (1989:210) called their task
of being part of the system of checks and balances
in relation to the mayor.
Contributory reasons are as follows:
a)The municipality internal auditing depends
greatly on the municipality management, in
relation to its budget, the size and remuneration
of its staff, and even the condition of the work
facilities. In addition, the relationship
between the mayors and the municipality internal
auditors will very much influence the way that
others in the municipality will regard the
municipality internal auditing unit.
b)It is not realistic to expect the municipality's
internal auditing unit to audit a management
level higher than its own. It is, therefore,
doubtful whether the municipality internal
auditing unit would investigate an operation
directly involving the mayor.
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C) Contrary to other internal auditing units in
organisations, the municipality internal
auditing unit has its annual report published.
This creates high expectations from the public,
which cannot be met given the way that
municipality internal auditing units operate at
present.
(2)Implementation of corrective action was evaluated as
lower than the other components, by all respondent
groups. This indicates a problem which has to be
solved in order to improve the effectiveness of
municipality internal auditing.
(3)The data analysis reveals a tendency for the
municipality's internal auditing unit to be
perceived as less effective in municipalities with a
population of up to 40,000 than in bigger
municipalities.
(4)From numerous meetings which the author had with
holders of different offices both within and outside
the municipality, it appears that:
a) The audit committee does not play a major role.
The committee is composed of councillors, who
generally lack an appropriate background and are
driven mainly by political motives.
b) The	 high number	 of	 different	 auditing
establishments active in the municipality sphere
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is detrimental to the objectives of auditing.
The different auditing establishments include
not only the municipality's own internal
auditing unit but also the State Comptroller and
the Ministry of the Interior. The latter is
active in two domains: first, its own staff
audits local authorities directly, in much the
same way as the State Comptroller; and second,
it employs CPA firms which prepare the
municipalities' annual audit balance sheet. One
mayor confided to the author his impression that
the fact that the State Comptroller has assigned
a team to audit his municipality for some months
showed a lack of respect for the work performed
by the municipality's own internal auditor.
c) There is wide acceptance that quality assurance
is needed in municipality internal auditing.
Although some representatives of the State
Comptroller and the Ministry of the Interior had
mentioned that they were active in that
direction, it is at best sporadic, without any
long-term strategy. In addition, those two
auditing establishments that are external to the
municipality have disagreements of their own
about the role each has to play, and show little
mutual co-operation.
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10.2.	 Recommendations
(1)In	 the	 present	 structure,	 there	 are	 high
expectations of the municipality internal auditing
unit, but the possibilities do not and cannot meet
those expectations.
There can be two solutions. One is based mainly on
lowering the expectations, the other on improving
the possibilities to meet the expectations.
The solution of lowering expectations is based on
having the municipality internal auditing unit act
like any other internal auditing unit, accountable
only to the management. The implications would be:
a) The municipality internal auditing report should
not be made accessible to the public.
Publishing the report raises expectations from
the public that cannot be met and, in addition,
creates bad feelings on behalf of the auditees.
As a matter of fact, the I.I.A. (Israel) has
opposed the recommendation of the Adam Report,
presented at the end of 1994, for internal
auditing reports in the ministries of the
central government be published after their
presentation to the minister. The Adam
Committee had been appointed by the central
government in order to suggest improvements in
the civil service. Their recommendation was
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opposed by the I.I.A. (Israel) generally, and
specifically by the internal auditors in the
ministries of the central government. The
reasons were given in the editorial of the
(Israeli) Internal Auditor (1997:90) as follows:
"The strength of internal auditing is its
essence of being internal. Publishing its
reports turns it into an external audit...
There are reasons to believe that publishing
reports in the newspaper would bring
unfavourable reactions from superiors and from
auditees, which could create obstacles to the
internal auditing in future audits... The final
results in that case would be to weaken internal
auditing." (Translated from Hebrew).
b)Criteria must be set up for providing appropriate
working conditions for the municipality internal
auditing unit. Those criteria should encompass
the budget, staff numbers and salaries, so that
the municipality internal auditing unit would not
depend on any future possible auditee for the
satisfactory continuation of its work. The
Ministry of the Interior has started to work on
such criteria, as was reported by Amrani
(1996),but the work is not yet complete.
If, as seems to be the intention of the Ordinance,
the municipality internal auditing unit is expected
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to be more than any other internal auditing unit,
then its organisational dependence must change to
increase its possibilities, as will be recommended
at the end of this section.
(2)More effort needs to be invested on behalf of the
municipality	 management	 to	 ensure	 that
implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings is more effective.
An improvement in that component would generate,
directly and indirectly, more effective municipality
internal auditing. It would also correct
deficiencies faster, and ultimately save public
money.
(3)In small municipalities, at present, the internal
auditing staff comprises often just one person.
Instead it is recommended here that a cluster of
small municipalities should co-ordinate an internal
auditing team which would work for them all. A
larger internal auditing staff will have a better
mix of skills. The same idea could be applied to
local councils which in the near future will need to
integrate	 internal	 auditing	 into	 their
organisations.
(4)It is crucial to incorporate quality assurance for
municipality internal auditing.	 This, in fact, is
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also required by the I.I.A. Standards in the
management of the internal auditing unit.
(5)It is recommended that the model for evaluating the
effectiveness of internal auditing in municipalities
in Israel be used for such evaluation within
individual municipalities.
Such an evaluation, if performed, could be very
instructive if a comparison is made between the
different scores collected by the various groups of
respondents (users of the internal auditing product)
taking part in the evaluation. It could point out
weak areas, help to characterise any problems, and
ultimately facilitate measures to correct
deficiencies regarding specific components or
respondent groups.
(6)In line with some of the recommendations mentioned
above, and in order to overcome various problems
that have been mentioned in the conclusion, it seems
to the author that the effectiveness of municipality
internal auditing could be improved by certain
organisational and conceptual changes. At present,
in addition to the internal auditing unit, there are
different external auditors (quite apart from the
CPA firms which mainly prepare the annual audit
balance sheet) with no co-ordination between them.
Instead, there could be one body responsible for
internal auditing in all local authorities in
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Israel. This body could be financed by all local
authorities that would be required to set aside a
certain percentage of their budget. This suggestion
is in part inspired by the Audit Commission for
local authorities operating in England.
The author believes that, without entering into the
question of the merits of the balance of power
between central and local government, there would be
many advantages in having a single body, serving the
needs of internal auditing in local authorities
exclusively. Such a body could hire and train
personnel and be responsible for continuing
education programs. It would pay the salaries of
internal auditors in local authorities and decide on
promotion or even rotation of individuals between
different local authorities. It would also be
responsible for establishing quality assurance
programs.
In such a structure, the municipality internal
auditing unit would be professionally accountable to
that body.
However, in order to create a positive attitude on
behalf of the municipality, it is important that the
municipality should have a part in the process of
appointing its municipality internal auditor. This
body would recommend candidates, from among whom the
municipality would make its choice. This body could
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also prove instrumental in strengthening the trend
found in this study, of career internal auditors in
municipalities in Israel.
In addition to providing for internal auditing in
local authorities, this body could publish its own
reports. It could produce an analysis on a national
scale of the internal auditing reports referring to
the different local authorities, and could point out
any common problems that exist.
In such a situation, the annual internal auditing
reports for each municipality would probably cover a
wider range of topics than at present in relation to
the mayors' operations, and would serve as
intended - as part of the system of checks and
balances to the mayor.
If the trend is for decentralisation from the
central government, then this body should report
directly to the Knesset, though this is not the only
possibility. This by itself will not improve the
implementation of corrective action following the
internal auditing findings. One may hope, however,
that the municipality internal auditing unit's
reports will have greater impact, and that there
will be more pressure on the mayor to ensure that
deficiencies are corrected.
318
That said, the author is aware that his
recommendation has its own drawbacks and there are
important pre-requisites for this idea to work. The
main drawback may be that an auditor linked one way
or another to an external body, might be seen by the
different jobholders in the municipality as an
external rather than internal auditor. Given this
perception, some may be more reluctant to
co-operate, and the problem may be exacerbated if
the annual internal auditing report is seen as
taking a tougher stance towards the municipality.
As to pre-requisites, there are various legislative
needs. The Knesset has to approve changes in the
legislation regarding internal auditing in
municipalities, the State Comptroller's Office
duties in relation to local government, the role of
the Ministry of the Interior in the auditing of
local government, and the definition, formation and
operation of the new body suggested by this study.
The first reaction of all the parties mentioned
above may be rejection of the idea because it limits
the authority of each one of them. Still, the author
believes that the idea has its merits, and that
after a process of adaptation it can work to improve
the effectiveness of internal auditing in the
municipalities.
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10.3. Suggestions for further research
At the completion of the present investigation, the
following ideas suggest themselves for further research:
1.Relationships between internal auditor and auditees.
A number of studies have been made on relationships
between internal auditors and their superiors and/or the
external CPA auditors. Further research should be made
into relationships between internal auditors and
auditees. This could encompass auditees from different
levels in the organisation and from different fields of
activity.
As has been pointed out in this study, the closer the
respondents are to the internal auditing operation, the
higher they evaluate its effectiveness. It would be
interesting to find out if further research yields the
same pattern, and if it can be generalised.
2.Evaluating the effectiveness of internal auditing in
other organisations
The same systematic approach used in this study could
serve as a model for evaluating the effectiveness of
internal auditing in other types of organisations.
3.Internal auditing as a career
In this study, internal auditors with greater seniority
in internal auditing gave higher evaluations for the
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independence component. Do they objectively have more
independence because, for example, the organisation
places more confidence in them, or is it a subjective
feeling whereby they simply convince themselves that
they are more independent? More research to check the
effect of seniority on internal auditing and
effectiveness at work could help decide if internal
auditing as a career is desirable or not.
4.The use of audit committees in local government.
The impression which the author gained from his many
meetings with different jobholders within and outside
the municipality, was that the role of the audit
committee was controversial. Further research could
enlighten this topic and, if necessary, suggest ways to
improve the situation. With no relation to the Israeli
scene, Sharp and Bull (1992) have suggested that the
chairperson and the majority of the committee members
should be people outside the city management who possess
competence and bring with them the objectivity, free of
any political agendas, needed for the committee. Such
ideas and others should be included and discussed in
such research.
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Appendix A:	 Statement of responsibilities of Internal
Auditing (1991)1
The purpose of this statement is to provide in summary
form a general understanding of the responsibilities of
internal auditing. For more specific guidance, readers
should refer to the Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing.
OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
Internal auditing is an independent appraisal function
established within an organization to examine and
evaluate its activities as a service to the
organization.
The objective of internal auditing is to assist
members of the organization in the effective discharge
of their responsibilities. To this end, internal
auditing furnishes them with analyses, appraisals,
recommendations, counsel, and information concerning the
activities reviewed.	 The audit objective includes
promoting effective control at reasonable cost.	 The
umbers of the organization assisted by internal
The Statement of Responsibilities of Internal Auditors
was originally issued by The Institute of Internal
Auditors in 1947. The current Statement, revised in
1990, embodies the concepts previously established and
includes such changes as are deemed advisable in light
of the present status of the profession.
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auditing including those in management and the board of
directors.
The scope of internal auditing should encompass the
examination and evaluation of the adequacy and
effectiveness of the organization's system of internal
control and the quality of performance in carrying out
assigned responsibilities. Internal auditors should:
• Review the reliability and integrity of financial
and operating information and the means used to
identify, measure, classify, and report such
information.
• Review the systems established to ensure
compliance with those policies, plans, procedures,
laws, and regulations which could have a
significant impact on operations and reports, and
should determine whether the organization is in
compliance.
• Review the means of safeguarding assets and, as
appropriate, verify the existence of such assets.
• Appraise the economy and efficiency with which
resources are employed.
• Review operations or programs to ascertain whether
results are consistent with established objectives
and goals and whether the operations or programs
are being carried out as planned.
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RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
The internal auditing department is an integral part
of the organization and functions under the policies
established by senior management and the board. The
purpose, authority and responsibility of the internal
auditing department should be defined in a formal
written document (charter).	 The director of internal
auditing should seek approval of the charter by senior
management as well as acceptance by the board. The
charter should make clear the purposes of the internal
auditing department, specify the unrestricted scope of
its work, and declare that auditors are to have no
authority or responsibility for the activities they
audit.
Throughout the world internal auditing is performed in
diverse environments and within organizations which vary
in purpose size and structure. In addition, the laws
and customs within various countries differ from one
another. These differences may affect the practice of
internal auditing in each environment. The
implementation of the Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing, therefore, will be
governed by the environment in which the internal
auditing	 department	 carries	 out	 its	 assigned
responsibilities. Compliance with the concepts
enunciated by the Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing is essential before the
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responsibilities of internal auditors can be met. As
stated in the Code of Ethics, members of the Institute
of Internal Auditors, Inc. and Certified Internal
Auditors shall adopt suitable means to comply with the
Stanaards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing.
INDEPENDENCE
Internal auditors should be independent of the
activities they audit. Internal auditors are independent
when they can carry out their work freely and
objectively. Independence permits internal auditors to
render the impartial and unbiased judgments essential to
the proper conduct of audits. It is achieved through
organizational status and objectivity.
The organizational status of the internal auditing
department should be sufficient to permit the
accomplishment of its audit responsibilities. The
director of the internal auditing department should be
responsible to an individual in the organization with
sufficient authority to promote independence and to
ensure a broad audit coverage, adequate consideration of
audit reports and appropriate action on audit
recommendations.
Objectivity is an independent mental attitude which
internal auditors should maintain in performing audits.
Internal Auditors are not to subordinate their judgment
on audit matters to that of others.	 Designing,
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installing, and operating systems, are not audit
functions. Also, the drafting of procedures for systems
is not an audit function. Performing such activities
is presumed to impair audit objectivity.
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Appendix B: Definitions and abbreviations,
clarification
1. The following definitions are used for this study:
Authority:	 a public administrative agency or
corporation having quasi-governmental
powers and authorised to administer a
revenue producing public enterprise.
(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1969)
Council:	 a local governing instrumentality - as
a	 town,	 borough,	 city,	 county.
(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1969, one of the
definitions appearing under this title.
- Z.H.)
Local Government: self government in local affairs by a
political subdivision as distinguished
from administration of the area by the
central government (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1969, - one of
the definitions appearing under this
title. - Z.H.)
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Municipality: a' a primary urban political unit - as a
town or a city - having corporate
status and usually power of self
government.
b) the governing body of such a unit.
(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1969)
Municipality internal auditor: The head of the internal
auditing	 department	 in	 the
municipality.
2. The following abbreviation is used in this study:
I.I.A.:	 The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc.
Altamonte Springs, Florida
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Appendix C: Summary of General and Specific Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing
100 INDEPENDENCE — INTERNAL AUDITORS SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT
OF THE ACTIVITIES THEY AUDIT.
110 Organizational Status — The organizational status
of the internal auditing department should be
sufficient to permit the accomplishment of its
audit responsibilities.
120 Objectivity — Internal auditors should be
objective in performing audits.
200 PROFESSIONAL PROFICIENCY — INTERNAL AUDITORS SHOULD BE
PERFORMED WITH PROFICIENCY AND DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE.
The Internal Auditing Department
210 Staffing — The internal auditing department
should provide assurance that the technical
proficiency and educational background of internal
auditors are appropriate for the audits to be
perfolmed.
220 Knowledge, Skills and Disciplines — The internal
auditing department should possess or should
obtain the knowledge, skills and disciplines
needed to carry out its audit responsibilities.
230 Supervision — The internal auditing department
should provide assurance that internal audits are
properly supervised.
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The internal auditor
240 Compliance with Standards of Conduct — Internal
auditors should comply with professional standards
of conduct.
250 Knowledge, Skills and Disciplines — The internal
auditors should possess the knowledge, skills and
disciplines essential to the performance of
internal audits.
260 Human Relations and Communication — Internal
auditors should be skilled in dealing with people
and in communicating effectively.
270 Continuing Education — Internal auditors should
maintain their technical competence through
continuing education.
280 Due Professional Care — Internal auditors should
exercise due professional care in performing
internal audits.
300 SCOPE OF WORK — THE SCOPE OF INTERNAL AUDITING SHOULD
ENCOMPASS THE EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION OF THE
ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION'S SYSTEM
OF INTERNAL CONTROL AND THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE IN
CARRYING OUT ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES.
310 Reliability and Integrity of Information
Internal auditors should review the reliability
and integrity of financial and operating
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information and the means used to identify,
measure, classify, and report such information.
320 Compliance with Policies, Plans, Procedures, Laws
and Regulations — Internal auditors should review
the systems established to ensure compliance with
those policies, plans, procedures, laws and
regulations which could have a significant impact
on operations and reports and should determine
whether the organization is in compliance.
330 Safeguarding of Assets — Internal auditors should
review the means of safeguarding assets and, as
appropriate, verify the existence of such assets.
340 Economical and Efficient Use of Resources
Internal auditors should appraise the economy and
efficiency with which resources are employed.
350 Accomplishment of Established Objectives and Goals
for Operations or Programs — Internal auditors
should review operations or programs to ascertain
whether results are consistent with established
objectives and goals and whether the operations or
programs are being carried out as planned.
400 PERFORMANCE OF AUDIT WORK — AUDIT WORK SHOULD INCLUDE
PLANNING THE AUDIT, EXAMINING AND EVALUATING
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATING RESULTS, AND FOLLOWING UP.
410 Planning the Audit — Internal auditors should plan
each audit.
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420 Examining and Evaluating Information — Internal
auditors should collect, analyze, interpret, and
document information to support audit results.
430 Communicating Results — Internal auditors should
report the results of their audit work.
440 Following up — Internal auditors should follow up
to ascertain that appropriate action is taken on
reported audit findings.
500 MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNAL AUDITING DEPARTMENT — THE
DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL AUDITING SHOULD PROPERLY MANAGE
THE INTERNAL AUDITING DEPARTMENT.
510 Purpose, Authority and Responsibility — The
director of internal auditing should have a
statement	 of	 purpose,	 authority,	 and
responsibility	 for	 the	 internal	 auditing
department.
520 Planning — The director of internal auditing
should establish plans to carry out the
responsibilities of the internal auditing
department.
530 Policies and Procedures — The director of internal
auditing should provide written policies and
procedures to guide the audit staff.
540 Personnel Management and Development — The
director of internal auditing should establish a
332
program for selecting and developing the human
resources of the internal auditing department.
550 External Auditors — The director of internal
auditing should coordinate internal and external
audit efforts.
560 Quality Assurance — The director of internal
auditing should establish and maintain a quality
assurance program to evaluate the operations of
the internal auditing department.
Appendix D: Suggested components and criteria for the
evaluation of the effectiveness of the
internal auditing unit in municipalities
1. Independence:	 a)Organisational status
b)Objectivity
2. Competence: a)Appropriate	 educational
background (individual)
b)Knowledge, skills, disciplines
(department)
C) Properly supervised internal
audits
d)Mastering	 techniques	 and
procedures of internal audit
e)Skilled in written and oral
communication
f)High	 honesty,	 objectivity,
diligence and loyalty
g)Recommend	 improvement	 to
correct defects
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3. Scope of work:
	
	
a)Reliability and integrity of
information
b)Compliance	 with	 policies,
plans, procedures, laws and
regulations
c)Safeguarding of assets
d)Economical and efficient use
of resources
e)Accomplishment of established
	
objectives	 and	 goals	 for
operations or programs
	
* f)Maintaining	 an	 honest,
objective and fair ongoing
process in the decision making
was added after the first phase of the meetings
4. Performance: a)Planning the audit
b)Examining and evaluating
information
c)Communicating results
d)Following up (ascertain that
proper action is taken on
report audit findings)
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5. Management of the 	 a)Statement	 of	 purpose,
internal auditing	 authority and responsibility
department:	 b)Audit work planning
C) Policies and procedures
d)Personnel	 management	 and
development
e)Co-ordinating internal and
external audit efforts
f)Quality assurance
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Appendix E: Data on Municipalities in Israel
General informationl 
In 1995, the total population of Israel was 5,619,000: 74%
of the population in municipalities, 16% in local councils
and 10% in regional councils.
The municipalities have a population ranging from 20,000
to more than 500,000.
Specifications on some of the big municipalities
Municipalities Population2	Full time positions3
Jerusalem	 591,000	 6,079
Tel-Aviv	 356,000	 9,050
Haifa	 252,000	 4,526
Holon	 164,000	 1,929
Petach Tikva	 153,000	 2,118
Netanya	 148,000	 1,894
Ramat Gan	 122,000	 1,485
Herzelia	 84,000	 1,098
Kfar Saba	 69,000	 957
Raanana	 59,000	 624
1 From Statistical Abstract of Israel (1996:68) (The data
refer to 1995	 Z.H.)
2 Ibid. (1996:70-72)
3 From Local Authorities in Israel 1994 (1996:149-150)
(The part time positions were aggregated in the original
table - Z.H.)
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Number of internal auditors'
The number of internal auditors in municipalities varies
from the three big cities where there are about ten in
each, to other cities where there are less and often
between one and two.
Total income, expenditures and deficit of local 
authorities by municipal status2
Income Expenditure Deficit
Municipalities 10,443,000,000 11,249,000,000 -806,000,000
Local councils 2,693,000,000 3,014,000,000 -321,000,000
Regional councils 1,869,000,000 1,979,000,000 -83,000,000
Joint authorities3
In 1992, there were 19 joint authorities for fire fighting
services, 7 such federations for sewage and sanitary
services, 3 such federations for veterinarian services, 6
for the environment services and one for water supply.
Information from people working in internal auditing
in local authorities.
2 From Statistical Abstract of Israel (1996:456-457)
(The data refer to 1993. All amounts are in I.S. (Israeli
shekels). The average representative exchange rate in 1993
in US dollars was $1 = 2.89 I.S.)
3 From Statistical Abstract of Israel (1995:575)
(There was no updated data regarding this item in the
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1996 - Z.H.)
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Appendix F: The cover letter in Engli
Professor Georges M Selim BCom MCom PhD FBA
Director
April 9, 1996
CITY
University
BUSINESS SCHOOL
Dear Sir/Madam
Frobisher Crescent
Barbican Centre
London EC21" 8HB
Switchboard: 0171-477 8000
Direct Line: 01-1-477 	
Fax:	 0171-4778880
I am writing to ask for your cooperation in a research survey being
conducted by Mr. Zvi Haimon -- one of our Ph.D. students.
The City University Business School is one of the largest in the U. K.
It is located in the City of London, with close contacts to the City's
many institutions. A recent survey placed the City University Business
School among the ten best in the U. K.
Dr. Rozevitch of Bar Ilan University in Israel and myself are supervising
the study.
In his research, Mr. Haimon suggests a model to evaluate the
effectiveness of municipality internal auditing in Israel. The model,
inspired by the Standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors, is based
on five criteria: a) Independence b) Competence c) Scope of Work d)
Performance e) Management of the Internal Auditing Department.
The respondents invited to take part in the research belong to different
groups of "users" of the municipality internal auditing product, with a
direct or indirect relationship to its services.
In the questionnaire, there might be questions that are not applicable to
you in your capacity or to which you do not know the answer. In that
case, please tick the appropriate box in the last column.
You will find enclosed herewith:
The questionnaire to be completed.
A collect paid envelope in which to return the questionnaire.
A prompt response would be extremely helpful. You may add your name and
address on the material you send back, but you do not have to. If you
do, this will make it easier to send you the results of the research when
they will be available.
The data, information and any comments collected or transmitted are
strictly used for research purposes only. Individual responses will be
kept in strict confidence. Only group data will be reported.
For any further questions regarding this questionnaire, please contact
Mr. Zvi Haimon:
P.O. Box 53004, Tel Aviv 61530, Fax 03-6430269 or Phone 03-6417794.
The survey has been pilot tested and should take approximately 15-20
minutes to complete.
Your response to this test would be extremely valuable and would
contribute to the success of this important research. I would like to
take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your participation and
effort.
Yours Sincerely,
Prof. Georges Selim
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Appendix G: The cover
AR-1LAN UNIVERSITY
Department fo Economics and
Business Administration
gOORamat-Gan, Israel
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Appendix H: The questionnaire in English
A Questionnaire on Internal Auditing in Municipalities
in Israel
Section I:	 The following demographic questions have been included to
process the data according to the different appropriate groups.
Please answer by filling in the blank or ticking El as appropriate. 
1. Please indicate your occupation 	
and title
If you are a municipality council member: please tick "the box 0.
Tick whether in the municipality council you are from the: 0 coalition or0 opposition,
Then proceed to question No. 3.
2. Assuming — for the purpose of the study — that the management of your section is
divided into three levels, where would you place yourself
Othe top level
Othe middle level
Othe low level
If you are not connected to a specific municipality: please continue to
section II, p. 3.
3. What is the population of your municipality:
Oless than 40,000
040,001 to 70,000
070,001 to 100,000
0100,001 to 140,000
0140,001 or more
If you are not the municipality internal auditor: please proceed to
Section II, p. 3.
4. How large is your professional internal auditing staff?
5. Has your internal auditing staff been increased during the last three years?
O No
O Yes - If yes, by how many?
6. Is the internal auditing staff involved with participation in professional
organisations?
O No
0Yes - If yes, how many staff members?
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7. Is the internal auditing staff encouraged to participate in continuing education
programs?
EINo
ElYes - If yes, during the last two years, how many participated in
such a program?
8. What is the total budget of the municipality?
	
9. What is the total budget of the municipality internal auditing?
	
10. Do you have a budget to hire external professional experts to assist you, if
necessary?
OINo
O Yes - If yes, how many times did you use this help in the last 24
months?
11. Who, in fact, decides what items will be included in your annual internal auditing
work plan? You may select more than one.
O The mayor
EIThe audit committee
['Yourself
O 0ther (please specify) 	
12. Please indicate the type of audits your department performs. You may select
more than one.
['Financial audits
0Compliance audits
O 0perational or performance audits
0 Special management requests
['Other (please specify) 	
13. How many years do you work as the municipality internal auditor in your
municipality? 	
14. How many years have you been working in internal auditing in general?
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O 0
6 5
O 0
6 5
O0
6 5
O0
6 5
0 0
6 5
O0
6 5
Section II: Activities related to the effectiveness of internal auditing
in the municipality
A list of activities that relate to the effectiveness of municipality internal auditing are
listed below. You are asked to evaluate the following items on a scale from 1 to 6, the
value of 1 being "complete disagreement" and 6 being "complete agreement". To
evaluate the municipality internal auditing activity, you need to tick the appropriate
boxes.
For the purpose of the research, you may find some questions which seem quite similar.
Please evaluate each item. Use the not known / not available boxes only for those items
that you have no information about.
Part 1.	 The following items are related to the independence of
internal auditing in the municipality
Not known / not available
Completely disagree 	
Strongly disagree 	
Disagree 
	
Agree 	
Strongly agree 	
Completely agree --I
1. The organizational status
internal auditor is adequate
his/her job.
2. The internal auditing staff carry out their work
freely and objectively.
3. The internal auditing staff has access to all
information, employees or elected members in the
municipality, considered pertinent in the conduct of
an audit.
4. All areas within the municipality are allowed
internal auditing access.
5. The internal auditing staff assumes operating
responsibilities to design or operate systems.
6. The internal auditing staff operation does not
encounter any situation where conflict of interest is
present.
,
7. The mayor decides what subjects will or will not
appear in the work plan of the internal auditing
unit.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
of the municipality 	 0 0
for the fulfillment of	 6 5
1
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 2 1 N/A
344 $
Part 2:	 The following items are related to the competence of
internal	 auditing in the municipality
Not known / not available
1. Completely disagree 
	
2. Strongly disagree
3. Disagree 	
4. Agree 	
5. Strongly agree 	
6. Completely agree
8.	 The internal auditing staff is articulate. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
9.	 The	 internal	 auditing
	 unit	 possesses	 the 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
knowledge, skills and disciplines needed to carry
out its audit responsibilities.
6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
10. The	 internal	 auditors	 maintain	 satisfactory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
relationships with auditees. 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
11. The internal auditors convey effectively, in oral
and	 written	 communication,	 audit	 objectives,
evaluations, conclusions and recommendations.
12. The internal auditors maintain high standards of
0
6
0
0
5
0
0
4
0
0
3
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
N/A
0
honesty and objectivity. 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
13. The	 municipality	 internal	 auditing	 unit
recommends improvements to correct deficiencies
or irregularities.
0
6
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1
0
N/A
Part 3:	 The following items are related to the scope of work of
internal auditing in the municipality
Not known / not available 	
1. Completely disagree 	
2. Strongly disagree 	
3. Disagree 	
4. Agree 	
5. Strongly agree 	
---1
6. Completely agree
14. The scope of internal 	 auditing includes the	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
evaluation of the adequacy of the municipality's 	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
system of internal control.
15. Internal auditors examine the reliability and	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
integrity of information.	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
16. Internal auditors check whether the systems	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
operating in the municipality ensure compliance	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
with	 policies,	 plans,	 procedures,	 laws	 and
regulations.
17. The internal auditing staff review the systems
	
0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
used for safeguarding of municipality's assets. 	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
18. Internal auditing staff appraise the economy and
	
0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
efficiency with which resources are employed.
	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
19. Internal auditing staff review operations or 	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
programs	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 results	 are	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
consistent with established objectives and goals.
20. The internal auditing unit ascertains that an	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
honest, objective and fair ongoing process is	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
maintained	 in	 the	 decision	 making	 in	 the
municipality and that no irregularities or personal
benefits are involved.
21. The internal auditing unit applies the same rules 	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
for all levels of the municipality. 	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
22. The municipality internal auditing unit does not 	 0 0 0 0 0 0	 0
encompass the mayor's own operations. 	 6	 5 4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
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Part 4:	 The following items are related to the performance of
internal auditing in the municipality
2.
3. Disagree 	
4. Agree 	
5. Strongly agree 	
6. Completely agree
23. The municipality internal auditing reports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
are issued in a clear, concise and timely
manner.
6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
24. The municipality internal auditing reports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
identify such elements as audit objectives, 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
scope,
	
background,	 results	 and
recommendations.
25. Most reports presented by the municipality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
internal	 auditor tackle subjects of major 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
importance to the municipality.
26. The	 internal	 auditing	 unit	 develops 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
appropriate audit plans for established audit 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
objectives.
27. The	 internal	 auditing	 unit	 maintains	 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
follow-up and reports whether corrective 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
actions were taken following deficiencies
and recommendations indicated by the unit.
28. The	 speed	 of corrective	 action	 on the 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
findings of the municipality internal auditing 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
is satisfactory.
29. There are no unnecessary delays in taking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
appropriate corrective action on reported 6 5 4 3 2 1 N/A
audit findings.
346
	
o
Not known / not available
1.	 Completely disagree 	
Strongly disagree 	
Name (optional) 	
Address (optional) 	
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Please fold the questionnaire package in the stamped envelope and send it in.
347
Part 5:
	 The following items are related to the management of
internal auditing in the municipality
Not known / not available 	
1. Completely disagree 	
2. Strongly disagree
	
3. Disagree 	
4. Agree 	
5. Strongly agree 	
6. Completely agree
-1
30. The	 internal	 auditing	 department
coordinates activities with the municipality
external auditors.
0
6
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1
31.	 The internal auditing department has an 0 0 0 0 0 0
external	 review	 program	 to	 objectively
determine the quality of its operation.
6 5 4 3 2 1
32. The internal auditing staff is involved with 0 0 0 0 0 0
participation in professional organizations. 6 5 4 3 2 1
33. The internal auditing staff is encouraged to 0 0 0 0 0 0
34.
participate	 in	 continuing	 education
programs,
The	 municipality	 internal	 auditing
6
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1
0
department maintains a written policy and
procedures manual.
6 5 4 3 2 1
35. Performance appraisals ensure that audit 0 0 0 0 0 0
personnel promotions and dismissals are
consistent with the results of evaluators.
6 5 4 3 2 1
n
N/A
0
N/A
0
N/A
0
N/A
0
N/A
0
N/A
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Appendix J: Letter and
municipality inter
AR-ILAN UNIVERSITY
Department fo Economics and
Business Administration
t of job titles sent to
auditors from Dr. Rozevitch
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«Ci ty» ni-rp
((Address))
((Postal Code)) ((City))
,111:1171ll «LastName» «Tit1e»7
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,utnium n-nay muuna ,D1sp1]7 nnip -1113'11 '13 113 "1) 111)) ipnnn .(rrryn
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:ntiuunnynriarrnisnnyr-rvair-rpgnn'71/1nTwi 
Job holders in the municipality that are part of the
respondent groups
-nwin	 UN) 131 91313 nmpia '-rau) 0	 rr-rivn n n pan 0
1Rann
Other auditing staff (if there 	 municipality internal
is) in the municipality 	 auditor
internal auditing unit
	
rrimn	 -run WN1
	
l'lln TIMM
	 Mayor
General director (if non
existent, the municipality
secretary)
mvan min nmn
num	 - ir11131 n'T1191KM
Member of the audit committee
from the opposition in the
municipality - preferably the
chairman.
nu-nrin'2nrnWN1
Head of engineering
nu-onn 7nrn ninun 0
Chief officer of Engineering
nu-nnn '2n3'Tn awnimpn 0
Officer in charge of the budget
in Engineering
nrwtnn nunwnn 1112ro1] 0
Head bookkeeper
mirinn n-rvi nnan 0
FIIT7ti1R1113
Member of the audit
committee from the coalition
in the municipality
-prinn '2nrn win 0
Head of Education
-pun 7nrn nimn
Chief officer of Education
'7n3'n awrria'spn
Officer in charge of the
budget in Education
nnin T1'113.T1 0
Chief officer of finance
'7131.7 rraim, 2iwn -r2	 n-rIn fl1Wi rano 1WN ni guu mum] Inw nigiisn
.117Nur2 urown n71p7 nr-ri31 1T9D1] ul-r-pgn
Two optional questionnaire packages are added if it seems
important to you to have additional job holders filling in
the questionnaire.
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Appendix K: List of Municipalities that were
part of the research
1.Affula
2.Ashdod
3.Ashkelon
4.Bat Yam
5.Beer Sheva
6.Belt Shemesh
7.Bne Brak
8.Carmiel
9.Dimona
10.Eilat
11.Givatayim
12.Hadera
13.Haifa
14.Herzelia
15.Hod Hasharon
16.Jerusalem
17.Kfar Saba
18.Kiryat Bialik
19.Kiryat Gat
20.Kiryat Yam
21.Lod
22.Migdal Haemek
23.Nazareth
24.Nazareth Ilit
25.Nes Ziona
26.Netanya
27.Petach Tikva
28.Raanana
29.Ramat Gan
30.Ramleh
31.Rehovot
32.Rishon Lelion
33.Rosh Haayin
34.Shfarham
35.Tel Aviv
36.Tiberias
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